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Medication Safety has become a major health issue in Australia and internationally. 
Medication use is a part of most people lives with around seven in ten Australians and 
nine in ten older Australians having taken at least one medication over a two week 
period. But the taking of medications is not devoid of risk to the patient and a 
subsequent cost to society. This risk of an adverse outcome can be due to a predictable 
or idiosyncratic direct effect of the medication (adverse drug reaction) or a breakdown 
in the systems involved in the management of medications (medication incident). 
Although the risk of an adverse outcome is low and most medication incidents do not 
cause any harm, the volume of medications in use dictates that the problem when 
quantified is still significant. Following the publication of major patient safety studies 
it has become possible to estimate that almost 2 to 3 per cent of all hospital admissions 
are related to problems with medicines with an annual cost of $380 million. 
In 2002, following the publication of the Second National Report on Patient Safety 
―Improving Medication Safety‖ it became apparent that despite medication safety 
issues growing in awareness in public hospitals, the same could not be said for 
private hospital practice which catered for about one third of all admitted patient 
episodes in Australia. Later that year a first step was taken with the Private Health 
Industry Quality and Safety workshop with representatives from most private 
hospitals attending. This meeting highlighted that medication safety practices at St 
John of God Hospital Subiaco was not aligned very well with public sector hospitals 
and that a number of deficiencies existed requiring urgent attention. 
AIMS:  
This study had a broad range of aims. These were as follows:  
1. To chronicle the development of medication safety procedures at St John of God 
Hospital Subiaco, nationally and internationally. 
2. To quantify and uniformly classify, medication incidents reported from different 
sources in a private hospital 
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3. To develop and assess a range of contributing factors as to why the medication 
incidents occurred 
4. To quantify the clinical significance of reported medication incidents 
5. To develop strategies to minimise/reduce the incidence of medication incidents in 
the future 
6. To investigate the influence of pharmacy ownership, location and employment of 
clinical pharmacists on medication incident reporting practices in Australian 
private hospitals.  
METHOD: 
The study was conducted in different phases. Initially the focus was a retrospective 
review of reported medication incidents in the hospital based on the date of 
occurrence of the medication incident rather than the date of review by a pharmacist. 
Secondly all incidents were then classified using a standardised format using the 
origin of the error. These included prescribing errors by medical practitioners, 
dispensing error by pharmacists and administration errors by nursing staff. Standard 
sub-categories were devised by St John of God Health Care, the national body 
coordinating the practices of all St John of God Hospitals, but in some instances they 
were noted to be too general. This led as part of this study to the development of 
more specific and sensitive categories for dispensing errors.  
Due to the realisation that medication error was now seen as a systems failure it was 
appropriate then to assess the risk to the patient and/or the organisation for a 
particular incident as well as determine some measure of harm to the patient. The 
level of risk associated with a medication incident was ranked according to the 
consequence of the incident and the likelihood of it recurring. Allied to this, a 
determinant of harm suffered by a patient following an incident or error was devised 
and promoted which differentiated harm into potential and actual harm. 
To further gauge private hospital medication safety practices, a national survey was 
undertaken of Australian private hospitals to gain an insight into the methodology 
used to collect and collate medication incidents and the roles played by pharmacy 
services in that process. In particular the survey sought to determine the influence of 
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the ownership and location of the pharmacy service on those practices along with the 
employment or not of clinical pharmacists. 
RESULTS:  
The classification of medication incidents by the date of occurrence aided in the 
assessment of why an incident occurred as it now became possible to study whether 
the ward location and day or time of an incident contributed in any way to causing 
that error. The classification of medication incidents by their origin in the medication 
cycle, highlighted that most incidents were reported by nursing staff and were 
therefore heavily weighted towards administration errors, which embodied their core 
medication function. 
The development of knowledge and understanding surrounding the causes and 
contributing factors associated, in particular with administration and dispensing 
medication errors, has helped to retrain caregivers to seek ways to avoid the incident in 
the future rather than focusing on any individual blame for what is a system failure. 
The clinical significance of a particular incident both to the patient and to an 
organisation can be more adequately assessed if a risk stratification and harm model 
is in place. This is apparent when dispensing errors were assessed as clinically 
significant to the pharmacy department but from a hospital perspective were noted 
only to have a potential for harm. In contrast, while the majority of administration 
errors had the potential for harm, some did cause actual harm. 
With the awakening of the need to improve our medication practices, the Pharmacy 
Department and the Hospital have committed to embracing more fully those 
practices more commonplace in public hospitals. These included having an active 
Drug and Therapeutics Committee and the implementation of clear medication 
polices and guidelines. Other initiatives have been embraced such as the use of 
standardised medication charts and ensuring a strong focus on medication 
reconciliation at the transitions of care. This included the employment of more 
clinical pharmacists to service areas such as preadmission and high risk areas such as 
Intensive Care and Oncology.  
The survey, with a response rate of 43%, highlighted that pharmacy services in 
private hospitals in Australia were either located On Site (52.8%) or Off Site (47.2%) 
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and were either Hospital Owned (22.2%) or Contracted Out (77.8%).  On Site 
pharmacy respondents were significantly more likely to be involved in the review of 
medication incidents (p = 0.047), have a policy on medication safety (p = 0.024), 
employ more clinical pharmacists (p = 0.006) and have a higher mean number of 
medication incidents reported (p = 0.001) as compared to Off Site pharmacies.  
Pharmacy providers who employed clinical pharmacists were more likely to be 
involved in the review of medication incidents (p = 0.02).  Hospital Owned services 
were more likely to report a higher number of medication incidents (p = 0.011) and 
be On Site whilst Contracted Out services were more likely to be Off Site (p = 
0.026). 
Medication safety has grown to become an international phenomenon. Two of the 
World Health Organisations top five priority areas to improve patient safety 
worldwide involve medication usage. In Australia, the formation of an active 
Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, has provided 
leadership to all hospitals both private and public whilst at state level Medication 
Safety Groups drive more local state based issues. The willingness of some private 
hospitals to embrace fully the concept of medication safety is very evident at St John 
of God Health Care where a national medication reference group was set up to lead 
all their hospitals along a common path and this has been complemented recently by 
the formation of a medication safety committee at the Subiaco campus. 
CONCLUSION:  
The safe use of medicines is still a major issue. Medication errors are now recognised 
to be a system failure. Great progress has been made to improve the system of how 
we manage medications in our hospitals, but the system must continue to evolve. 
Gaps still exist that need addressing to make our hospitals safer. The various private 
hospital models that exist lend themselves to differing levels of service and 
participation in medication safety. It is vital that the Australian Council for Health 
Care Standards, the private health insurers and the Commonwealth Health 
Department develop a higher expectation from all private hospitals to ensure systems 
are in place so that patients are safe regardless of the health care environment they 
enter. 
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CHAPTER 1 WHY DO THE PROJECT? 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Australian healthcare is a comprehensive and highly technical service with well 
trained and motivated staff of all disciplines. But problems do occur in this industry 
as in any, usually as a result of system failures that lead to mishaps by doctors and 
nurses.1,2 Lessons can be learnt from other industries such as aviation to reduce and 
manage any risk and improve safety by concentrating on system improvement and 
redesign.3 Bruce Barraclough in his Preface to the Second National Report on Patient 
Safety said that safety in healthcare is highly valued by patients and their families, 
and is a complex function of safe systems of care and safety conscious personnel, to 
provide the best value for our health dollar.4  He also stated that ―adverse events were 
more likely the result of error prone situations rather than error prone people‖. 4  
In particular, medication safety has become a major focus for the Commonwealth 
Department of Health and Ageing in Australia under the auspices initially of the 
Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Healthcare (ACSQH) formed in January 
2000.3 The ACSQH defined in the Glossary of their reports that an incident as 
an ―event or circumstance, which could have, or did lead to unintended and/or 
unnecessary harm to a person, and/or a complaint, loss or damage‖.4,5 
Michael Cohen, president of the Institute for Safe Medication Practice, defines a 
Medication Error as ―any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate 
medication use or patient harm, while the medication is in the control of the 
healthcare professional, patient or consumer‖.5 Near misses or potential adverse 
events are events that by chance are intercepted before they reach the patient and 
they do not cause harm.5-7 
Since human error is inevitable, systems need to be designed to tolerate the 
occurrence of errors but minimise their potential to cause harm.7 Hence medication 
errors can usually be attributed to faults in the medication systems rather than the 
individual.7 Medication errors are considered common in the healthcare system.5-7 
They can occur at any time during the continuum of care in a hospital setting from 
admission to discharge of a patient, involving prescribing, dispensing and medication 
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administration.5-6,8 Medication errors are considered the leading cause of adverse 
events in Australia and overseas.9,10 Although the majority do not cause any harm, 
i.e. near misses, 1-2 % of medication errors do cause adverse drug events.7 Ten to 
twenty per cent of adverse events in hospitals are drug related with 50% or more 
being considered preventable.11,12 Other studies have quoted figures as high as 30-
45%.13,14 In Australia, medication errors are estimated to be responsible for 80,000 
hospital admissions and a cost of $350 million per annum.15 Queensland Health 
believes drug related problems are the underlying cause in 4-5% of unplanned 
hospital admissions and 15-50% of geriatric admissions.16 
The potential for error has increased as the number of medications, especially generic 
brands, has exploded over the past few years, together with the reducing length of 
stay of patients in hospital, and the rising acuity and expected higher occupancy of 
beds. So as patients are turned over faster, pressures mount on staff to provide the 
quality of care required. 
The ACSQH was formed to ―lead national efforts to improve the safety and quality 
of health care, with a particular focus of reducing the likelihood and effects of 
errors‖.3 To date the ACSQH has provided two national patient safety reports to 
Health Ministers focused on minimising medication incidents. The first report Safety 
First was presented in July 2000.6 The Second National Report on Patient Safety- 
Improving Medication Safety was presented in July 2002.4 This report has 
highlighted many issues including; the beneficial role of clinical pharmacists in 
medication error reduction, individual patient medication supply in hospitals, use of 
computerised prescribing with clinical decision support systems by doctors, and 
transfer of information between hospitals and community settings. Other issues 
identified were the need for a multidisciplinary approach and ownership by all 
stakeholders, and the need to identify the causes and contributing factors leading to 
medication incidents.4 
The promotion and urging for a greater uptake of the role that clinical pharmacists 
could play as medication managers was timely, as pharmacists had to this point been 
attempting to justify their existence and quantify their roles in the medication cycle.  
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With the focus squarely on public health settings to date and medication safety 
initiatives embraced in particular hospital sites only, the private hospital setting was 
floundering on its own trying to adopt public sector models or creating its own. A 
coordinated approach begun with the first ‗Safety and Quality of Medicines- Issues 
for the Private Sector Workshop‖, held 17-18 October 2002 in Sydney under the 
auspices of the Private Health Industry Quality and Safety Committee (PHIQS).17 
This workshop put private health on the agenda and under the spotlight. At the 
workshop it was identified that the success of the government‘s initiatives required 
private health to become fully involved. Discussions took place on how this would 
occur from the relevance and implementation of the Australian Pharmaceutical 
Advisory Committee principles of the Continuum of Care Guidelines18 through the 
role of advisory committees. This workshop crystallised the need for published work 
on medication incidents in the private health arena and to provide information on the 
type, frequency and causes of medication errors in that setting. 
There have been many audits on the number and types of medication incidents in the 
public sector setting but at that time none had focused on the causes. This is the first 
study in a private hospital setting to attempt to quantify and classify, as well as look 
at the causes and contributing factors of medication incidents. It is hoped this 
information will assist in developing a model that may be used with all forms of 
reported medication errors and provide a mechanism to link them altogether. 
This research project into medication incidents in private hospitals was inspired by 
two major events. The first was local and followed the submission of a report by the 
Deputy Chief Pharmacist on the work carried out whilst reviewing medication 
incidents for the hospital to the Drug and Therapeutic Committee (DTC) meeting at 
St John of God Hospital Subiaco (SJOGHS) in December 2002. This report was 
considered a landmark report for the hospital as it was the first time a review of all 
medication incidents by error type had been conducted. The review initially covered 
a 6 month period but was later extended to cover the 12 months July 2001 to June 
2002. Prior to this, reports were made on an ad hoc or as needed basis to cover the 
period between DTC meetings and no comparative data was available. 
Underpinning this was the strong belief that a review by a senior clinical pharmacist 
was an essential part of the process as the unique skills of the clinical pharmacist in 
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medication management were ideally suited to this purpose. The position would 
require adequate resourcing if it was to continue and with that in mind all medication 
incidents reviewed during the 2001 to 2002 period had a time allocated to it to reflect 
both the direct and indirect time involved in reviewing them. The Hospital Executive 
were presented with this data and were asked for direction as to how this would best 
be progressed as the time involved could not be easily sustained within the current 
staff full time equivalents (FTE) of the pharmacy department. 
The second event was the primary investigators attendance at the PHIQS Workshop 
in Sydney in October 200217 and the discussion surrounding the availability of the 
Second National Report on Patient Safety - Improving Medication Safety. 
Attendance and discussion at this event, which catered for the majority of private 
health providers in Australia, prompted the realisation that there was a need for a 
major shift in thinking. As a result the following initiatives were embarked upon: 
1. Review how incidents were classified to more appropriately reflect the practice 
environment and to strive for a more uniform approach to allow comparison with 
public sector health providers. 
2. Change the data set included from date of review to the date the incident 
occurred. 
3. Differentiate incidents as either ―Prescribing‖, ―Dispensing‖ or ―Administration‖ 
errors which would more broadly reflect the type of processes involved in a 
hospital setting for that error.  
4. Highlight the usefulness of annual comparisons to allow benchmarks to be 
attained and comparisons made with other institutions of a similar size or within 
our own organization. This would also allow the monitoring of any improvement 
strategies that were put in place or to target a specific area for improvement.  
5. Broaden the type of review to include why the incident happened. Identification 
of the ‗why‘ was seen as integral to the development of strategies necessary for 
the prevention or reduction of the incidence of a particular type of medication 
incident. 
6. Development of a medication incident data set that was specific to private 
hospital practice as none was seen to exist at that point. 
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7. Extend the understanding of the ‗why‘ an incident occurred to facilitate the 
assessment of the level of harm or risk associated with that incident to the patient 
or the organisation. 
1.1.2 THE RISE OF MEDICATION SAFETY AT ST JOHN OF GOD HOSPITAL SUBIACO 
(SJOGHS) 1997-2006  
In 1997 SJOGHS created the position of Coordinator of Clinical Pharmacy Services 
(CCPS) to develop a hospital wide clinical pharmacy service, and to support a 
medication safety focus. This required the involvement in all committees and 
structures that were involved in medication safety issues at the hospital which would 
reduce the risk of harm to patients and the hospital, and focus on the quality use of 
medicine. Some of these aspects included education to nursing and pharmacy staff, 
provision of or advice on the purchase/provision of up to date medication 
information resources, preparation of standardized medication guidelines to 
caregivers on wards and clinical areas, development of medication related policies 
and procedures, development or updating of any therapy and medication charts and 
forms etc. In addition the CCPS became a member of the hospital‘s DTC. 
At this time, in the late 90‘s, any reported medication incidents were recorded on a 
hard copy ―Accident and Incident Report‖ form (HR 150) (Appendix 1) which was 
sent to the Chief Pharmacist for review and comment. Once signed the form was 
returned for storage in the patient‘s medical record. By 1997 the DTC was provided 
by the Chief Pharmacist with a quarterly de-identified summary of the medication 
incidents reported with similar errors grouped together. Unfortunately, many forms 
often had incomplete information. This often necessitated investigation of the 
medical record by the Chief Pharmacist to ascertain what had in fact occurred. If any 
action or trend was noted it became the CCPS (later the Deputy Chief Pharmacist) 
role to enact whatever action if any that had been recommended. Subsequent to this, 
in 1999 and on the CCPS‘s recommendation, a Medication Policy and Procedure 
Subcommittee was formed as a subcommittee of the DTC to assist in the review and 
development of medication policies and procedures, and to advise and implement 
any changes that were required to improve medication safety and reduce the 
hospital‘s risk due to the frequent recurrence of similar errors noted from the 
hospital‘s medication incident reports. 
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In conjunction with this role the Chief Pharmacist in January 1999 requested the 
DCP to assume responsibility for the review of all medication incidents sent to the 
Pharmacy Department and to continue to advise the DTC on the types of errors seen 
and identify any trends. 
1.1.3 TYPES OF ERRORS REPORTED 
The medication incidents reported were classified according to the twelve category 
descriptions used on the Accident and Incident Report form (HR150). 
Table 1.1 Medication incident categories on the Accident and Incident Form 
(HR150) 
Medication Incident Categories  Description of Medication Incident 
1 Extra dose given 
2 Incorrect fluid 
3 Incorrect IV rate 
4 Not given 
5 Not ordered 
6 Given but not signed for 
7 Wrong dose 
8 Wrong patient 
9 Wrong route 
10 Wrong time 
11 Previous drug reaction, but given 
12 Other 
 
It became apparent that this process of investigation and reporting of medication 
incidents was flawed. There was no control or follow up over what actions had or 
would occur as a result of the investigations and suggestions put forward by the 
DCP. This lack of outcomes for the time invested came under scrutiny as other duties 
were impacted on. In association with this the medical members of the DTC were 
concerned over their own and the hospital‘s liability surrounding the reviewing of 
medication incident trends where no perceived action or improved outcome 
(reduction in error type) was apparent. 




1.2.1 INTRODUCTION OF SUMMARY MEDICATION INCIDENT FORM AND DATABASE ENTRY 
To improve the reporting of the outcomes achieved following this review by the 
DCP, a change in process was initiated in July 1 2001. The DCP would begin to 
summarise the incident and suggest some recommendations to attempt to avoid the 
incident in the future, on a separate ―Summary Medication Incident‖ form (Appendix 
2), which would be attached to the Accident and Incident Form. The 
recommendations would be based on experience, knowledge of hospital/nursing 
/pharmacy policy and procedure, legal requirements and common sense. The 
Accident and Incident form including the Summary, would then be sent for data 
entry into a newly created Access® database. After this the completed form would be 
sent to the relevant Nursing Care Centre Director for review or further investigation 
if needed and any comments entered onto the data base. The completed form would 
then be stored in the patient‘s medical record. 
Every month the clinical projects nurse would print off a report (Appendix 3) for the 
newly formed Medication Policy and Procedure Sub-Committee to review the DCP‘s 
recommendations and any comments added to the database. This committee, whose 
terms of reference were extended, would comment on or endorse the pharmacy 
recommendations and initiate any strategy that was required. This Medication 
Incident Summary Report (Appendix 3) would then be tabled at Nursing Practice and 
Research Council for action by the Nurse Managers and a quarterly report compiled 
for the hospital‘s DTC. 
This was considered to be an improvement on the previous process and the DCP 
undertook this role with a view to it being reviewed for effectiveness after a 6-month 
trial. 
As more experience was gained with the new process the time taken to review, 
summarise and suggest recommendations had become an issue for pharmacy as the 
medication incident numbers had become more consistent and the complexity of the 
reports increased. Added to this, it was noted that the time spent investigating an 
incident may involve a number of blocks of time being devoted to a single incident 
due to its complex nature and the need to speak to relevant staff. However, the 
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Pharmacy Department was not allocated any additional resources to tackle this new 
―risk management‖ role. 
1.2.2 IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CHANGE IN REPORTING PROCESS FOR 
MEDICATION INCIDENTS 
The process change implemented in July 2001 was effective as the entry of the 
summary and recommendations from the DCP onto the database, allowed the easy 
generation of reports.  
The monthly summary reports allowed the easy review of the previous periods 
incidents by the various hospital committees and assisted the endorsement or action 
required from the recommendations. 
A number of new concerns were soon highlighted with this improved process: 
1. Workload may influence the speed of data entry by the data entry clerk so that an 
incident from a particular month often did not appear in the report until the 
following month, or later. 
2. Incident reports tended to arrive in pharmacy in bundles even though the incident 
dates were not the same. This created a backlog of work associated with 
investigating each incident and slowed down the process even further. 
3. Some medication incident forms were not coming to pharmacy at all for review 
/comment and were not being entered onto the database. 
4. Some incident forms were delayed as they were reviewed by members of the 
Hospital Executive first, contrary to the agreed procedure which stated they be 
sent directly for review by the DCP in the first instance. This delayed entry onto 
the data base and subsequent committee review. 
5. The time invested in reviewing medication incidents and the effectiveness of that 
investment in preventing further similar incidents needed to be reconsidered. 
Although all recommendations from the DCP were endorsed by the Policy and 
Procedure Sub-Committee, there was a lack of structure as to how these 
recommendations were to be managed or actioned to ensure effective outcomes. 
The highlighting of some issues at Nursing Practice and Research Council did 
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not seem to ensure practice change and the same incidents recurred time after 
time.  
6. The majority of medication incidents reflected that hospital policy was not being 
followed. The need for individual professional accountability for regular 
breaches of hospital policy needed to be balanced against the voluntary reporting 
of incidents and a ―No Blame‖ culture associated with reporting. Whilst 
penalising individuals involved in reporting incidents was not thought to be 
appropriate as it could reduce or prevent incidents being reported, it was evident 
that current strategies were still not preventing the recurrence of similar events. 
An interim report was prepared for the Executive Director of Clinical Services on 7th 
March 2002 which provided some interim results for discussion by Nursing 
Executive and Pharmacy Senior Management groups at its April meeting. Issues 
addressed were:  
1. The investment of time by the DCP and the lack of adequate resources for the 
Pharmacy Department to fulfil this role.  
2. The then Health Services (Quality Improvement) Act 199419 and the concerns 
regarding litigation or liability for reviewing committees in a hospital setting, in 
particular of medication incidents.  
3. The subsequent abandonment of any review or comment by DTC, Medication 
Policy and Procedure Subcommittee and Nursing Practice and Research Council 
as a direct result of the doubts concerning indemnity under the Health Services 
(Quality Improvement) Act 1994.  
4. The recurrence of the same types of incidents despite the development and more 
routine use of the self-directed learning package, ―Principles of Medication 
Administration in Nursing Practice‖ developed in May 2001. This joint initiative 
between nursing and pharmacy was part of a strategy to reduce the incidence of 
medication errors on the wards by requesting all staff to complete the package. 
5. Who was responsible to follow up trends in medication incidents and implement 
strategies for correction?  
6. The need to focus on ―Why this incident occurred‖ and ―What were the 
contributing factors‖? A Severity ranking was also required.  
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7. That the hospital needed to consider employing a Clinical Risk Manager to 
oversee this important medication safety issue in the future 
The meeting held on the 17th April 2002 led to the following conclusions: 
1. The time invested by pharmacy was very worthwhile but too big a commitment 
and not part of the DCP‘s Job Description. 
2. The responsibility for investigation was to be returned to the Nurse Managers 
primarily who would investigate ―who was primarily responsible‖ and ―why this 
incident occurred‖. 
3. The format of the Accident and Incident form was to be reviewed and a project 
nurse was to be employed to review it, 
4. Pharmacy was still to see all medication incident forms and sign the form once 
sighted. Summaries were to be discontinued and any relevant recommendations 
placed on the form itself. 
5. Outcome management was not addressed any further but was noted for future 
review. 
1.3 RESULTS 
1.3.1 REPORT TO DRUG AND THERAPEUTICS COMMITTEE ON MEDICATION INCIDENT 
DATA JULY 2001-JUNE 2002  
 
A report on all medication incidents reviewed by the DCP for the 12 months July 
2001 June 2002 was submitted to the hospital‘s DTC at their July 2002 meeting. This 
was an extension of the report provided to senior hospital staff in April 2002.  
During this period, 2001-2002, 901 Accident and Incident forms were submitted for 
review at St John of God Hospital Subiaco. This equated to 2.13% of all admissions 
to the hospital being involved in an incident. At this time, ‗all admissions‘ included 
all inpatient, day case, maternity and newborn patients. Of these, 20% (184/901) 
were Medication Incidents forms reviewed by pharmacy and collated into a report 
for the DTC to demonstrate the incidence and spread of medication incident reports. 
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This figure accounted for 0.43% of ‗all admissions‘ as defined above. This figure had 
steadily increased over the previous 5 years as shown in Figure 1.1: 
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% Patient Admissions 
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1.3.2 MEDICATION INCIDENTS BY WARD OR DEPARTMENT 
Medication incident forms were received from all wards and departments in the 
hospital. They cover a broad range of specialties as expected of a large private 
hospital (Table 1.2). 
 
Table 1.2 Ward names at St John of God Hospital Subiaco and a description of their 
specialty 
Ward names Description of specialty 
33 Delivery Suite 
34 Neonates 
41 Cardiology 
42 Intensive Care Unit 
43 Gynaecology surgery 
44 General surgery 
51 & 52 Orthopaedics 
53 & 54 Maternity 
61 Neurology 
62 & Ivy Oncology inpatients & Day cases 
7 Urology and Ophthalmology 
Paeds Paediatrics 
Theatre Peri-operative areas 
Short Stay Unit  
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of Total by 
ward 
% 
33 1 1 0 1 3 1.6 
34 1 0 0 2 3 1.6 
41 4 5 2 3 14 7.6 
42 1 1 1 1 4 2.2 
43 3 3 1 7 14 7.6 
44 14 5 1 7 27 14.7 
51 2 7 5 7 21 11.4 
52 1 5 5 3 14 7.6 
53 1 2 4 1 8 4.3 
54 1 4 4 1 10 5.4 
61 7 5 10 8 30 16.3 
62 2 2 4 9 17 9.2 
7 2 1 1 1 5 2.7 
Paediatrics 0 0 1 1 2 1.1 
Theatre 1 1 2 2 6 3.3 
Short Stay  0 2 0 0 2 1.1 
Ivy (Day Onc) 3 0 0 0 3 1.6 
Pharmacy 1 0 0 0 1 0.5 
Total 45 44 41 54 184 100% 
 
The number of reports reviewed was relatively even over the four quarters 2001-
2002. However, there were a slightly higher number of incidents reviewed in the last 
quarter as it was the end of the reporting period for that year (Table 1.3). 
The greatest number (16.3%) of forms came from the Neurology Ward 61 (Table 
1.2) which managed both medical (neurology) and surgical (neurosurgery) patients. 
This was followed by Ward 44 Gynaecological Surgery (14.7%) and Orthopaedics 
Ward 51 (11.4%). It is interesting to note that the Cardiology and Oncology wards, 
which are high throughput medical wards with patients expected to be on multiple 
medications had a lower number of reports with 14 (7.6%) and 17 (9.2%), 
respectively. A suspicion existed that the number of forms emanating from a specific 
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area was a factor of the enthusiasm of the relevant Nurse Manager for the process 
and willingness to ensure reports were completed rather than a reflection of the lack 
of incidents occurring. It is also noticeable that there was very little consistency 
across the quarters if we look at a particular ward‘s frequency of review by pharmacy 
(Figure 1.2). This initial review was seen as a timely intervention to provide the DTC 
with base level data on medication incident frequency and so an assessment could be 
made in the future on any possible under reporting.  
Figure 1.2 Number of incidents reviewed by pharmacy (DCP) per quarter by ward or 
area 

















































Figure 1.3 Number incidents reviewed per quarter 2001-2002 
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1.3.3 MEDICATION INCIDENT CATEGORIES  
Each medication incident report had the potential to be categorised according to error 
type to assist in further understanding the incidents (Table 1.1). When applied to a 
year‘s data the classification showed that the ―Other‖ category was the most 
common, making up 37% of the incident reports (Figure 1.4). This category was 
used for anything that could not be easily classified using the stated available 
categories on the form. The high number indicated the need to reassess the existing 
categories in use and to create some new ones that would capture the information 
better. Besides the ―Other‖ category the most frequent categories used were ―Not 
Given‖ (21%) and ―Extra Dose Given‖ (14%) (Table 1.4). This trend was also 
observed when the data was looked at on a quarterly basis, although ―Incorrect IV 
rate‖ was a substantial issue in the first and second quarter and declined thereafter, 
after some strategies were put in place to reduce this type of error cluster. 
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Table 1.4 Breakdown of the various medication error types reported 2001-2002 



















1. Extra dose given 5 7 3 10 25 14 
2. Incorrect fluid 2 0 1 0 3 2 
3. Incorrect IV rate 9 7 1 4 21 12 
4. Not given 9 10 8 13 40 21 
5. Not ordered 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6. Given not signed 0 0 1 3 4 2 
7. Wrong dose 5 1 3 6 15 8 
8. Wrong patient 0 1 1 0 2 1 
9. Wrong route 0 0 1 0 1 1 
10. Wrong time 1 0 1 2 4 2 
11. Previous drug 
reaction 
0 1 0 0 1 1 
12. Other 14 17 21 16 68 37 
Total Incidents 45 44 41 54 184 100 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Classification of medication incidents 2001-2002 
 1.     Extra dose given 
2.     Incorrect fluid 
3.     Incorrect IV rate 
4.     Not given 
5.     Not ordered 
6.     Given but not signed for 
7.     Wrong dose 
8.     Wrong patient 
9.     Wrong route 
10.   Wrong time 
11.    Prev drug reaction, but given 
12.   Other 
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1.3.4 BREAKDOWN OF THE “OTHER” CLASSIFICATION 
As the ―Other‖ category was the largest group at 37% of incidents (Table 1.4), it was 
felt appropriate and helpful to review what types of errors were required to be 
categorised in this manner (Table 1.5). It was hoped that this information would 
assist in providing feedback so that the number of classifications or categories could 
be increased to better reflect practice at our hospital.  
By far the biggest reason the ―Other‖ category was used was for Schedule 8 
(narcotic) discrepancies, accounting for 31% of reports. This was followed by 
―Incorrect drug given‖ which accounted for 19% of reports and ―Incorrect drug 
transcribed by doctor‖ with 7.3%.  
Table 1.5 Breakdown of the various “Other” medication error types reported: 





Schedule Eight Discrepancy 21 31 
Incorrect drug given 13 19 
Incorrect drug transcribed by Doctor 5 7.3 
Delay in order for patient 4 5.9 
Documentation breach by Nurse 4 5.9 
Epidural management issues 4 5.9 
Intravenous pump issues 4 5.9 
Extravasation 3 4.4 
Fall secondary to medication 3 4.4 
Pharmacy (Dispensing/Supply) 3 4.4 
Contraindicated drug charted 2 2.9 
Given not ordered 2 2.9 
Total 68 100 
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1.3.5 THERAPEUTIC CLASSES OF MEDICATIONS INVOLVED IN THE REPORTS 
The therapeutic classes of the medications involved in the incidents reviewed gave 
some indication of the seriousness of each error and assessment of the potential for 
harm (Table 1.7). It should be noted that there were 190 medications 
reported/reviewed from the 184 Medication Incidents submitted, which meant some 
incidents involved more than one medication. Schedule 8 medications or narcotics 
made up 21.6% (41/190) of the medications involved and when added to the 
Analgesics/NSAIDS group (6.8%) and the Epidural group (3.1%) brought the total of 
pain relieving medications to almost a third of all medications involved (31.6%). 
This typically reflects the predominantly surgical nature of a large private hospital 
such as SJOGHS and the expected high use of pain medications. Antibiotics were 
involved in 16.3% of cases (31/190) of occasions and this may reflect their likely use 
for surgical antibiotic prophylaxis and treatment of post-operative infections. 
Cardiovascular medications with (14.7%) were the third most commonly involved 
medications, possibly reflecting the demographic of some patients attending the 
hospital and the likelihood that some cardiovascular co-morbid condition would exist 
allied to having a large cardiology medical ward.  
An in-house single day snapshot survey, conducted in 2002, of the medication 
demographic or the number of medications charted for patients on SJOGHS wards, 
(Table 1.6) indicated that wards with a higher percentage of medical patients had a 
greater mean number of regular medications charted as compared to surgical patients 
(7 vs 3.5 to 4). Surgical patients were more likely to have a higher mean number of 
‗when required‘ medications charted than medical patients (4-5.5 vs 2.5) and were 
more likely to have an epidural or ―patient controlled analgesia‖ device in place. The 
mean age of patients in hospital that day varied quite considerably with oncology and 
cardiology patients (medical) ranging from 53.5 to 56 years, orthopaedic surgery 
patients were 60-65 years of age over both orthopaedic wards, while the general 
surgery ward had a patient mean age of 71 years.  
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41 56.0 7.0 0.35 2.81 6 1 0 32.2 31 
42 31.7 7.0 0.33 2.67 0 1 0 66.6 3 
43 63.7 4.4 0.09 4.13 20 1 4 86.4 22 
44 71.0 4.4 0.19 3.00 5 2 0 51.9 27 
51 65.0 4.3 0.11 5.44 0 1 0 100 18 
52 60.0 3.5 0 4.71 0 4 1 100 24 
61 60.9 4.62 0.17 4.96 8 1 0 45.8 24 
62 53.5 6.04 0.48 2.59 7 0 0 0 27 
7th 
floor 
68.8 4.16 0.11 3.11 1 0 1 52.6 19 
 
Table 1.7 Therapeutic classes of medications involved in the reported incidents 






Cytotoxics 5 2.6 
Epidural Fluids 6 3.1 
Antiepileptics 7 3.7 
Insulin 7 3.7 
Analgesics/NSAID 13 6.8 
IV Fluids 19 10 
Cardiovascular 28 14.7 
Antibiotics 31 16.3 
Various Others 31 16.3 
Narcotics 41 21.6 
Total medications 190 100 
Total incident reports 184  
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Figure 1.5 Classes of medications involved in incidents 2001-2002 
 
1.3.6 TIME TAKEN BY REVIEW PROCESS 
One of the major concerns of the Pharmacy Department was the amount of DCP time 
taken up by the review process of these incidents. It was deemed essential that a log 
be maintained of the time involved ―directly‖ in reviewing, investigating and 
reporting on each incident. Further, it was seen as essential that the ―indirect time‖ 
involved in preparing a report for various committees and developing policies and 
procedures to reduce the incidence of medication incidents also be recorded. Using 
this data for each incident it was found that the mean amount of time necessary to 
directly review and comment on an incident was approximately 40 minutes (Table 
1.8). The mean indirect time per incident was approximately 15 minutes which gave 
a mean total time of approximately 55 minutes per incident reviewed. The monthly 
mean average ranged from 36-133 minutes per month. Over the year the time 
invested equated to 10,330 minutes or 172 hours and 10 minutes. If we assume the 
Deputy Chief Pharmacist routinely works a 38 hour week over a 48 week period 
(given four weeks annual leave) then the commitment to this process of review is 
approximately 3.6 hours a week or almost 9.4% of the position‘s work time. It is 
worth noting that the troughs seen in January reflect the very low activity in the 
hospital over the Christmas and New Year break and consequent lower number of 
incidents reported. 
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July 20 700 35 180 880 44 
August 9 305 34 240 545 60 
September 16 550 34 450 1000 63 
October 8 595 74 465 1060 133 
November 20 740 37 180 920 46 
December 16 795 50 170 965 60 
January 9 260 29 60 320 36 
February 13 625 48 605 1230 95 
March 19 630 33 390 1020 54 
April 16 665 42 60 725 45 
May 16 660 41 180 840 53 
June 19 765 35 60 825 43 
Totals 184 7290 40 3040 10330 56 
 
Figure 1.6 Time in minutes to review incidents each month 
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Figure 1.7 Mean time to review each incident 


































































At SJOGHS since 1990, a generic accident and incident form has been used to record 
all incidents including patient falls, patient injuries, complaints, medication and 
miscellaneous incidents. It was intended to be a voluntary, ―no blame‖ system which 
was initiated by a nurse, doctor or pharmacist, investigated initially by the relevant 
nurse manager and if a medication was involved, sent to the Pharmacy Department 
for comment. 
The ACSQHC defined a medication error as a “failure in the (drug) treatment process 
that leads to, or has the potential to lead to, harm to the patient and includes an act of 
omission or commission.4,5 While the 1966 National Coordinating Council on 
Medication Error Reporting and Prevention definition of a medication error is quoted 
as any “preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or 
patient harm, while the medication is in the control of a health care professional, 
patient or consumer‖ by Michael Cohen, President of the  Institute for Safe 
Medication Practices (ISMP).4 
We know from the Quality in Australian Health Care Study9 that medication errors 
occur frequently in the hospital setting and can occur anywhere along the continuum 
from prescribing by the doctor, dispensing by the pharmacist and administration by 
the nurse. It has been reported that 10-20% of adverse events are drug related with 
50% of these deemed preventable.9 The 2001 data from incidents occurring within 
Australian hospitals that use the Australian Incident Monitoring System, maintained 
by the Australian Patient Safety Foundation, show that 11.6% of reports were for 
medication errors, e.g. omissions, wrong dose or wrong medication.4,5 
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1.4.1 ISSUES RAISED AS RESULT OF REPORT 
The Hospital Executive was presented with interim results from this data in March 
2002 and a final report in July 2002 which was also presented to the hospital‘s DTC. 
The report raised the following issues: 
1. The investment of time by pharmacy with no extra allocation of staff to meet the 
needs of the day as well as the future. 
2. The high probability of underreporting. 
3. The concerns regarding the liability under the Health Services (Quality 
Improvement) Act 199419 and the need for the hospital to overcome this to allow 
a wider multidisciplinary committee review of all adverse events including 
medications. 
4. Development of trend data and responsibility and ownership for corrective 
strategies to prevent recurrence. 
5. The need to improve the incident classifications used. 
6. The need to determine why the incidents occurred and what were the contributing 
factors. 
7. The need to determine what risk and/or harm existed, if any, for each reported 
incident. 
8. The need to consider the creation and appointment of a Clinical Risk Manager 
position for the hospital with the Pharmacy Department still involved with a 
more streamlined medication incidents review process. 
1.4.2 USE OF POOR DESCRIPTOR/CLASSIFICATIONS 
Looking at some of these issues more closely it became apparent that the 
classification system available on the form in use at the time was inadequate. The 
descriptions were not robust enough and did not cater for many common scenarios. 
For example, ―Incorrect medication given‖ did not have its own classification and 
ended up being included in the ―Other‖ category. As a result the ―Other‖ category 
was quite large and formed the largest group with 37% of reports whilst omissions 
were the highest error type reviewed comprising 21% of all incidents.  
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This classification system was limited and could not and did not differentiate 
between incidents that were deemed ‘near misses‘ from those that reached the 
patient. The Second National Report on Patient Safety definition of a ‗near miss‘ or 
―close call‖ was one where it was deemed to have caused no harm but the incident 
had the potential for harm if it had reached the patient or had the potential to reach 
the patient.4 They can be indistinguishable from adverse events except for their 
outcome.4  The system in use could not provide any differentiation between incidents 
that caused actual harm or had the potential for harm. The facts indicated that these 
anomalies in the risk management system needed attention.  
1.4.3 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS TO SHPA WA CONFERENCE 
This report culminated in the presentation of a paper at the Society of Hospital 
Pharmacists WA State Branch Conference 6-8th September 2002, Perth, entitled 
―Should the Pharmacist Act as a Risk Manager for Medication Errors?‖ (Appendix 4). 
The paper was well received and the major points outlined from the paper were that: 
1. It was important to have a single person coordinating the analysis of medications 
incidents. 
2. A pharmacist was ideally placed to do this role. 
3. The reporting process needed to be improved to reduce underreporting. 
4. An electronic data system solution should be investigated and may be more 
efficient to record, disseminate, alert and report on medication incidents.  
5. Medication incidents should be part of a coordinated risk management strategy 
which would include falls and other safety issues.  
6. The major shortcoming noted in the report and presented paper was that the 
incidents included were based on those incidents that were reviewed by the DCP 
in a particular month and year and not when the medication incidents occurred. 
From a system point of view, a further shortcoming was that the classifications 
used to describe the incidents were poor, unclear and required review.  




In the past a process of committee review existed so that possible causes of medication 
incidents could be discussed and strategies implemented quickly to minimise risk and 
improve outcomes. Following concerns about liability and lack of indemnity under the 
Health Services (Quality Improvement) Act 199419, committee review ceased in 2002 
and the responsibility for error management was returned to unit managers. Pharmacy 
still had a role to play as a reviewer but not to the same extent as before. 
The hospital agreed to investigate whether a new Accident and Incident Form with 
more accurate classifications, could be provided and that all medication incidents 
would be sent to pharmacy immediately. Pharmacy, it was hoped would then have a 
date of review which would more closely reflect the date of the incident. 
SJOGHS sought assistance from the St John of God Health Care (SJOGHC) national 
head office on these matters. This issue was of great interest to them as coincidentally 
a national approach was seen as fundamental to the organization‘s development as a 
safe and quality driven provider of health care to the private sector. A new hard copy 
form was proposed for development which in time it was envisaged would become a 
wholly electronic system (see Chapter 7). Similarly SJOGHC was moving towards 
developing quality and safety departments in each hospital which would undertake the 
risk management function and provide a method to overcome the qualified privilege 
issues. This initiative was to take place irrespective of whether pharmacy departments 
had a high profile in a particular private hospital in the group or not e.g. in Subiaco the 
Pharmacy Department had a section 94 restricted Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme 
license and was owned by the hospital with all pharmacy staff working as employees 
of the hospital. This was and is not the norm in private hospital pharmacy practice and 
external contracted pharmacy services are provided to a private hospital often only to 
the level that a service agreement has dictated. This issue will be further discussed in 
Chapter 5 when the findings of a survey of leading private hospitals and large private 
hospital operators in Australia will be presented to determine the level of medication 
incident management that occurs in each hospital and the involvement of their 
pharmacy provider in that process. 
 
Medication Incidents in a Private Hospital: Frequency, type, causes and outcomes 
 
30 
CHAPTER 2 STUDY OBJECTIVES  
This study was divided into a number of sub-studies which had the following 
objectives: 
1. To chronicle the development of medication safety procedures at St John of God 
Hospital Subiaco, nationally and internationally. 
2. To quantify and uniformly classify, medication incidents reported from different 
sources in a private hospital. 
3. To develop and assess a range of contributing factors as to why the medication 
incidents occurred. 
4. To quantify the clinical significance of reported medication incidents. 
5. To develop strategies to minimise/reduce the incidence of medication incidents in 
the future. 
6. To investigate the influence of pharmacy ownership, location and employment of 
clinical pharmacists on medication incident reporting practices in Australian 
private hospitals.  
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CHAPTER 3 DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 
A NEW INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM  
3.1 MEDICATION INCIDENTS 2001-2002 
3.1.1 BACKGROUND - THE WAY FORWARD 
Following attendance at the Private Health Industry Safety and Quality workshop in 
Sydney October 200217 and the publishing of the 2nd National Report Patient Safety 4 
in the same year, it became apparent that a fresh approach was required to improve 
medication safety in our private hospital. It was also apparent that there were gaps in 
our reporting (Chapter 1) and that risk would not be reduced unless a more 
comprehensive approach was undertaken and a greater understanding of the types of 
errors occurred. This new approach included: 
 The classification of errors into their primary sources i.e. prescribing, dispensing 
and administration. 
 The development of standardised classification or description under each error 
type as the error descriptions currently which were in use had proven not to be 
specific enough. 
 The collection of data in a more reproducible, uniform manner to enable 
comparative reports to allow the hospital to achieve benchmarking with other 
leading private hospitals. This in particular would require that reporting was 
conducted on the basis of when the incident was reported and not when the 
incident was reviewed by the DCP. 
 The development of a list of reasons or contributing factors as to why these 
incidents occurred and when they occurred e.g. time of day, what day; and who 
was primarily responsible (Enrolled or Registered Nurse, 
Agency/Casual/permanent nursing staff, Prescriber, Pharmacist). The 
identification of the person involved even by professional classification was 
deemed difficult considering the promotion of the ‗No blame‘ culture of incident 
reporting at the hospital. 
 The development/implementation of a ‗Risk‘ severity tool to be aligned with 
each incident and medication error type. 
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 The development/implementation of an outcome based ‗Harm‘ model to 
encompass both Potential and Actual harm to patients. 
The requirements for change prompted the commencement of this research project as 
a means of changing and improving practice in medication safety. This research 
involved: 
1. A re-examination of the medication incidents already reviewed but now 
quantified from a date of incident point of view rather than the date of review and 
classified as per prescribing, dispensing or administration medication errors. 
2. A review of any self-reported pharmacy dispensing incidents from the same 
period. 
3. A review of any pharmacist interventions from the same period if possible. 
With the aims to: 
4. Develop some Causal statements and contributing factors for different error types 
to identify ‗why‘ they occurred. 
5. Gain an insight into the types of practices currently in use in other Private 
Hospitals around Australia to improve medication safety. 
3.1.2 METHOD 
3.1.2.1 ETHICS APPROVAL 
The Curtin University of Technology Human Research Ethics Committee (HR 
29/2004) conditionally approved the project in 2004 (Appendix 5) and on the 9th 
June 2005 the completed questionnaire (Appendix 6) and covering letter (Appendix 
7) were submitted and final approval granted by the committee. 
3.1.2.2 A FRESH LOOK AT THE 2001-2002 DATA USING BETTER TOOLS 
SJOGHC which supports and manages each hospital in the St John of God group as 
part of a cohesive national approach to incident management and medication safety 
in particular, developed new categories and sub-categories (Appendix 8) for use by 
all member hospitals. This categorized medication incidents into prescribing, 
dispensing and administration errors with subcategories within each classification to 
further aid description.  
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Given the shortcomings identified by the review of our medication incidents in 
Chapter 1, the data for 2001 to 2002 was revisited with the date of incident now 
being an essential determinant for inclusion rather than the date the incident was 
reviewed by the DCP and those incidents were reclassified using the new national 
tools. At this juncture all the medication incidents had been saved electronically in a 
database but not all the other non-medication incidents. Hence the total number of 
Hospital Incidents is lower than is reported initially (i.e. 205 versus 901) (Table 3.1). 
Although medications were the highest category of incident (Table 3.1), it was noted 
that three in the therapeutic device category dealt with medications, as did the six 
patient record incidents which dealt with medication charts and as such were 
included in the medications total. This provided a total of 162 medication related 
incidents.  
Table 3.1 Patient incidents by incident category on database 2001-2002 
New Incident Category Number of incidents 
(n) 
Frequency of occurrence 
% 
Access 0 0 
Behaviour 3 1.5 
Biohazard Exposure 0 0 
Blood/Oxygen 1 0.5 
Decision Making 0 0 
Fall 8 3.9 
Injury 4 2.0 
Intra-operative 1 0.5 
Medication 152 74 
Nutrition 0 0 
Patient Record 6 2.9 
Quality of clinical care 3 1.5 
Result reporting 2 1 
Safety Issues 8 3.9 
Therapeutic Device 17 8.3 
Total 205 100 
 




3.1.3.1 BREAKDOWN OF MEDICATION INCIDENTS INTO SUB-CATEGORIES 
Using the newly developed tool provided by SJOGHC, the 162 medication incidents 
could then be subcategorised into prescribing, administration and dispensing errors 
(Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 Breakdown of 2001-2002 medication incidents into subcategories 






Administration (by Nurse) 132 81.5% 
(Pharmacy) Dispensing 9 5.5% 
Prescribing (by Doctor) 12 7.4% 
Pat. Record & Therapeutic Device 9 5.5% 
Total medication incidents 01-02 162 100% 
Total Bed days occupied 01-02 123,847  
Medication incidents/Bed day 0.00131  
 
It is now apparent (Table 3.2) that the majority of medication incidents reported 
during 2001-2002 could be classified as administration errors (81%) with prescribing 
errors next at 7% followed by dispensing errors (6%). This result was what had been 
expected given that the vast majority of reported medication incidents in the hospital 
are completed by nursing staff and should thus reflect more their participation in the 
medication cycle, i.e. the administration of medication.  
In addition a review of the recorded pharmacy dispensing errors for that period was 
undertaken, as the Pharmacy Department keeps separate records of all dispensing 
errors that are self-reported by staff in the department. The dispensing incidents 
reported here in this section (Table 3.2) were only those where a nurse had picked up 
the error and had entered the incident onto an incident report form and hence onto the 
new electronic data base. The frequency of just over 5% (9/162) dispensing errors in 
total for a year was considered to be very low by pharmacy management staff and 
was believed to reflect gross under reporting if this source was the only one used. 
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The self-reported dispensing errors in pharmacy are entered in a hard copy ledger 
and were not included in the hospital reporting system. The error rate was reported 
by the Chief Pharmacist as a percentage of prescriptions dispensed in his monthly 
and quarterly reports to the Hospital Executive. 
The prescribing error rate of 7.4% was felt to represent gross underreporting and 
reflect only known transcription errors or some duplication of order errors that had 
been picked up by nursing staff. It was postulated that a review of the Clinical 
Pharmacists‘ intervention reports would provide a more accurate determinant for the 
prescribing error rate as the majority of these interventions would reflect changes to 
doctors' orders on a therapy chart and as such would predominantly relate to 
prescribing errors.  
In order to allow comparison of incident rates over time or between hospitals, it was 
agreed that a common denominator should be adopted. This was determined to be 
bed occupancy; i.e. number of incidents per number of bed days occupied. This 
equated in financial 2001-2002 to: 162/123,847 or 0.00131 medication incidents 
reported per occupied bed day (Table 3.2). 
Figure 3.1 Percentage of medication incidents by source 2001- 2002:  
 
 
81% Administration Errors 
6% Dispensing Errors 
7% Prescribing 
Errors 
6% Patient Record 
and Therapeutic 
Device 
Administration by Nurse 
Pharmacy Dispensing 
Prescribing by Doctor 
Pat. Record & Ther. Device 
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3.1.3.2 BREAKDOWN OF ADMINISTRATION INCIDENTS 
Using the SJOGHC subcategories we can get an assessment of the different types of 
administration errors that are reported. 
The results demonstrated that omissions (Table 3.3) were the highest category of 
administration errors reported, as was seen in the initial report ‗by date of pharmacist 
review‘ (Table 1.4) and this was not unexpected. They were followed by the ―wrong 
infusion rate‖ comprising 19% of reported administration errors. This category 
reflects the practice of administering intravenous fluids by gravimetric means where 
drops are counted to relate to a specific rate per millilitre with the standard being 20 
drops per mL. This method of administration is fraught with inconsistency as it is 
easy for the patency of the line to be changed by kinking when for example patients 
lie on it or if the roller clamp used to modify flow is not moved to a new part of the 
line after each rate change. It became apparent from these incidents that large 
volumes (e.g. 1000mL) were often infused over 1-2 hours instead of the prescribed 
10-12 hours. If this fluid contained a potent medication a potential adverse 
medication event could occur quite easily. The solution proposed to the hospital was 
to consider a budgetary change to enable purchase of enough volumetric IV pumps to 
ensure the gravimetric means of administering intravenous fluids was no longer 
practised. 
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Table 3.3 Administration incidents by subcategory 2001-2002 






Omission 37 28 
Wrong infusion rate 25 19 
Given without order 14 11 
Wrong dose 12 9 
Wrong medication 8 6 
Wrong time 5 4 
Wrong frequency 5 4 
Theft or loss 5 4 
Given, not signed for 4 3 
Schedule 8 discrepancy 4 3 
Transcription error 3 2 
Wrong patient 2 2 
Damaged product 2 2 
Extravasation 1 1 
Incorrect labelling 1 1 
Expired medication 1 1 
Previous drug reaction, given 1 1 
Wrong route 1 1 
Reaction to medication 1 1 
Self-inflicted overdose 0 0 
Total 132 100 
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Figure 3.2 Administration medication incidents by sub-category 
 
3.1.3.3 A REVIEW OF THE TIME MEDICATION INCIDENTS WERE REPORTED TO HAVE OCCURRED 
An analysis of when medication incidents were reported was considered a 
worthwhile item to review, to see if there was any particular time of the day or 
stressors that may influence or be implicated in causing medication errors. 
3.1.3.3.1 NURSING SHIFT TIMES IN HOSPITALS 
The commencement and ending of shifts for nursing staff has often been considered 
a time when medication errors could occur as one team of caregivers 'handover‘ 
patient care to another team. This exchange of information and care process occurs at 
least three times in a 24 hour period. This handover is a very complex process and 
medication management is only a portion of the information passed on. Handover is 
achieved by face to face contact or if unavailable written or taped messages. If we 
assign for the purpose of this review 8 hours to each shift to accommodate morning, 
afternoon and nightshifts, the times worked should be quite uniform (Table 3.4). But 
nursing working shifts are nonstandard and these times do not reflect actual practice 
(Table 3.5) as they are designed to accommodate workforce availability and ward 
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shifts are used to accommodate busy times within the 24 hour period, such as 0700-
1330 hours and 1800 to 2400 hours (Table 3.5). Added to this there is usually a cross 
over period of about thirty minutes between night shifts and morning shifts and 
morning shifts and afternoon shifts to allow staff to ―handover‖ from one to the other 
that particular patient‘s care. This handover period has long been thought to be an "at 
risk period" for medication and other errors to occur secondary to communication 
gaps and in 2010 became a key focus area of improvement for the Australian 
Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care.20 
Table 3.4 Nursing eight hourly shift times 
0700-1500 hrs. Morning shift 
1500-2300 hrs. Evening shift 
2300-0700 hrs. Night shift 
 
Table 3.5 Nursing normal shift times in a private hospital 2002 
0700-1530 hrs. Morning shift 
1300-2130 hrs. Evening shift 
2130-0730 hrs. Night shift 
 
3.1.3.3.2 NURSING SHIFT TIMES AND MEDICATION INCIDENT REPORTING 
With this in mind a review was undertaken of the time an incident was reported to 
have occurred. Six discrete time slots were developed to facilitate the fact that short 
and long shifts exist and to cover all the likely changeover periods or at risk times 
(Table 3.6.). As it was noted that five incidents did not have a time assigned to the 
incident report it was decided that they should be excluded from the review. As a 
result the frequency of occurrence was reported out of a total 157 medication 
incident reports. 
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Table 3.6 Medication incidents by time occurred 
Period 
Code 








A 0800 - 1300 hours 55 35 
B 1301 - 1530 hours 20 12.7 
C 1531 - 2100 hours 41 26.1 
D 2101 - 2159 hours 1 0.6 
E 2200 - 0659 hours 35 22.3 
F 0700 – 0759 hours 6 3.8 
 Total  157 100 
 
The majority of reported medication incidents (35%) occurred in the period 0800 to 
1300 hours (Table 3.6) which corresponds with the busiest time on the ward of a 
private or a public hospital. This is when morning medications are administered as 
well as meals (breakfast and lunch) and other patient care issues must be attended to. 
It is also a period when many patients are being prepared for morning surgery and is 
a busy and stressful time. Allied to this many medical practitioners arrive on the 
ward to review their patients and a nursing staff member may become interrupted to 
accompany them on their ward round. The next most prominent time for errors was 
the afternoon shift or Period C (26.1%) followed by the night shift or Period E 
(22.3%). It must also be noted that the changeover period from morning to afternoon 
shift (Period B) was the next most reported error time and was almost four times 
higher than the changeover period from night-time to morning shift (Period F) 
(12.7% Period B Vs 3.8% Period F). But if we make allowance that Period B was 2.5 
hours in duration, the average error rate per hour becomes much closer (8 per hour 
Period B Vs 6 per hour Period F). The changeover period from afternoon to night 
shift (Period D) was by far the least reported time for medication incidents with only 
one report which may reflect that the time period is relatively quiet and free of 
interruption. 
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Figure 3.3 Number of medication incidents per time occurred 
 
3.1.3.3.3 NURSING SHIFT TIMES AND OMISSION MEDICATION INCIDENTS 
As omission errors were the highest category of incident reported, it was thought 
reasonable to apply the same criteria for nursing shift changes to assess when most of 
the omissions were reported to have occurred. It was noted that one report that 
involved an omission did not record the time of the incident and was such excluded 
from this part of the review. 
The review indicated (Table 3.7) that it was during the night shift (Period E) that the 
highest numbers for omission errors were reported with almost a third (30.6%) of all 
omissions reported then. The periods B (22.2%) and C (22.2%) were equivalent and 
represented the next highest reporting times (i.e. when changing from morning to 
afternoon shift and during the afternoon shift). 
55 errors (35%) 41 errors (26.1%) 
35 errors (22.3%) 
6 errors  
(3.82%) 
1 error  
(0.64%) 








A = 0800-1300 hours 
B = 1301-1530 hours 
C = 1531-2100 hours 
D = 2101-2159 hours 
E = 2200-0659 hours 
F = 0700-0759 hours 
Normal Shift Hours 
Morning =    0700-1530 hours 
Afternoon = 1300-2130 hours 
Night =         2130-0730 hours 
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Table 3.7 Omission medication incidents by time occurred 
Period 
Code 
Time Period Incident 
Recorded as Occurred 
(hours) 
Number of Incidents 




A 0800 - 1300 hours 6 16.7 
B 1301 - 1530 hours 8 22.2 
C 1531 - 2100 hours 8 22.2 
D 2101 - 2159 hours 1 2.8 
E 2200 - 0659 hours 11 30.6 
F 0700 – 0759 hours 2 5.6 
 Total  36 100 
 
Figure 3.4 Times of Omission Medication Incidents 
 
6 errors (16.7%) 8 errors (22%) 
11 errors (30.5%) 
2 errors  
(6%) 
1 error  
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A = 0800-1300 hours 
B = 1301-1530 hours 
C = 1531-2100 hours 
D = 2101-2159 hours 
E = 2200-0659 hours 
F = 0700-0759 hours 
Normal Shift Hours 
Morning =    0700-1530 hours 
Afternoon = 1300-2130 hours 
Night =         2130-0730 hours 
 




The reviewing of medication incidents by date of incident rather than by date of 
review as before, provided a more accurate and consistent method of assessing the 
data. This approach would now allow accurate comparisons of the data from one 
month to the next and from one year to the next. This more consistent approach 
would allow for benchmarking to be undertaken with other hospitals in the SJOGHC 
Group, as well as other suitable peer group hospitals in the future. 
The differentiation of these medication incidents into the sub-categories of 
prescribing, dispensing and administration errors further clarified the origin and type 
of error that was being reported. Administration errors were the predominant form of 
error reported which reflected the fact that the medication administration process is a 
direct nursing responsibility and medication incident reports were primarily 
completed by nursing staff. A number of studies have studied administration error 
rates in Australian hospitals using different supply systems. Where administration 
was based on a ‗ward stock or imprest‘ system (bulk ward stock supplied by 
pharmacy staff but measured and dispensed by nursing staff) administration error 
rates ranged from 15 to 20%.21,22 When individual patient supply was used 
(pharmacy prepared measured individual doses) the error rate was reduced to 5-8%.22 
Medication errors of omission were the most frequent administration errors reported 
at SJOGHS. This fact is supported in a review of studies carried out which concluded 
that errors of omission and under use made up as much as one third of the total 
medication incidents reported.23 While omissions were the largest category of 
administration errors they were noted to occur either at the busiest times of the day 
for the ward e.g. in the morning or when nursing staff numbers were at their lowest 
e.g. during night duty. A recent UK National Patient Safety Agency Rapid Response 
Report24 highlighted that although omissions and delays in therapy may not seem 
serious, they were for some critical medicines and conditions including patients with 
sepsis or pulmonary embolism. The report detailed 27 deaths and 68 cases of severe 
harm from omission of these medications between 2006 and 2009.24 These errors 
could be avoided by developing a list of high risk medications and guidelines to 
follow when a medicine is omitted or delayed. The report also suggested continued 
medication incident review as well as an annual audit of omissions of critical 
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medications be undertaken.24 This latter strategy has become an annual feature of 
SJOGHC. The audit is carried out in all hospitals within the group over the same 
time period and provides a valuable insight to our medication administration 
practice. Another local initiative has been trialled on a ward in SJOGHS where the 
nurse administering medications wears a distinctive bib asking for ‗no interruptions‘ 
while that nurse undertakes the administration process. To date initial results indicate 
that it has been a success in reducing the number of omitted and delayed 
medications. 
3.1.4.1 REPORTING ERROR RATES 
The number of medication incidents reported was still felt to be grossly under 
reported at SJOGHS, although what the actual true reporting rate would be, may be 
impossible to determine. The ISMP25 infer that the collection of error rates as an 
indicator of patient safety within an institution is debatable. They contend that the 
true incidence of error reporting is dependent on having a clear reproducible 
definition of what an incident is, as well as the manner with which errors are 
identified and the efforts made to report them.25 A high error rate could be suggestive 
of an unsafe practice environment or it could reflect an organisational culture which 
encourages error reporting. Conversely, low error rates may be suggestive of a 
successful medication safety programme or initiative or may be the result of a 
punitive, blaming culture which discourages people to report errors.25 Low error rates 
can lead to a false sense of security and an acceptance of preventable errors such as 
omissions.25 
To avoid underreporting and improve medication incident reporting, education was 
needed as to what should be reported, the process must be simple and feedback must 
be given to reporters of all professions.26  
Michael Cohen, co-founder of and president of ISMP (USA), stated that analysing 
the causes of medication incidents and implementing changes to address them, as 
well as measuring outcomes from those changes was a more effective way to gauge 
the success of error prevention strategies.25  
 




The review of medication incident reporting in 2001 -2002 has given some indication 
of the type of problems faced by the hospital in creating a medication safe culture. A 
number of challenges are still outstanding and will be need to be addressed to ensure 
the number of administration error are reduced and in particular the number of 
omitted or delayed medications. This latter group of errors long thought to be 
relatively harmless, now require further work to ensure critical medicines and critical 
conditions are identified earlier to avoid harm to patients. The perceived problems of 
under reporting or excess reports need to have a balanced interpretation, given an 
organisation requires a culture of reporting with no blame attached to learn from the 
reported incidents. There is still a need for the development and implementation of a 
risk stratification tool, a measurement of harm (both actual and potential) associated 
with each incident and the provision of appropriate resourcing for the management 
and assessment of these incidents by the Pharmacy Department and the hospital at 
large. In addition further effort is required to capture more accurately the number of 
pharmacy dispensing errors and medical prescribing errors. 
3.2 DISPENSING ERROR REVIEW 2001-2002 
3.2.1 BACKGROUND 
In house reporting of pharmacy dispensing errors has been part of the Pharmacy 
Department‘s practice at SJOGHS since 1995. The errors were reported in a ledger 
set aside for the purpose and the account and accuracy of the detail of the error relied 
on the reporter. The prompt for a report usually came from a third party, usually a 
nurse or clinical pharmacist, or more rarely the discharged patient who discovered 
the error at home. Reports initiated from a medical practitioner were extremely rare 
and occurred only when a patient reported a suspicious event to them and the 
information was then passed onto pharmacy.  
Errors were not classified by type and were recorded using very generic descriptors. 
These included: date of incident, patient identifier, description of error, reported by, 
action taken, pharmacist involved aware and recorders name. There was no linkage 
of this system of recording by the Pharmacy Department with the accident and 
incident forms in use at the time in the hospital and later the electronic system of 
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reporting. Pharmacy dispensing errors would only get into the accident and incident 
reports if a ward nurse, on discovering an error, decided to complete a form as well 
as report the error to the Pharmacy Department 
The SJOGHC subcategory classifications for dispensing errors were a similar but 
shorter version of the classifications for administration errors prepared for ward use. 
These codes were developed in isolation and without consultation with the Pharmacy 
Department at SJOGHS. The intent of this section of the research project was to take 
the new dispensing error classification codes and apply them to the reports of 
dispensing errors received by the department. This would enable more consistent 
reports to be produced with a defined classification or error type, which it was hoped 
would lead to easier recognition and subsequent avoidance or reduction of that type 
of error. This strategy would also allow the Pharmacy Department to produce more 
consistent reports and allow some bench-marking to take place with other hospitals 
in the future. 
3.2.2 METHODOLOGY 
3.2.2.1 REVIEW OF SJOGHC NATIONAL DISPENSING ERROR SUBCATEGORIES 
The reported pharmacy dispensing errors for financial year 2001 to 2002 were 
chosen for review as they covered the same period used for the medication errors 
already studied earlier. An attempt was made to apply the SJOGHC nationally 
derived codes to the errors described in the dispensary error ledger for that period. 
All medication errors were designated the letter M, with administration errors as M1, 
dispensing errors M2 and prescribing errors M3. Sub-categories existed for each 
major category and were each designated an extra number, e.g. dispensing error 
wrong medication was M2.1 (Table 3.8). 
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Table 3.8 Pharmacy dispensing error categories developed by SJOGHC 
Dispensing error category Description of dispensing error categories 
M2.1 Wrong medication 
M2.2 Wrong frequency 
M2.3 Wrong time 
M2.4 Wrong route 
M2.5 Wrong patient 
M2.6 Incorrect labelling 
M2.7 Expired medication 
M2.8 Omission 
M2.9 Wrong dose 
M2.10 Damaged product 
M2.11 Theft or loss 
M2.12 DDA discrepancy 
M2.13 Previous drug reaction dispensed 
 
On closer examination the categories or codes as presented were not appropriate or 
practical to the range of errors that could occur in a large private hospital pharmacy 
department and in particular for use in the inpatient Dispensary. These inadequacies 
included the following: 
1. The specific dispensing error subcategory was unlikely to occur and so the 
classification was irrelevant or needed further clarification to make it relevant, 
e.g. M2.3 ‗wrong time‘ or M2.8 ‗omission‘ which was clarified to become ‗not 
supplied when ordered‘.  
2. The subcategory was not specific enough and allowed for an error to be classified 
under a number of subheadings which would then be open to the interpretation of 
the reporter, e.g. M2.6 ‗incorrect labelling‘ was felt to be too broad and did not 
offer sufficient information on the type of labelling error that had occurred. This 
was later clarified to mean wrong drug name, strength or form stated on the label. 
Another example was M2.9 ‗wrong dose‘ which could be used to describe an 
incorrect strength of medication being dispensed causing the wrong dose to be 
administered, or the dose was incorrectly stated on the label i.e. 1 tablet instead 
of 2 tablets. 
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3. No subcategory existed to accurately reflect a type of error that had occurred, e.g. 
M2.1 ‗wrong medication‖ was changed to M2.1.1 and M2.1.2 to demonstrate 
whether the medication was chosen incorrectly and the label was wrong or the 
label was correct in the interpretation of the prescription but the medication was 
incorrect due to a choosing error.  
These anomalies were due in the main to the fact that the sub-categories selected 
were created from the administration error sub-categories with no consultation with 
the Pharmacy Department prior to their introduction nationally to all St John of God 
hospitals. As a consequence, it became apparent that some newer more specific 
codes were required to cover all the types of errors that could occur during the 
dispensing process. 
Some additional error codes were developed as part of this review process and they 
included the inclusion of new codes for ‗wrong form‘ and ‗wrong strength‘ which 
were not adequately covered by the existing codes. Similarly, codes which had to 
differentiate between interpretation of a prescription or computer data entry errors 
from errors in choosing of a medication, were not well accommodated. An example 
of this was where a label was created correctly but the error occurred subsequently in 
the choosing of the product or alternatively where the label was incorrect but the 
choice of medication could be correct or incorrect.  
To accommodate this deficiency five new codes were introduced whilst some of the 
codes such as code M2.6 ‗incorrect labelling‘ was clarified to reflect any other 
labelling errors not already catered for in the existing or newly developed codes. 
These extra codes are designated as ―new‖ in the Table 3.9. 
3.2.3 RESULTS 
3.2.3.1 DISPENSING ERROR TYPES AND SUBCATEGORIES 2001-2002 
In total 95 dispensing errors had been reported through the dispensary ledger system 
(Table 3.9). These errors can be further categorized into the time in the dispensing 
process they occurred, i.e. errors of interpretation of the prescription and/or data 
entry into the computer to generate a label (designated with a #) or a choosing of 
medication error (designated with a *). It should be noted that some errors met more 
than one category as specified above. 
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The results indicate (Table 3.9) that the two most frequent errors reported were sub-
categories M2.5 ‗wrong patient‘ (25.3%) and M2.14.2 ‗wrong strength of 
medication/correct label‘ (24.2%). Wrong patient (M2.5) was interpreted to mean 
where the wrong patient‘s name appeared on the label. This type of error usually 
occurred as a result of the computer screen not being cleared from the previous 
patient before commencing dispensing or where the wrong patient identifier was 
entered and the outcome was not checked appropriately against the medication chart 
order. This can be a result of fatigue, haste or interruption to the normal dispensing 
and checking processes.  
Wrong strength chosen/correct label (M2.14.2) was a choosing error usually as a 
consequence of pharmaceutical manufacturers packaging not distinguishing between 
different strengths very well, i.e. look alike or sound alike names. This is a growing 
phenomenon as a result of companies wanting to achieve a ‗brand‘ image for all their 
products. In this new sub-category the labels were correctly interpreted from the 
medication order and the error occurred subsequent to this, during the choosing of 
the item from the shelf.  
In the case of wrong strength chosen/incorrect label (M2.14.1) the wrong medication 
strength was chosen but the prescription was interpreted incorrectly as well. This 
may be due to two factors, one where the prescription was misinterpreted due to poor 
product knowledge or a poorly legible prescription, or secondly where the item is 
chosen incorrectly first and the incorrect item influences the data entry for label 
generation. 
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Table 3.9 New and existing medication dispensing error subcategories  
Dispensing 
error codes 
Description of various subcategories Number of 
errors 




M2.1.1 Wrong medication and incorrect label * # 6 6.3 
M2.1.2 (new) Wrong medication/correct label * 15 15.8 
M2.2 Wrong frequency # 1 1.1 
M2.3 Wrong time # 0 0 
M2.4 Wrong route # 1 1.1 
M2.5 Wrong patient # 24 25.3 
M2.6 Incorrect labelling i.e. wrong drug name, 
strength or form stated on label # 
4 4.2 
M2.7 Expired medication * 1 1.1 
M2.8 Omission (not supplied when ordered) 0 0 
M2.9 Wrong dose # 13 13.7 
M2.10 Damaged product * 0 0 
M2.11 Theft or loss 0 0 
M2.12 S8 discrepancy 0 0 
M2.13 Previous drug reaction dispensed 0 0 
M2.14.1 (new) Wrong strength of medication/incorrect 
label * # 
2 2.1 
M2.14.2 (new) Wrong strength of medication/correct 
label * 
23 24.2 
M2.15.1 (new) Wrong form of medication and incorrect 
label * # 
1 1.1 
M2.15.2 (new) Wrong form of medication/correct label * 4 4.2 
Total 2001-02 Number of dispensing errors recorded 95 100 
Total 2001-02 Number of prescription/items dispensed 114,621  




# Note these errors all involve an error in labelling 
* Note these errors all involve where the wrong item is chosen 
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Figure 3.5 Types of dispensing errors including ‘new’ codes 






















































3.2.3.2 DISPENSING ERROR REPORTS PER QUARTER 
Dispensing error reports were greatest in the first and third quarters of the financial 
year, (Table 3.10). This is despite the fact that the third quarter (January to March) is 
usually a quieter time of the year for the hospital with many beds closed and staff on 
leave over the Christmas/New Year period and often into late January. On the other 
hand, given that wards are closed during this period, staff who are working are often 
assigned to wards they are not as familiar with. Similarly the mix of patients that 
staff are caring for on a particular ward are often quite different to the usual patient 
cohort seen on that ward due to bed access pressure. These two environmental issues 
would increase the potential for error and possibly explain the increased rate of 
reporting in the third quarter. 
Table 3.10 Frequency of dispensing errors reported per quarter 2001 -2002 
Quarter period Number of dispensing errors 
reported (n) 
Frequency of occurrence 
(%) 
July to Sept 2001 30 31.6 
Oct to Dec 2001 21 22.1 
Jan to March 2002 28 29.5 
April to June 2002 16 16.8 
Total 95 100 
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3.2.3.3 DISPENSING ERROR INDICATOR RATE 
The number of reported dispensing errors reported to and by the Pharmacy 
Department staff was documented as 95. Internal dispensing records indicated that 
114,621 prescription items were dispensed during the same financial period (Table 
3.9). This equates to an error rate of 0.000828 errors per prescription items dispensed 
through the Pharmacy Department in 2001-2002, or one dispensing error reported 
per 1206.5 prescription items dispensed. 
Although the number of prescriptions dispensed is a very precise denominator to 
determine workload in the pharmacy, it may be more applicable to use another 
hospital wide denominator to allow comparison with other performance indicators. 
For example the total number of discharges or separations during this financial year 
for SJOGHS was 23,119 (Table 3.11). 
Table 3.11 Inpatient discharges/separations 2001-2002 
Discharge/Separation 
categories 




Total Discharge/Separations 23119 
 
This equates to 0.0041 pharmacy dispensing errors per discharge or separation or one 
dispensing error reported for every 243.4 patient discharges or separations. 
3.2.3.4 INCLUSION OF MEDICATION INCIDENT REPORTS OF DISPENSING ERRORS 
Although it was felt the total of 95 reports accurately reflected all the reported errors 
to the department it may not have accounted for all errors that had occurred. It was 
possible that some errors may have slipped through unnoticed by the end users, 
nursing staff or patients on discharge. This fact could only be determined in a 
prospective study where all dispensed items are checked for errors prior to leaving 
the department by a third party over a set period of time and the results extrapolated 
for a year.  
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On the other hand it is worth noting that the nine pharmacy dispensing incidents 
recorded in the medication incident data already reported on, were all identifiable in 
this pharmacy dispensing error cohort as well. Therefore the Pharmacy Department 
was informed of a dispensing error and an incident form was completed on 
approximately 10% of occasions (9/95). An incident form is more likely to be filled 
out by nursing staff when the error has left the Pharmacy Department and has 
reached the patient on the ward or department. The fact that all nine dispensing errors 
reported on the hospital system and discovered on the ward, were subsequently 
identified in the pharmacy dispensing error report, reflects the accuracy of that report 
and that the values quoted for dispensing errors in the hospital accident and incident 
system reflect underreporting. 
3.2.4 DISCUSSION 
3.2.4.1 SOME IDENTIFIED CAUSES OF DISPENSING ERRORS 
Following this review it was felt useful to try and determine why dispensing errors 
occurred at SJOGHS. It would appear that from a review of the sub-categories of 
dispensing errors that they fit the following general categories: 
 an error in labelling 
 an error in choosing a medication 
 or a combination of both 
In early 2003 a number of potential causes for dispensing errors were determined 
during a group review with dispensary staff. An error in labelling was deemed to be 
multifactorial. They could be due to misinterpretation of part of the medication order. 
This could be caused by many factors that included legibility, lack of product 
knowledge, interruptions, and pressure to complete prescriptions owing to the 
volume of work or demands of the patient or nursing staff to receive the medication. 
Other potential causes mentioned included key stroke entry, wrong or rushed 
selection on the computer, or the inadvertent non-clearance of the computer screen 
from a previous entry. 
An error in choosing the medication could be due to a misinterpretation of the order 
(due to legibility issues or look alike sound alike names) and/or a selection error (due 
to similar packaging). The issue of look-alike sound alike names was deemed to 
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require attention by the pharmaceutical industry and the Therapeutic Goods 
Administration in the future.  
3.2.4.2 DISPENSING PROCESS AND ERROR POTENTIAL. 
Peterson stated27 in an Australian survey that the dispensing process was a core 
activity of the pharmacist which allowed safe and efficient provision of medications 
some of which could be dangerous. The process was composed of a sequence of 
checks and steps, often as much as 20-30,28 which if interrupted or broken could lead 
to poor quality outcomes for the patient and undesirable consequences for the 
pharmacist.27 Dispensing errors are errors in the dispensing process by a pharmacist 
that are undetected and corrected prior to the patient leaving the pharmacy27 or are a 
discrepancy with a written prescription order and the following of that order.29 They 
usually form part of the reportable medication errors in a hospital.28 
Ongoing review of this system is necessary to minimise any harm to the patient and 
any loss of credibility of the pharmacist from a dispensing error. 
The use of individual patient dispensing from an original order will reduce the 
frequency of error as compared to non-individual dispensing.28 This however is 
complicated further by the system in use, for example carbonated copies that are 
unclear, use of photocopy or faxed prescriptions, and large prescription volumes for 
different patients sent in advance of need.28. 
3.2.4.3 FREQUENCY OF DISPENSING ERRORS 
A 1996 USA study stated 5% of filled prescriptions contained some type of 
dispensing error30 and another study in a hospital based outpatient pharmacy31 
revealed 12.5% with errors, of which 1.6% were considered potentially serious. 
An Australian survey of pharmacists27 revealed that although pharmacists were 
concerned about dispensing errors and that they may be increasing, they were unsure 
what the error rate was and considered the dispensing errors that do occur to be part 
of their practice. 
Dispensing error rates in UK hospitals have been reported as between 16-18 per 
100,000 dispensed items.32,33 
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The SJOGHS dispensing error rate in 2001 – 2002 was quoted earlier (Table 3.9) and 
was noted to be higher at 82.8 errors per 100,000 dispensed items. 
3.2.4.4 CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO DISPENSING ERRORS 
The primary contributing factors noted by pharmacists in studies that contribute to 
dispensing errors were: 
 High prescription volumes27 
 Pharmacist fatigue27 
 Pharmacist overwork27 
 Interruption to dispensing27,34 
 Similar or confusing medication names27 
 Communication errors29 
 Drug labelling and packaging29 
 Work environment and conditions- light, space, flow29 
 Work overload29 
 Distractions and interruptions29 
 Out-dated sources of information29 
 Poor patient counselling – errors often picked up during counselling29 
 Low work volume34 -lack of concentration 
 
3.2.4.5 FACTORS TO REDUCE DISPENSING ERRORS 
The following factors have been reported to assist in reducing dispensing errors: 
 Having mechanisms for checking dispensing procedures27 
 Systematic dispensing workflow27 
 Checking the original prescription27 
 Improve the packaging and labelling of products27 
 Distinctive medication names27 
 Counselling patient at time of supply27 
 Up to date medication knowledge27 
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 Avoiding interruptions27,34,35  
 Reducing workloads27,34 
 Improving doctors handwriting27 
 Privacy to allow counselling of patient27 
 Unit dose dispensing28 reduced errors by 57% 
 Patient Individualised labelled dispensing28 
 
3.2.4.5.1 PHARMACIST DISPENSING WORKLOAD 
As workload for a pharmacist in a dispensary has been identified as a contributor to 
dispensing errors, having a targeted workload rate would then be a useful indicator or 
alert. A review of the literature indicates that there exists a lack of any available 
consensus.  
An Australian study suggested that 17 items per hour was the safest maximum 
number of prescriptions to be dispensed by a pharmacist during a 9 hour day.27 
The Australian Pharmacy Board suggest a rate of 12-15 items per pharmacist per 
hour while a UK hospital benchmarking group suggest 13 items per pharmacist per 
hour.34 
The Welsh national average for hospital dispensary activity was reported as 9.9 items 
per pharmacist per hour (95% CI = 0.9, n = 17).34 
Another approach was a USA risk analysis model that reported using a geometric 
probability distribution that enabled an assessment of dispensing error risk to be 
made as a function of a pharmacy‘s accuracy rate and the number of prescriptions a 
pharmacy staff member should dispense in a work shift.36 
3.2.4.5.2 PHONE INTERRUPTIONS 
It is common in dispensaries in hospitals for them to be areas which are busy, noisy 
and with high stress levels placed on staff.35 It is not uncommon to be dispensing a 
prescription, attempt to answer a telephone and deal with a caregiver or patient at the 
dispensary window.35 This increased stress on dispensing staff may increase the risk 
of a dispensing error. Changing the work environment and reducing stress levels 
were reported to be positive moves by hospital pharmacy staff.35 Some examples 
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included the employment of pharmacy receptionists or the use of a dedicated ‗phone 
help desk‘ for callers were reported as good ways to alleviate interruptions and stress 
situations.35 
3.2.4.5.3 USE OF TECHNOLOGY TO ACHIEVE SAFER SYSTEMS 
The results of an American Society of Hospital Pharmacists survey of over 1000 
hospitals to gauge their practice pertaining to the dispensing and administration of 
medications, indicated some interesting practice developments to improve dispensing 
accuracy and reduce error.37 In this survey, a growth in decentralized drug 
distribution models was noted; automated dispensing cabinets were used in 72% of 
hospitals and robots by 15%. Increases were noted in unit dose dispensing, two 
pharmacist checking for high risk medications, while hand written medication 
administration records (akin to a medication chart) declined substantially.37 Bar-code 
technology was implemented by 9.4% of hospitals, smart infusion pumps by 32%.37 
Thirty per cent of hospitals surveyed provided around the clock services and 12% 
used off site medication order review after hours.37 
In some states of Australia e.g. Victoria, scanners have been mandated for use in the 
dispensing process. Dispensing selection errors in Australia account for 
approximately 50% of all cases brought to the attention of the Pharmaceutical 
Defence Limited, professional indemnity insurers for pharmacists.38 The use of 
scanners has been reported to cause a significant reduction in the number of reported 
incidents involving wrong selection when done in conjunction with patient 
counselling and ensuring pharmacist workload is not excessive.38   
A recent article by Poon et al, highlighted the value of bar-coding technology in a 
hospital setting.39 In a hospital, almost one third of serious medication errors occurs 
at the ordering stage of the medication cycle, one third at administration, and another 
third during transcription and dispensing processes.8 Other information technology 
such as computerised physician order entry has been shown to reduce serious 
medication errors by 55%.39 
Bar-code verification has been shown to prevent dispensing errors in the 
pharmacy38,40 and is considered a promising strategy by USA Veterans Affairs 
hospitals. It may be used at the bedside to verify a patient‘s identity and match it to 
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the administered medication.41 This is usually implemented in conjunction with an 
electronic medication administration system, which Poon et al reported reduced 
significantly the number of administration errors in that institution.39  
3.2.5 CONCLUSION  
The pharmacy dispensing errors were collected by pharmacists based on reports from 
nurses, pharmacists or patients. The process was independent of the hospital‘s 
medication incident process except in approximately 10% of cases where an incident 
form was completed as well. The development of sub-categories to classify and 
describe the types of dispensing errors that had occurred was felt to be a major step 
forward. The complexity of the process has been highlighted with the need for the 
development of newer sub-categories to reflect all the errors possible and to highlight 
in what part of the process the error was made. This is reflected in particular in the 
need for categories to capture whether the label was prepared correctly and the 
wrong item was chosen or whether the label was incorrect and the medication was 
chosen correctly or not. 
The reporting of all dispensing errors noted (medication incident forms and 
dispensary error book), excluding any duplication and their reporting through the 
hospital‘s central system would provide a more accurate figure for the hospital on the 
number of medication dispensing errors that occur on an annual basis. A more robust 
and accurate process will allow the hospital to benchmark their error rates with other 
peer group hospitals. It will be essential that the hospital system is sensitive to the 
type of information needed to report a dispensing error and have an appropriate and 
meaningful classification system in place. 
Pharmacy dispensing errors were reported accurately at SJOGHS during this period, 
but the hospital‘s centralised medication incident reporting system only recorded 
10% of the actual dispensing errors that had occurred. The remaining dispensing 
errors were noted and siloed only in the Pharmacy Department. The total dispensing 
error rate at SJOGHS was noted to be higher than published studies (88 vs 16-18 
errors per 100,000 items dispensed) but would have been less if the centralised 
reporting rate (8 per 100,000 items dispensed) was the one used for comparison.32,33 
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This is an important clarification that has to be considered by hospital authorities 
when assessing error rates sources to ensure they have the complete picture. 
Secondly the dispensing error process needs to focus more on why dispensing errors 
occurred and to ask staff to assign contributing factors to all reported errors. 
Understanding the ‗why‘ an error occurred will assist in introducing steps to reduce 
our exposure to that error category. Finally it is important that some sort of ‗harm‘ 
measurement is introduced to assess the risk that the hospital has been exposed to. 
Although most dispensing process failures do not harm patients28 they are indicative 
of a fragile process and an increased risk of a more serious event. They are also 
considered commonplace, but despite this, they can reach significant levels and are 
an indicator of a breach in the safe supply of medications to the patient, 
3.3 PHARMACIST INTERVENTIONS 2001-2002 
3.3.1 BACKGROUND 
Ward based Clinical Pharmacists have provided a clinical pharmacy service to all 
inpatients, medical practitioners and nursing staff at SJOGHS since 1997. Their role 
as medication managers assists in ensuring appropriate prescribing, dispensing and 
administration of medications to all patients during their stay. Allied to this, clinical 
pharmacists are involved in a variety of diverse roles which included the supply of 
medication, cost minimisation of treatment, Poisons Act compliance, and education 
for nursing, medical and pharmacy staff. The service is provided Monday to Friday 
during business hours only (0800 hours to 1630 hours). The role and cost benefit of 
employing clinical pharmacists in improving medication safety has been well 
documented.42,43 They are required to record their activities as a workload measure as 
well as demonstrating clinical benefit and improved patient safety by recording the 
types and outcomes of their interventions in medication management matters on 
behalf of the patient and their employer.  




3.3.2.1 CLINICAL PHARMACIST ACTIVITY RECORDING 
Clinical pharmacists recorded their activities using a Clinical Services 
Documentation Form (Appendix 9) developed in house by the Pharmacy Department 
at SJOGHS. This form divided their involvement into two distinct categories: 
 Clinical Services 
 Pharmacist Intervention Details 
The details of these activities were then added by the pharmacists into an Access™ 
database, created for the Pharmacy Department, from which reports could be 
provided as required. 
3.3.2.1.1 CLINICAL SERVICES 
Clinical Services recorded the number and type of activities that were carried out on 
a ward and included the core clinical functions of the clinical pharmacists:  
 Medication chart review 
 Counselling 
 Information provision to patients or carers 
 Intervention numbers 
 Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme Authority requests, Pension or Concession 
Number clarifications 
 Adverse drug reactions investigated. 
Clinical services activity did not include any medication supply services provided, 
Schedule 8 medications delivered or any cost minimisation negotiations carried out 
directly with Health Funds or Pharmaceutical Companies on behalf of patients. 
3.3.2.1.2 INTERVENTION DETAILS: 
An Intervention was defined by the Society of Hospital Pharmacists of Australia 
(SHPA) as ―any change made to therapy by the Clinical Pharmacist‖42 during their 
visits to the wards. The interventions reflected changes to therapy made as a result of 
prescriber error, e.g. omission and transcription errors or suggested changes by the 
clinical pharmacist following pharmaceutical review to aid administration or improve 
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therapy, e.g. change of form from intravenous to oral with a suitable dose, or 
suggesting an appropriate choice of medication for the patient‘s current condition. 
Intervention details were recorded based on the criteria listed below and where 
possible codes were used to assist in recording those details. The criteria covered the 
following: 
 Medication involved 
 Reason for the intervention 
 Type of intervention made 
 Outcome/Benefit 
 Brief description 
Codes were developed in house and in consultation with other local practitioners in 
Western Australian public sector hospitals. The codes were of two types, those that 
were used to depict the ‗reason why‘ the intervention was carried out and codes that 
described the ‗type of intervention‘ carried out. 
3.3.2.1.3 PHARMACY INTERVENTION DATABASE REVIEW 
Following review of the database of clinical pharmacist activities for the period July 
2001 to June 2002, it became apparent that the dataset had a number of 
shortcomings. It appeared that gaps in the recording of the detail existed and that in 
fact individual clinical pharmacists had not entered the data as expected. During this 
period there was also a lack of secretarial assistance available to help enter the 
handwritten clinical services and intervention data onto the Access™ database. This 
double handling of data from paper based collection to data entry into an electronic 
database, was a perceived weaknesses of this approach. 
For the cohort July 2001 to June 2002 the figures for all clinical services were 
entered for the twelve months including the number of Pharmacist Interventions. 
Unfortunately only five months detailed data on the Pharmacist Interventions 
conducted were entered covering the period February 2002 to June 2002 inclusive. 
Given the time elapsed from collection of data to its review, staff turnover prevented 
the recovery of the missing information.  
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The clinical services data available was further reduced to include only the pertinent 
data for this study. As such only two points collected under clinical services were 
collated in full and they were the number of Medication Chart Reviews (MCRs) 
conducted and the number of Pharmacist Interventions carried out. The data for the 
MCRs by the clinical pharmacists was seen as an essential core activity of the 
pharmaceutical review processes whilst the number of Pharmacist Interventions was 
an outcome measure of the value of the service. 
 It is likely that there was still a degree of under reporting as individuals, without 
clerical support, put off entering the data which eventually could get mislaid or the 
volume became so large a burden that it was never completed. A solution tailored to 
providing live reporting of interventions and workload statistics at the time of 
completion at the bedside was required.  
3.3.3 RESULTS 
3.3.3.1 INTERVENTION RATE PER MEDICATION CHART REVIEW (MCR) COMPLETED 
As the MCR process is the primary component of the activity of the clinical 
pharmacist and is the source of information for assessment and intervention if 
required, it is reasonable to portray the available Pharmacist Intervention results as a 
proportion of MCRs (Table 3.12). This resulted in an average intervention rate of 
0.043 interventions per MCR or one pharmacy intervention per approximately every 
twenty three MCRs.  
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Table 3.12 Medication chart review vs pharmacist interventions July 2001 to June 
2002 
Month Number of MCRs 
conducted 
Number of pharmacist 
interventions 
Ratio of intervention 
rate to MCR’s 
Jul-01 2537 127 0.050 
Aug-01 1841 76 0.041 
Sep-01 2613 132 0.051 
Oct-01 1286 38 0.030 
Nov-01 737 34 0.046 
Dec-01 1235 21 0.017 
Jan-02 1473 38 0.026 
Feb-02 1824 49 0.027 
Mar-02 1030 37 0.036 
Apr-02 884 78 0.088 
May-02 995 71 0.071 
Jun-02 1064 47 0.044 
Total 17519 748 0.043 
 
3.3.3.2 REASON FOR INTERVENTION BY THE CLINICAL PHARMACIST: 
The Pharmacist Intervention recording sheet used a range of different codes to 
reduce the amount of writing and shorten the time that the clinical pharmacist 
required to accurately record their activities (Table 3.13). The secondary advantage 
of the codes used was that it allowed the measurement of different types of 
interventions and acted as a classification system.  
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Table 3.13 Description of codes used for the reason for pharmacist intervention 
Code Code description for reason for intervention 
6.1 Drug has a documented ADR 
6.2 Drug given > 72 hours without serum levels taken 
AH Admission history 
ADV Adverse effects from drug 
AF Administration facilitation 
CON Contraindicated drug 
D Dose frequency/time incorrect 
DC Discharge counselling 
HOS Hospital policy/protocol 
INT Drug interaction 
PC Prescribing clarification (significant) 
PR Pathology results 
TDM Therapeutic drug monitoring 
TR Therapeutic reason 
O Other 
 
As stated earlier, the dataset with the details of the Pharmacist Interventions was 
found to be incomplete and was only available for the period February 2002 to June 
2002 inclusive. During this period 282 Interventions were recorded in full and 
available for review. 
The most frequent reasons stated for intervention (Table 3.14) by the clinical 
pharmacist were for Therapeutic Reasons (TR) (28%) followed by Therapeutic Drug 
Monitoring (TDM) (14.9%) and Prescribing Clarifications (PC) (14.2%) with 
Dose/Frequency/Time incorrect (D) next at 10.3%. Prescribing errors could be 
associated with approximately 60% (9/15) of the intervention reason codes. They 
included the following Clinical Indicators 6.1 and 6.2, AH, CON, D, HOS, INT, PC 
and TR whilst the remainder (40%) of intervention codes reflected interventions to 
improve a patient‘s benefit from their therapy. 
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In this dataset, 67.7% of interventions recorded were linked with possible prescriber 
error with the balance 32.3% linked with improving a patient‘s benefit from their 
prescribed therapy. All interventions improved the level and quality of 
pharmaceutical care for the patient and acted as a second check for a busy prescriber. 
Table 3.14 Reason for pharmacist intervention February 2002 to June 2002 
Reason code for pharmacist 
intervention 
Number of interventions 
(n) 
Frequency of occurrence 
(%) 
6.1 5 1.8 
6.2 3 1 
ADV 17 6 
AF 18 6.4 
AH 19 6.7 
CON 1 0.4 
D 29 10.3 
HOS 6 2.1 
INT 9 3.2 
O 9 3.2 
PC 40 14.2 
PR 5 1.8 
TDM 42 14.9 
TR 79 28 
Total 282 100 
 
3.3.3.3 TYPE OF INTERVENTION MADE BY THE CLINICAL PHARMACIST 
Table 3.15 documents the codes used to describe the different types of interventions 
carried out by the clinical pharmacists. 
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Table 3.15 Description of codes used to identify type of intervention made 
Code Code description for type of intervention performed 
A Addition of drug 
C Cessation of drug 
D Dose change 
O Other 
P Pathology test 
R Route of administration change 
S Substitution of drug 
T Time of administration change (not frequency) 
 
The results (Table 3.16) indicate that the most frequent type of intervention was a 
dosage change (36.2%) followed by cessation of a medication (18.1%) and Other 
(18.8%). The Other code was used when the type of intervention did not fit one of 
the already described codes. 
Table 3.16 Types of pharmacist interventions February 2002 to June 2002 
Type Code for pharmacist 
intervention 
Number of interventions 
n 
Frequency of occurrence 
% 
A 32 11.3 
C 51 18.1 
D 102 36.2 
O 53 18.8 
P 7 2.5 
R 5 1.8 
S 24 8.5 
T 8 2.8 
Total 282 100 
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6.1   3   1     1   5 1.7 
6.2     1 2         3 1 
ADV 1 6 3 3 1   3   17 6 
AF 0 2 1 10   2 2 1 18 6.4 
AH 5   10 2     1 1 19 6.7 
CON   1             1 0.4 
D     24 1   1 1 2 29 10.3 
HOS 1 2   2     1   6 2.1 
INT   6         2 1 9 3.2 
O 2   2 5         9 3.2 
PC 2 5 17 13 1 1 1   40 14.2 
PR   1 1 1     2   5 1.8 
TDM 1 1 27 6 5     2 42 14.9 
TR 20 24 16 7   1 10 1 79 28 
Types  
(n) 




11.3 18.1 36.1 18.8 2.5 1.8 8.5 2.8 282 100 
 
The most frequent reason for intervention (Table 3.17) was therapeutic drug 
monitoring (TDM, 14.9%) followed by prescribing clarification (PC, 14.2%) and 
dose (D, 10.3%). This is not surprising given the primary role of the clinical 
pharmacist is the pharmaceutical review of a prescribed order and to assess the 
clarity of the orders and the appropriateness of the  doses prescribed for a particular 
patient based on reference to evidence based guidelines or by measuring outcomes of 
the effect of the previous dose. Reviewing the most common type of intervention i.e. 
a dose change (Table 3.16) it becomes apparent that the most frequent reasons for 
that intervention are therapeutic drug monitoring (27/102), dose (24/102), prescribing 
clarification (17/102) and admission history (10/102). The addition of the admission 
history is interesting as a reason for intervention, as it highlights that when that 
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activity is performed accurately and a subsequent reconciliation of that admission 
medication history to the orders prescribed by the doctor is carried out, there is a 
great potential to reduce error and avoid harm to that patient. This concept is now 
known as ‗medication reconciliation‘.  
3.3.3.4 PHARMACIST INTERVENTIONS BY WARD/SPECIALTY: 
On examination of the interventions by ward (Table 3.18) over the five month period 
it became apparent that the spread of intervention numbers was not uniform with 
some wards having many more interventions that others. Another observation was 
that some of the recorded interventions were picked not by the ward clinical 
pharmacists but by the dispensing pharmacists in the Dispensary. These latter 
interventions were recorded against the name of the ward with the letter ―D‖ after it 
on entry to the database, to designate the origin of the intervention was the 
Dispensary.  
Clinical pharmacists accounted for the majority (89.7%, 253/282) of interventions 
while the dispensing pharmacists accounted for 10.3% (29/282). That differential 
may have been larger as there was likely a degree of underreporting by the clinical 
pharmacists onto the database and it was known that some data was lost. 
The high number of interventions (Table 3.18) from the General Surgery (22.3%), 
Neurology (22%), Obstetrics and Gynaecology (18.8%) and Orthopaedic (9.2%) 
areas was not surprising given the high number of patients admitted by the hospital 
to those specialties. The low intervention numbers for the Medical wards e.g. wards 
41 and 62, was thought to reflect poor reporting and entry into the database and in 
addition much of the data from the Oncology Ward was lost from a Personal Digital 
Assistant (PDA) when its power source failed. 
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Table 3.18 Interventions by clinical and dispensing pharmacist by ward  















41 Cardiology 3 4 2.5 
42 ICU 26 2 10.1 
43 Obs & Gynae 
Surgery 
51 2 18.8 
44 General Surgery 60 3 24.4 
52 Orthopaedics 20 6 9.2 
61 Neurology 60 2 22.0 
62 Oncology 6 2 2.8 
7th Floor Plastics/Urology 18 8 9.2 
Paediatrics Paediatrics 6 0 2.1 
DSU Day Surgery Unit 2 0 0.7 




 253/282 29/282 100 
 
3.3.3.5 PHARMACIST INTERVENTIONS BY MEDICATION INVOLVED: 
The most frequent medication involved in the recorded interventions was gentamicin 
with 29 interventions from the total of 282. The most frequent reason for intervention 
was TDM accounting for 89.7% of gentamicin interventions (Table 3.19). The most 
common type of intervention initiated was a dose change (65.5%) with TDM as the 
most frequent reason for that intervention (17/19). This is predictable as gentamicin 
is a nephrotoxic and ototoxic medication with a recognised relationship between the 
dose administered, measured serum concentration, the length of treatment and the 
potential for toxicity.44 
There were 19 interventions with the medication tramadol which was a new pain 
relieving medication on the Australian market at that time. Tramadol has multiple 
action sites as it has serotonin and noradrenaline uptake inhibitor properties along 
with opioid agonist activity. The majority (eight) of the reasons for intervention were 
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for therapeutic reasons and involved the ceasing, substitution or dose reduction of the 
medication as the type of intervention. Three of the interventions were for potential 
interactions with other medications that may have exacerbated the effects of the 
tramadol e.g. enhanced the serotonergic effects when co-administered with 
antidepressants such as selective serotonin receptor inhibitors, which could cause 
serotonin syndrome. 










6.2  1 1   2 6.9 
TDM 1 17 3 3 2 26 89.7 




1 19 4 3 2 29 100 
Frequency of 
occurrence % 
3.4 65.5 13.8 10.3 6.9 29 100 
 
Another intervention example was paracetamol which was ceased by the clinical 
pharmacist on seven occasions primarily due to a duplication of orders following a 
therapeutic review of the patient‘s pain management. On another occasion Painstop® 
which contains promethazine and paracetamol was prescribed as a four hourly 
regimen based on the paracetamol content only. This caused sedation in the patient 
due to the high promethazine content and the dose frequency was amended to be 
given six hourly which was more reflective of the dosage interval for promethazine, 
thus lowering the total daily dose and minimising the sedation side effect.  




3.4.1 ROLE FOR CLINICAL PHARMACISTS 
Evidence as to the value of clinical pharmacists has been mounting over the past 
decade and recognition of their roles in preventing medication adverse events has 
been publicised in major Australian reports and publications. The Second National 
Report on Patient Safety in 20024 stated that clinical pharmacy services were a key 
area known to improve medication safety. The Australian Pharmaceutical Advisory 
Council ―Guiding principles to achieve continuity in medication management‖ 
published in 200545 outlined a way forward to improve the system of transference of 
medication information across all the different health care settings a patient moves 
through. Guiding principle 2 ―responsibility for medication management‖ outlined 
the responsibilities of each profession in medication management and clearly 
articulated roles for clinical pharmacists beyond a supply function. These included 
medication review, supporting information for medicines, monitoring of response 
and the transfer of information (at admission and discharge).  In particular Stowasser 
et al46,47  reported two randomised controlled studies that outlined the benefit of 
medication liaison services to improve medication management continuity into the 
community and using clinical pharmacists in this role. These studies indicated this 
approach led to fewer problems with medicines, fewer visits to medical practitioners 
and lower readmission rates.46,47 
The Western Australian Department of Health in March 2007, released its 
Pharmaceutical Review Policy (PRP).48 This policy outlined that the role of 
Pharmaceutical Review was part of a robust clinical governance system to improve 
the quality processes around medication usage. The first of its five Standards 
highlighted that all inpatient medication charts were reviewed, ideally on a daily 
basis by a suitable credentialed professional such as a clinical pharmacist. Studies 
have shown that error in the prescribing or ordering stage of a medication in a 
hospital account for the majority of medication errors.49,50 These included dose and 
frequency addition and adjustments owing to ambiguous, incomplete or 
inappropriate orders. These results mimic closely the types and reason for clinical 
pharmacist interventions noted in our cohort (Table 3.17). 
Medication Incidents in a Private Hospital: Frequency, type, causes and outcomes 
 
72 
The benefits of a clinical pharmacist conducting a regular medication chart review 
were reported as reduced adverse drug events, reduced length of stay, reduced 
probability of readmission and reduced drug costs.43 
The second PRP Standard requests a medication reconciliation on admission be 
conducted and this is also very relevant as a clinical pharmacist could easily 
undertake this function in conjunction with either a doctor or nurse depending on the 
type of hospital setting. The value of the process has been vindicated by reports that 
between 60-70% of patients will have at least one discrepancy during their admission 
reconciliation process. In private hospital practice it is likely the medication history 
will be taken initially by a nurse and/or a clinical pharmacist, as most hospitals do 
not have junior medical staff and most doctors are Visiting Medical Officers. Some 
hospitals such as SJOGHS have a Preadmission Clinic where patients are initially 
screened by nursing staff and if considered high risk are referred for review by a 
clinical pharmacist. A review of 800 referral interviews of high risk surgical patients 
to the Preadmission Pharmacist in 2004-2005 at SJOGHS showed that 1.8 
pharmacist interventions for errors were noted per interview.51 The errors primarily 
were for omitted details (53%), omitted drug (29%), wrong dose (6%) and wrong 
drug name (2%). Of the omitted details they ranged from missing strength, dose, 
frequency and form in descending order.  
The SHPA Standards of Practice in Clinical Pharmacy42 outlined the roles that a 
clinical pharmacist must carry out within recommended pharmacist to patient ratios. 
The SHPA also produced a position statement which highlighted that an increased 
use of clinical pharmacists in hospitals, would lead to improved patient health 
outcomes and a better use of health resources.52 The ACSQH in a Fact Sheet in 2004 
stated that ―pharmacists in hospitals can support systems to reduce medication 
incidents, through patient and staff education, monitoring and medication review‖.53 
3.4.2 VALUE OF CLINICAL PHARMACIST INTERVENTIONS 
Since the eighties clinical pharmacists have felt the need to quantify and prove the 
value of their roles on the wards. This has led to the publication of numerous studies 
to demonstrate their value in Australian hospitals. These studies have demonstrated 
that clinical pharmacists reduced the length of stay, decreased the risk of readmission 
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and reduced the likelihood of adverse medication events such as drug toxicity or 
exacerbations of pre-existing medical conditions.54-56 
Evidence of positive outcomes and benefits achieved by having hospital based 
clinical pharmacists involved in patient care have been primarily focused on 
specialised areas such as cardiology, respiratory, psychiatry or intensive care.57,58,59,60 
Similar results have also been achieved in paediatric settings where the most 
common type of intervention or error noted was incorrect dosage and the most 
prevalent was overdosage.61 The American Society of Hospital Pharmacists 
published recommendations to prevent medication errors in hospitals and highlighted 
the level of undetected medication errors that exists while emphasising the role of the 
pharmacist in ensuring optimal use of a patients medicine by a systems orientated 
collaborative approach.62 This Guideline provided recommendations for prescribers, 
nurses and pharmacists to undertake to avoid medication error that are still valid 
today, including monitoring of drug therapy and availability at it‘s point of initiation, 
up to date knowledge,  good dispensing procedures, use of ancillary labels and good 
counselling techniques.62 
The publication by Dooley et al in 2004 not only showed improved patient health 
outcomes, but finally placed a financial value on the important interventions made by 
clinical pharmacists in Australia.43 This multicenter study across eight public 
hospitals demonstrated that for every $1 spent on clinical pharmacy services in drug 
therapy or management, approximately $23 was saved in hospital costs. These 
hospital costs were quantified as costs associated with patient readmission, decreased 
length of stay, medication cost savings and laboratory tests avoided. 
A Thai study in 2008, studied the cost savings associated with clinical pharmacist 
interventions in an Intensive Care setting.63 The study concluded that the pharmacist 
interventions yielded a reduced overall drug cost secondary to cost savings and 
adverse drug event cost avoidance.63 
Evaluating end user satisfaction via a survey is a way of evaluating the effectiveness 
and value placed on how a service is provided. A recent study provided an effective 
tool to measure perceptions and satisfaction of nursing staff pre and post the 
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introduction of a clinical pharmacy service to general surgery and gastrointestinal 
surgery wards.64 
3.4.3 CLINICAL PHARMACY SERVICE DELIVERY MODELS 
Different models of clinical pharmacy service have been investigated in an attempt to 
optimise the benefit associated with having a clinical pharmacist. The traditional 
model of having a clinical pharmacist assigned to a particular ward or wards is now 
being reviewed as to whether attachment to a medical team model would more 
effectively use the skills of a clinical pharmacist. A recent South Australian study 
demonstrated that the APAC guiding principles were partly achievable using either 
model.65 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
The range, acceptability and availability of clinical pharmacy services in hospitals 
has grown substantially over the past two decades in Australia. The acceptance of the 
clinical pharmacist as part of the multidisciplinary team has led to better patient 
outcomes and better and more cost effective medication management. The particular 
skills of the clinical pharmacist are now sought as an essential component in the 
effort to improve the process and reduce the chance of medication error occurring. 
Clinical pharmacist‘s activities or interventions have now been validated not only in 
their clinical value to reduce harm from medications, but have been costed out to 
demonstrate substantial financial benefit to the health care system. 
Clinical pharmacy services in private hospitals have struggled more than their 
counterparts in the public sector to achieve the funding required to employ sufficient 
staff to achieve satisfactory pharmacist to patient ratios. Private hospitals have had to 
use the revenue gained from PBS dispensing and reimbursement from the Health 
Insurance Commission to fund clinical pharmacy services, a funding model it was 
never intended to be used for. Currently no model of direct funding for clinical 
pharmacy services is available in the private sector on a fee per service basis and so 
despite their proven benefit of improving clinical outcomes for patients, clinical 
pharmacy services are still at risk. With the amount spent on the health dollar in 
Australia continuing to grow, scrutiny of every aspect is expected and highly 
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probable to include medication provision and any associated fees. This potential 
stressor on available revenue for private hospitals may reduce that hospitals 
willingness to entertain new or sustain current clinical pharmacy services levels. 
Given the recent surge in the publics‘ uptake of private health insurance and the 
expectations of the consumer to be admitted to a medication safe hospital, a dilemma 
may occur if tighter margins reduce the number of employed clinical pharmacists 
whose sole role is to intervene to make medication management safer. A new 
funding model would be required that is not linked to the supply of medications but 
more linked to a fee for service model to ensure an appropriate clinical pharmacist to 
patient ratio is maintained in private hospitals. 
The continued research into and collection of pharmacist interventions has been and 
will continue to be an important tool in ensuring the viability of clinical pharmacist 
services.  
The development of an agreed denominator e.g. occupied bed days, would ensure 
that consistent reproducible data would be obtained and would facilitate 
benchmarking against peer hospitals. In addition the problem of underreporting could 
be overcome by researching an electronic solution e.g. the use of wireless linked 
notebooks, that would allow immediate and live recording of any interventions made 
at the bedside.  
The inclusion and recording of pharmacist interventions into a centralised hospital 
incident reporting system, along with medication incidents and pharmacy dispensing 
errors, would ensure that their value would be reflected in regular hospital reports, 
avoid silos of information and would provide a complete picture of the medication 
safety status of a particular institution.  
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CHAPTER 4 UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES, RISK AND 
HARM ASSOCIATED WITH MEDICATION 
INCIDENTS AND DISPENSING ERRORS 
4.1 BACKGROUND 
In subsequent years post 2001-2002, with the increasing profile of the newly 
instituted Safety and Quality Departments in each St John of God Hospital, the focus 
shifted to attempting to increase the number of incidents reported from the numbers 
seen in 2001- 2002. This was due in part to underreporting in the past and the 
increased profile and status granted to medication safety in more recent years. By 
2005 SJOGHS had a full time Safety and Quality Department with a Manager and 
support staff, electronic direct reporting had been instituted replacing paper based 
forms and the hospital had been involved in major national medication safety 
initiatives including the National Medication Safety Breakthrough Collaborative 
Wave 2. 
Throughout this time the Pharmacy Department continued to provide a review of 
each medication incident reported. This review was to ensure that all the data 
pertaining to the incident had been collected and documented to provide an accurate 
account. From this the reviewing pharmacist (DCP) could gain an insight into the 
causes and contributing factors which led to the incident and then determine what 
actions needed to be taken to prevent their recurrence in the future. A record was 
maintained of the direct time involved in reviewing each incident and implementing 
any strategies to prevent the incident recurring. 
To facilitate this, a data recording sheet was developed which allowed the reviewer 
to focus on the most pertinent information required to make an assessment of why an 
incident occurred and what were the direct causes and contributing factors. 
Understanding of the why an incident occurred would focus our efforts on strategies 
to prevent recurrence of the same incident. 
In earlier attempts at collecting this information used by the reviewing pharmacist, 
the information collected was descriptive and not based on evidence, besides 
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experience of the practitioner or reviewer. Although any review was considered 
better than none a more reproducible approach was felt would have greater benefit. 
A review of the literature was undertaken to assess and compile a list of published 
causes and contributing factors that were involved in medication errors in a hospital 
setting. The provision of medication management to a patient in a hospital is very 
complex and involves a multiplicity of tasks carried out by many different health 
care professionals including medical practitioners, nurses and pharmacists. Having a 
good understanding of the tasks and processes involved and the role each profession 
plays were important factors in determining the causes as to why something could go 
wrong in the chain from prescribing, dispensing to administration of a medication.  
James Reason proposed the ―Swiss Cheese‘ model to explain the occurrence of 
system failures like medical mishaps.66,67 He postulated that hazards were prevented 
by barriers which had weak points or holes which open and close at random. If by 
chance the holes line up, the hazard reaches the patient and causes harm. This model 
draws attention away from the individual and onto the system and highlights 
randomness over deliberate action in error occurrence.66,67 The Reason ―Swiss 
Cheese Model‖66,67 demonstrated how complex this process was and the need for 
hospitals to put a number of barriers in place to ‗block off the holes in the cheese‘ or 
gaps in the system. These blocks comprise of many factors from appropriate 
medication charts, guidelines, policy and procedures, adequate training, readily 
available information resources and peer view by multidisciplinary committees to 
name a few. For an adverse event to occur, a number of factors must be in alignment 
i.e. the holes in the cheese must line up. The seriousness of the incident will depend 
on the outcome or harm suffered by the patient. 
Reason outlined that human rather than technical failures represented the greatest 
threat to complex systems such as healthcare.68 He stated human fallibility cannot be 
entirely eliminated.68 He described different error types that occurred in different 
parts of an organisation and needed different risk management strategies. These 
included slips, lapses, trips and fumbles (execution failures) and mistakes (planning 
failures) which are divided into rule based and knowledge based mistakes.68 Reason 
described the difference between errors (information problems) versus violations 
(motivational problems). He also spoke of active failures involving the direct contact 
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with the patient and latent failures on an organisational level which are slower to 
surface.68 
The Reason model for contributing factors for system failure68 was used as the basis 
for the contributing factors for the medication incident review process used at 
SJOGHS to allow us to more fully understand the why an incident occurred. Reason 
believed that ―human factors are a product of a chain of causes and the individual‘s 
psychological factors are the last and least manageable‖.68  
A structured analysis framework was then required to investigate the system 
conditions that contributed to an event.69,70 Root cause analysis (RCA) provides a 
systematic method to achieve this by learning the how and why (root/primary cause) 
an event happened and linking it to the effect seen and thus allowing the possibility 
of developing strategies to prevent it happening again in the future. As part of an 
RCA, there is a need to establish a causal link chain leading to a potential root cause 
and contributing factors.69,70 
So, as it was reasonable to understand the ‗how and why‘ an error occurred it was 
also necessary to define the outcome (effect) of that error and to determine two 
further parameters, i.e. the degree of risk for the organization associated with a 
particular incident and the degree of harm to the patient from each incident. By 
determining the extent of the risk and the harm involved, the organization or hospital 
can then be alerted at the appropriate level to ensure an appropriate review was 
undertaken commensurate with that risk or harm level. 
4.2 METHOD 
4.2.1 METHODOLOGY OF DEVELOPING A LIST OF CAUSES AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 
4.2.1.1 DEVELOPMENT OF A DATA COLLECTION SHEET 
The first step involved the preparation of a data collection sheet to be used by the 
reviewer. This process took multiple drafts to get to a point where the form prompted 
the reviewer to record the information in a sequential and logical manner. Each draft 
was trialled on different reviewers and all comments considered, to ensure the final 
draft was deemed suitable to collect all the appropriate information. The details that 
were finally agreed upon (Table 4.1) (Appendix 10) were complemented with some 
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room for a short summary of the medication incident. It was hoped to have seven to 
eight incidents summarized on each form and they would be maintained in hard copy 
in a file kept for that purpose in the Pharmacy Department. This process would allow 
the reviewer the opportunity to identify any trends that may be occurring, e.g. the 
same error recurring on the same or different wards or a spike in the number of 
reports being submitted from a particular area. Having identified a trend, the 
reviewing pharmacist could then alert senior hospital staff and suggest some 
remedial action, e.g. suggesting the initiation of some education at the local level or 
throughout the hospital, or suggesting improvements in the use of therapy or 
medication charts or the development of guidelines that may further assist staff 
understand a task and avoid that error in the future. 
Table 4.1 Data collected for medication incident review process 












Date of review 
Time taken (minutes) 
Brief description of incident 
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4.2.1.2 DETERMINATION OF CAUSES & CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OF MEDICATION INCIDENTS 
In 2002 as part of the medication incident review process by the hospital‘s 
Medication Policy and Procedure Sub Committee, a trend in causes of errors became 
apparent as similar errors or system breaches repeatedly occurred. This led to the 
development of a list of the most common ‗causal statements‘ or primary reasons for 
medication errors noted in the hospital. No literature addressed the issue of 
contributing factors for medication errors in a private hospital but the general system 
failures outlined did have some application.69,70 In order to determine their relevance 
to private hospital practice numerous meetings were held with the clinical 
pharmacists at SJOGHS in early 2006. These statements it was felt did not go far 
enough as it became obvious that the causes of medication error were often 
multifactorial. While a statement may give a description of what happened or the 
primary reason it did not dig down to the factors that contributed to the error. 
Then the ‗causal statements‘ were grouped into those relevant to the major 
classification of medication errors i.e. prescribing, dispensing and administration 
errors (Table 4.2). A range of ―contributing factors‖ could then sit under each casual 
statement based on the systems factors already identified but would reflect practice at 
SJOGHS.69,70 It was noted that some contributing factors doubled as causal 
statements and that similar contributing factors would be used under the different 
types of error causal statements. After a number of versions, the current draft 
(Appendix 10) was seen as the best fit for our hospital and the type of errors we were 
exposed to. 
The new process for medication incident review (which was primarily for 
administration errors) would in future now include the following new steps: 
 classification of the error type‘ into initially a prescribing, dispensing, or 
administration error classification,  
 followed by a determination as to ‗what caused the incident‘ (primary 
reason/causal statement), and then 
 noting any obvious ‗contributing factors‘ (why it happened/what contributed to 
the primary cause) 
 leading to preventative action to stop recurrence of the event. 
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Table 4.2 Causal statements for medication incidents 
Prescribing: 1. Unclear medication orders 
 2. Medication order written incorrectly 
 3. Medication order not charted by medical staff 
 a. admission medication missed 
 b. expired medication chart not rewritten 
 c. variable dose omitted 
Dispensing: 1. Pharmacy dispensing error 
 2. Stock not issued by pharmacy or received on ward 
 3. Out of date medication supplied to ward or directly to patient 
Administration: 1. Nursing oversight (missed dose on chart) 
 a. verbal/short term order (once only) from front of chart 
 b. variable dose from front of chart 
 c. regular charted medication order 
 d. separate therapy chart existed 
 2. Misinterpretation of medication order 
 3. Deviation from nursing policy 
 4. Delivery device (e.g. IV pump) programmed incorrectly 
 5. Use of gravity fed IV Infusions instead of IV pumps 
 6. Lack of knowledge/understanding of the medication order 
 7. Stock unavailable 
 8. Stock misplaced 
 9. Error in discharge process 
 a. medications not given to patient 
 b. medications given to wrong patient 
 10. Wrong medication chosen from imprest or patient’s own 
 11. Out of date medications administered by nurse to patient 
 12. Inadequate storage of medications 
 13. Unclear documentation of medication order 
 14. Other 
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Table 4.3 Contributing factors to medication incidents (v4 December 2006) 
1. INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL 
FACTORS 
2. WORK ENVIRONMENT 
A. Hospital bed not available 
B. Ward bed not available 
C. Constraints on operating theatre 
D. Required facilities not available 
E. Managers not supportive 
F. Administrative support inadequate 
G. Medication/therapy charts poorly designed 
A. Workload excessive 
B. Inadequate staffing levels 
C. Equipment not available or poorly maintained 
D. Poor design of equipment leading to error 
E. Other equipment problems e.g. chute 
malfunction 
F. Lost in transit (medications +/-chart) 
G. Use of casual or agency staff- unfamiliar with 
patient or processes 
H. Interruptions during complex task 
I. Excessive noise 
J. Procedure/Guidelines not provided 
3. COMMUNICATION AND TEAM FACTORS 4. INDIVIDUAL (STAFF) FACTORS 
A. Communication between junior and senior 
staff 
B. Communication between departments 
C. Abnormal results not communicated 
D. Relevant information not communicated 
E. Documentation inadequacies 
F. Management plan not documented 
G. Insufficient information to receiving team on 
referral 
H. Insufficient supervision of junior staff 
I. Senior staff not available or not responsive 
J. Unclear definition of responsibilities 
K. Lack of checking procedure 
L. Staff not made aware of hospital policy 
A. Unwillingness to seek assistance 
B. Inadequate knowledge or skills 
C. Inexperience 
D. Incompetence 
E. Hospital policies/protocols not followed 
F. Lapse in concentration 
G. Technical error 
H. Error of judgement 
I. Physical or mental health factors 
J. Overseas trained staff 
K. Personal issues 
L. New staff member 
5. TASK FACTORS 6. PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS 
A. Poor task design or unclear instructions 
B. Procedure/guidelines not available/accessible 
C. Inadequate training or education 
D. Inaccurate test results 
E. Too many steps in procedure (complex) 
 
F. Patient condition (complexity and seriousness) 
G. Patient co-morbidities 
H. Patient unavailable 
I. Patient sleeping 
J. Patient refused dose 
K. Non-disclosure of medications 
L. Financial hardship 
M. Behavioural issue 
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4.2.2 CAUSES AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS FOR DISPENSING ERRORS 
Following the successful development of causal statements and contributing factors 
for medication incidents, the model was considered applicable to pharmacy 
dispensary errors. A similar process was undertaken using the same system factors as 
a starting point. Consultation was had with the dispensing pharmacists with regard to 
the contributing factors (Table 4.3) already developed for medication incidents as to 
their suitability for dispensing errors. A consensus approach was taken to determine 
those that were deemed suitable or to identify specific contributing factors relevant to 
private hospital pharmacy practice. 
Following a series of meetings in 2006, the DCP, clinical pharmacists and dispensing 
pharmacists agreed to a list prepared using the same model. 
4.2.2.1 CAUSAL STATEMENTS OR PRIMARY CAUSES OF DISPENSING ERRORS 
The first step undertaken was to identify the primary causes of dispensing errors by 
pharmacists. The group concluded that there were three major types of error being 
identified. These included: 
1. Choosing or selection errors by the pharmacist (or technician) 
2. Misinterpretation errors of prescription orders written by the doctor 
3. Processing or transmission errors from the medication chart to the computerised 
label generation programme. 
4.2.2.2 CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO DISPENSING ERRORS  
The contributing factors chart for dispensing errors was developed (Table 4.4) using 
the already developed medication incidents contributing factors (Table 4.3) as a 
starting template. The same six major system factors were identified as relevant to 
this class of error as they were for medication incidents. They included: 
1. Institutional/Organisational and Departmental factors 
2. Work Environment 
3. Communication and Team factors 
4. Individual (Staff) factors 
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5. Task factors  
6. Patient Characteristics. 
Where required and when considered more relevant to the dispensing process, new 
contributing factors were identified specifically for dispensing errors by the group. 
Table 4.4 Contributing factors to dispensing errors (v2 June 2006) 
1. INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL 
FACTORS 
2. WORK ENVIRONMENT 
A. Medication not available 
B. Similar medication names 
C. Similar packaging 
D. Medication incorrectly located on shelf 
E. Lack of chute canisters to supply wards 
 
A. Workload excessive  
B. Inadequate staffing 
C. Reduced staffing e.g. after-hours or 
weekends 
D. Equipment not available or poorly 
maintained e.g. chute or computer 
systems down 
E. Excessive noise 
F. Distractions  
G. Multiple interruptions e.g. phone, staff, 
other duties 
3. COMMUNICATION AND TEAM FACTORS 4. INDIVIDUAL (STAFF) FACTORS 
A. Communication between departments 
B. Relevant information not communicated 
C. Documentation inadequacies 
D. Insufficient supervision of junior staff 
E. Senior staff not available or not 
responsive 
F. Unclear definition of responsibilities 
G. Poorly written/unclear orders 
H. Requests for multiple patients on same 
requisition 
A. Unwillingness to seek advice 
B. Inadequate knowledge or skills e.g. 
unfamiliar with medication 
C. Inexperience 
D. Incompetence 
E. Hospital policies/protocols not followed 
F. Dispensing policies/protocols not 
followed 
G. Breach of dispensing checking procedure 
H. Lapse in concentration- oversight 
I. Interpretation error 
J. Physical or mental health factors- sick 
5. TASK FACTORS 6. PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS 
A. Poor task design or unclear instruction 
B. Protocol not available 
C. Inadequate training or education 
D. Key stroke error on computer 
A. Patient condition (complexity and 
seriousness) 
B. Patient co morbidities- multiple 
medications 
C. Drug Alert status 
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4.2.3 MEDICATION INCIDENTS SEVERITY OR HARM 
During the National Medication Safety Breakthrough Collaborative (NMSBC) a tool 
called the ―Harmometer‖ (Appendix 11) was introduced to the teams. This defined 
harm into nine levels from A to J with the initial A to D levels defined as causing 
‗potential harm‘, and the next five, E to J, describing ‗actual harm‘, with J as Death 
as a result of the incident (Table 4.5). This ―Harmometer‖ tool was based on a tool 
developed by the American National Coordinating Council for Medication Error 
Reporting and Prevention (NCCMERP) Index for categorising medication errors71 
and was adopted by SJOGHS to define harm (Appendix 12). 
Table 4.5 Level of harm associated with an incident 
Harm level Description of harm level 
Level A: No error/harm - but potentially injurious circumstances 
Level B:  Error occurred, didn't reach patient 
Level C:  Error reached patient, not harmful 
Level D:  Not harmful, increased monitoring 
Level E:  Additional treatment, intervention, temporary harm 
Level F:  Prolonged hospitalisation, temporary harm 
Level G:  Permanent patient harm 
Level H:  Near-death event (MET, ICU required) 
Level I:  Death 
 
From our medication safety definitions we know that a ―Near Miss” is a potential 
incident that did not cause harm,4 i.e. a potential incident that was discovered before 
it occurred (e.g. nurse identifies a wrongly chosen medication from the imprest 
cupboard or a wrongly dispensed or labelled medication arrived from pharmacy and 
did not administer it). Thus, ―near misses‖ could be identified from a harm rating 
point of view as Category A or B for if the patient does not take or use the 
medication then this is interpreted as NOT having reached the patient. Whilst 
―reaching the patient‖ means patient administered the medication, i.e. Category C 
and above and this would not be considered a ―near miss‖. 
Similarly the same harm scale can be applied to our dispensing errors to assess the 
level of harm associated with each error category.. 
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It is well accepted that all incidents and adverse events must be reported on a hospital 
incident form. Similarly all ‗near misses‘ that are prevented at 
ward/department/outpatient level, should also be reported on a hospital incident form 
to ensure that those breaches in the system are highlighted and lessons are learnt 
from the experience. This holds true for errors that are reported through the 
medication incident system or are reported by the Pharmacy Department as 
dispensing errors. ‘Near misses‘ in the Pharmacy Department, i.e. that do not leave 
the department, should be reported in house via the pharmacy dispensing error book. 
Pharmacists are also encouraged to report all errors that have left the department that 
they are made aware of and whether they have requested an incident form to be 
commenced. This process ensures that errors are not counted twice. 
4.2.4 RISK ASSESSMENT TOOL 
The hospital and SJOGHC nationally adopted a Risk Rating Matrix to classify risk 
for the organisation. This type of risk assessment is used regularly as a hazard 
management tool in industry or is called a ‗process hazards analysis‘. This Risk 
Rating Matrix was formulated by assessing the ―Consequence of the incident‖ with 
the ―Likelihood‖ of the incident occurring or recurring and was based on the 
AS/NZS 4360: Risk Management Standard.72 
The consequences are qualitative statements that helped the reviewer to assess the 
impact of the incident on patients, contractors/visitors, caregivers, facility/security, 
reputation/public confidence and complaints, finance and administration, and 
organisational accreditation/licensing. This process establishes gaols for each area 
and allows easy identification of any risk. Using these descriptor terms the reviewer 
could then add a weighting to that consequence from negligible to critical (Table 
4.6.) 
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Table 4.6 Consequences (Qualitative) of an incident 







The likelihood is the likelihood of the frequency of the incident with its 
consequences occurring again (Table 4.7). 
Table 4.7 Likelihood of occurrence of an incident 
Description of occurrence Frequency rating 
Almost certain Weekly 
Likely Monthly 
Occasionally 3-5 times per year 
Unlikely 1-2 times per year 
Rare Less than 1 per year 
 
By then applying the appropriate likelihood rating with the chosen consequence 
rating the risk matrix can be used to assess the risk with that particular incident and 
the appropriate action or alert can immediately be put in place after this evaluation of 
the risk. The risk rating can range from Extreme A Risk to Low Risk (Table 4.8). 
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Table 4.8 Risk matrix assessment tool 
Likelihood Consequence 
 Critical Major Moderate Minor Negligible 
Almost certain Extreme A Extreme A Extreme B High High 
Likely Extreme A Extreme A High High Medium 
Occasionally Extreme A Extreme B High Medium Low 
Unlikely extreme B extreme B Medium Low Low 
Rare Extreme B Extreme B Medium Low Low 
 
Each level of risk from the matrix is associated with an ―Action required‖, with the 
greater the risk, the higher the need to inform hospital management and/or executive 
staff members and the quicker the action that must be taken. (Table 4.9) 
Table 4.9 Action required as result of risk assessment 
Risk Level Action Required 
Extreme A Immediate action needed and monitored by Directors. Initiate RCA. Notify 
National Risk Manager 
Extreme B Immediate action needed and monitored by Directors. Initiate investigation, 
corrective action, preventative measures. Notify National Risk Manager 
High Manager responsibility, Director involvement where appropriate 
Medium Managers responsibility. Link action requirements with department planning 
process 
Low Managers responsibility through procedure review and quality activities 
 




4.3.1 MEDICATION INCIDENTS AND THE HARM RATING SCALE 
Following review of our cohort of medication incidents from 2001- 2002, we can see 
(Figure 4.1) that the  majority of incidents are classified with regard to harm, as 
being between A and D and so have a potential for harm. The results indicate that 
58% (94/162) of errors are in Level C where the error reached the patient (i.e. taken 
by the patient) but caused no harm. Only 7% of incidents are rated E or above where 
harm was considered to have occurred. Two incidents are rated as Level H which 
necessitated an admission to Intensive Care Unit or the Emergency Response Team 
was called. 
Figure 4.1 Outcome Level of medication Incidents 
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4.3.2 DISPENSING ERRORS AND HARM RATING SCALE 
As noted earlier the same harm rating scale can be applied to our dispensing error 
reports but with some slight differences. The assigning of a ranking for severity for 
pharmacy dispensing errors will depend on who is reviewing it as the Pharmacy 
Department would view some dispensing errors more seriously from their 
perspective than others in the hospital may. This is because accuracy in dispensing is 
paramount for the pharmacy profession and the department has to maintain high 
levels of compliance with dispensing processes to minimize the chance of error. 
The hospital would view the first two levels of harm (Category A and B) as 
equivalent to ‗near miss‘ events but from the Pharmacy Department perspective there 
would be only one ‗near miss‘ category (Category A), as the Pharmacy Department 
would consider any error that left the department more seriously.  
 Error noted before leaving the department and corrected (Category A) 
 Error that left the Pharmacy Department but noted before reaching the patient, 
returned and corrected (Category B) 
This latter example (Category B) is more serious from a pharmacy perspective as it 
has a greater potential for harm and the Pharmacy Department would consider any 
wrongly dispensed item leaving the department a ‗Pharmacy Dispensing Incident‘ 
regardless of whether it reached the patient or not.  
Similarly dispensing errors noted that did get to the patient, i.e. patients drawer or 
possession, but have not been taken by or administered to the patient, would also be 
categorised as Category B by the hospital but the Pharmacy Department would 
consider these incidents more serious in their potential for harm. Hence, Pharmacy 
would subcategorise these errors as Category B2 – incorrect medication is in the 
patient‘s possession or medication drawer but not taken. 
Errors noted after reaching the patient and after being administered, but that caused 
no harm were deemed Category C. Errors that reached the patient and were 
administered and lead to increased monitoring only were Category D. 
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All categories would be adjudged in the same manner as medication incidents with 
categories A to D a measure of potential for harm and the subsequent categories E to 
I defining errors that cause actual harm to the patient. 
Table 4.10 Level of harm associated with each dispensing error type 2001-02 
Dispensing Level of Harm 
Error Type A B B.2 C D E F G H I Total 
2.1.1 0 2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
2.1.2 0 12 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 15 
2.2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2.5 3 18 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 
2.6 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
2.7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.9 1 3 3 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 13 
2.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.14.1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
2.14.2 0 9 5 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 23 
2.15.1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2.15.2 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Totals 4 53 13 21 4 0 0 0 0 0 95 
 
When we review the most frequently reported dispensing error types (Table 3.9) by 
harm (Table 4.10) we can see the degree of potential harm associated with these 
errors as no error was categorised above Category D. 
Wrong patient, error type 2.5 (n =24/95), is represented in harm categories A (3/24), 
B (18/24) and B2 (3/24). Whilst error type 2.14.2 (n = 23/95) i.e. wrong strength of 
medication/correct label, is represented in the harm categories B (9/23), B2 (5/23), C 
(8/23), and D (1/23). Finally wrong medication/correct label, error type 2.1.2 (n 
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=15/95) is represented in harm categories B (12/15), B2 (2/15), and D (1/15). As can 
be seen from Figure 4.2 and Table 4.11 no errors were considered likely to have 
caused a patient any actual harm (i.e. harm Category E or above)  
Figure 4.2 Severity or harm rating per dispensing error type 














































































As shown in table 4.11 the majority (69.5%) of dispensing errors were categorised 
with a potential for harm of category B (B + B2), with 22.1% as Category C. Very 
small numbers (4/95) are categorised as Category A or D. 
 
Table 4.11 Dispensing errors per harm rating 
Level of Harm Number of dispensing 
errors  
(n) 
Proportion of dispensing 
errors 
 % 
A 4 4.2 
B 53 55.8 
B.2 13 13.7 
C 21 22.1 
D 4 4.2 
E and above 0 0 
Total 95 100% 
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Figure 4.3 Harm rating per dispensing errors 











































For the year 2001-2002 the dispensing errors reported were all rated as level A to 
level D and as such were viewed as potential errors. From the hospital‘s perspective 
73.7% of errors (70/95) were considered near misses (i.e. Level A and B1 and B2) 
and did not reach the patient (Table 4.11). The Pharmacy Department would consider 
that only 4.3% (4/95) were near misses as the rest of the errors left the Pharmacy 
Department.  
Of the Category B dispensing errors that did not reach the patient, i.e. not 
administered to the patient, 55.8% were intercepted before reaching the patient‘s 
bedside locker or their possession and were picked up at the collection point at the 
chute, the bench in the ward medication room or the nurse‘s station. A further 13.8% 
(13/95), Category B2, were found in the patient‘s possession or in the patient‘s 
locked medication drawer. 
Of those errors that were administered to the patient 22.2% (21/95) caused no harm 
whilst a further 4.2% (4/95) required some extra monitoring to be carried out.  
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4.3.2.1 BREAKDOWN OF DISPENSING ERRORS PER HARM RATING CATEGORY 
The number of dispensing errors with a Harm Level A category rating i.e. discovered 
before leaving the Dispensary or inpatient pharmacy department was small (Figure 
4.4) and in 75% of cases the error involved the medication being dispensed to the 
wrong patient. 
Figure 4.4 Level A Harm dispensing errors 











The largest category of dispensary errors had a Level B Harm rating. This category 
was further subdivided in category B and category B.2 where the dispensing error 
had left the department but had not reached or been administered to the patient 
(Figure 4.5). The level B.2 level is a pharmacy indicator to more closely reflect 
dispensed items that got as far as the patient‘s bedside or locked medication drawer 
before the error was noted. The most frequent dispensing errors seen with a Level B 
harm rating were ‗wrong medication/correct label‘ (22.6%) and wrong patient (34%) 
and ‗wrong strength/correct label‘ (17%). 
 
Medication Incidents in a Private Hospital: Frequency, type, causes and outcomes 
 
95 
Figure 4.5 Level B Harm dispensing errors 





Wrong strength medication, correct 
label, 17%
Wrong from medication, wrong 
label, 1.9%
Wrong form medication, correct 
label, 5.7% Wrong medication, wrong label, 
3.8%
Wrong medication, correct label, 
22.6%
 
The Level B2 category of harm is deemed more serious by the Pharmacy Department 
than by the hospital as they reached the patient but were not administered to the 
patient. It is interesting to note that ‗wrong patient‘ (23%) and wrong 
medication/correct label‘ (15.4%) and ‗wrong strength/correct label‘ (38.5%) again 
provided the majority of errors as they did in the Level B Harm category (Figure 
4.6). 
Figure 4.6 Level B2 Harm dispensing errors 
 
Dispensing Errors with a B.2 Harm Rating 
Wrong strength medication, correct  
label, 38.5% 
Wrong dose, 23.1% 
Wrong patient, 23.1% 
Wrong medication, correct label,  
15.4% 
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Dispensing errors with a Level C harm rating were the second largest category 
(22.1%) after Level B (Table 4.11). In this category the wrongly dispensed 
medication was administered to the patient but was deemed not to have caused any 
harm. The majority of errors (38.1%) involved the wrong strength/correct label, i.e. 
the wrong strength was chosen but the correct strength was processed and reflected 
on the label (Figure 4.7). This was followed by ‗wrong dose‘ (23.8%) and wrong 
medication/wrong label (19%). All of these errors have potential for harm with either 
the wrong dose being administered or the entirely wrong medication being 
administered to the patient. 
Figure 4.7 Level C Harm dispensing errors 
 
Dispensing Errors with a C Harm Rating
Wrong strength medication, wrong 
label, 4.8%





Wrong medication, wrong label, 
19%
Wrong form medication, correct 
label, 4.8%
 
In the case of Level D errors the medication was administered to the patient and 
deemed would have had some pharmacological effect on the patient and hence 
required some monitoring to take place. This category only reflected 4.2% of 
dispensing errors (Table 4.11) and was the most serious category of harm identified 
with our dispensing errors in this 2001-2002 cohort. Each error type involved, 
(Figure 4.8), could have serious consequences with the wrong medication, wrong 
doses or wrong strength being administered to the patient. 
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Figure 4.8 Level D Harm dispensing errors 
Dispensing Errors with a D Harm Rating
Wrong strength medication, wrong 
label, 25%
Wrong strength medication, correct 
label 25%
Wrong dose, 25%




4.3.3 CAUSAL STATEMENTS AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO DISPENSING ERRORS 
Following the development of a table of contributing factors to dispensing errors by 
pharmacists (Table 4.4), each of the dispensing error categories were reviewed by a 
group of pharmacists and the DCP as to the most likely applicable contributing 
causes. Where possible, a causal statement or primary reason for the error was 
initially identified and then the agreed likely contributing factors added. Each factor 
was then ranked as to their perceived importance or priority by the group at that time. 
The results of this process are outlined below in the following tables (Tables 4.12 to 
4.17). 
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Table 4.12 Dispensing error codes 2.1.1, 2.1.2 
Dispensing error 
Code and Description 





Interpretation 1. Poorly written-unclear order 
2. Similar names 
3. Confused with generic name 
4. Unfamiliar generic name 
5. Unfamiliar with drug 
6. Drug knowledge 
7. Sickness 
M2.1.2 Wrong 
medication / correct 
label 
Breach in checking 
procedure 
1. Distraction e.g. excessive noise 
2. Multiple interruptions 
3. Similar drug names 
4. Similar packaging 
5. Drug stored in incorrect location 
6. Busy workload 
 












 1. Poorly written/unclear order 
2. Breach in checking procedures 
3. Drug knowledge- unfamiliar with drug 
M2.3 Wrong time  Not relevant to dispensing errors 
Suggest deletion 
M2.4 Wrong route  1. Poorly written/unclear order 
2. Breach in checking procedures 
3. Drug knowledge- unfamiliar with drug 
M2.5 Wrong 
patient 
Breach in checking 
procedure 
1. Busy workload 
2. Distractions e.g. noise 
3. Interruptions e.g. phone, attendance at 
front counter, drug information queries 
4. Computer entry not cleared from 
previous patient 
5. Incorrect key entry for patient e.g. Wrong 
UR number entered 
 








Primary Cause Contributing Factors -Ranked according 
to probability 
M2.6 Incorrect 
labelling - drug 
name, form, 
strength 
Breach in checking 
procedure 






Breach in checking 
procedure 
1. In date stock not ordered 




Breach in checking 
procedure 
1. Drug not available at the time 
2. Delivery not received from supplier 
3. Not ordered when stocks low 
M2.9 Wrong dose Breach in checking 
procedure 
1. Poorly written/unclear order 
2. Drug knowledge 
3. Unfamiliar with drug 
 












Breach in checking 
procedure 
1. Not packaged effectively for transporting 
i.e. refrigeration, chemotherapy, chute 
system 
M2.11 Theft or loss Breach in checking 
procedure 
1. Sent to wrong ward or department 
2. Chute malfunction 
3. Supply misplaced by nursing staff e.g. 
placed in wrong patients drawer, not given 
to patient on discharge or transfer 
M2.12 Schedule 8 
discrepancy 
Breach in checking 
procedure 
1. Schedule 8s sent in chute and not handed 
to an authorised person 
2. Schedule 8s not signed into S8 register 
3. Signed incorrectly into the S8 register 
4. Nurse did not check the movement 
properly on receipt or on placing into ward 
safe 
M2.13 Previous 
drug reaction and 
dispensed 
Breach in checking 
procedure 
1. Not recorded on all charts 
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Primary Cause Contributing Factors -Ranked 
according to probability 
M2.14.1 Wrong 
strength/wrong label 
Interpretation 1. Poorly written-unclear order 
2. Similar names 
3. Confused with generic name 
4. Unfamiliar generic name 
5. Unfamiliar with drug 





Breach in checking 
procedure 
1. Distraction e.g. excessive noise 
2. Multiple interruptions 
3. Similar drug names 
4. Similar packaging 
5. Drug stored in incorrect location 
6. Busy workload 
 
Table 4.17 Dispensing error codes 2.15.1 and 2.15.2 
Dispensing error  
Code and Description 
Primary Cause Contributing Factors -Ranked 
according to probability 
M2.15.1 Wrong form/ 
wrong label 
Interpretation 1. Poorly written-unclear order 
2. Similar names 
3. Confused with generic name 
4. Unfamiliar generic name 
5. Unfamiliar with drug 
6. Drug knowledge 
7. Sickness 
M2.15.2 Wrong form / 
correct label 
Breach in checking 
procedure 
1. Distraction e.g. excessive noise 
2. Multiple interruptions 
3. Similar drug names 
4. Similar packaging 
5. Drug stored in incorrect location 
6. Busy workload 




A series of primary causes or causal statements and contributing factors specific to 
SJOGHS have now been developed, based on the system factors identified.68-70   These 
are assigned to each medication incident and pharmacy dispensing error and play a 
major role in assisting the Pharmacy Department in understanding the ―why‖ an 
incident occurred and in developing preventative strategies to avoid them in the future. 
The contributing factors for medication incidents were developed initially and then 
used as the basis for a similar set of contributing factors for dispensing errors.  In 
conjunction with this a Risk Rating and Harm Rating scale have now been included for 
all incidents saved on the electronic system Risk- Pro™ used by the organisation. 
Following the review of our cohort of medication incidents from 2001-2002, we can 
see (Figure 4.1) that the great majority of incidents were classified, with regard to 
harm, as being between category A and D and had a potential for harm. Only 7% of  
medication incidents were rated E or above where actual harm was considered to 
have occurred and two incidents were rated as Level H which necessitated an 
admission to the Intensive Care Unit or the Emergency Response Team was called.  
The majority of dispensing errors had a harm category rating of Level A and B and 
were considered ‗near misses‘ as they were picked up before they reached the 
patient. Level B errors were picked up after they left the Pharmacy Department but 
before they were administered to the patient and constituted the majority of 
dispensing errors. Owing to the seriousness that Pharmacy viewed these errors a new 
Level B.2 category was developed for dispensing errors that had reached the patient, 
i.e. in their medication drawer or in the possession of the patient, but had not been 
administered. Of the dispensing errors that were administered to the patient only a 
very small number required increased monitoring. This study indicated that 
dispensing errors had a potential for harm but were less likely to cause actual harm 
compared to medication incidents. 
Preventative strategies to avoid medication errors in Australian hospitals were 
identified over a decade ago. 73 They included some we have made progress with 
including increased awareness of labelling and drug packaging issues, prescribing 
abbreviations, structured medication charts, use of ward based clinical pharmacists and 
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improved medication admission histories and education of patients on discharge. But 
other strategies such as electronic physician ordering, prescribing education for junior 
medical staff and individual patient dispensing are still not sufficiently advanced. 
More recently a Western Australian study reviewed ward-based clinical pharmacists 
identified clinically significant errors in prescribing, dispensing or the administration 
of drugs, during their routine clinical rounds.74 A senior pharmacist then selected 
incidents for study based on whether preventable errors had caused actual or potential 
patient harm. Staff members involved in the errors were interviewed to determine what 
may have contributed to the error and how it could be avoided in the future.  
The study noted that attentional slips, memory lapses and knowledge-based mistakes 
commonly occurred when staff were busy, distracted or tired — often when they 
were working after hours or on long shifts or were dealing with patients who were 
unfamiliar or had complex conditions.74 Communication problems between or within 
specific teams or failing to acquire relevant information before prescribing or 
administering unfamiliar drugs were also identified as contributing factors.74.  
The participants in the study emphasised vigilance and personal responsibility. They 
considered drug prescribing, dispensing and administration high-risk clinical tasks 
that needed to be performed meticulously and without interruption at all times.74  
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
The development and use of a risk assessment matrix and a harm rating system allied 
with appropriate coding of medication errors has advanced greatly the understanding 
of the different types of errors that exist, their frequency and potential for recurrence 
and for causing harm to the patient. Developing and understanding the cause of an 
error and the apportioning of contributing factors to each incident is the most valid 
method of learning from an error category and helping to reduce the likelihood of 
that medication incident recurring again. Investing the time to review and debrief 
participants in serious or harmful medication incidents in a structured manner has the 
potential to further deepen the understanding of why errors occur during the complex 
clinical task that is medication management.  
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CHAPTER 5 DEVELOP STRATEGIES TO REDUCE 
MEDICATION ERROR 
5.1 BACKGROUND 
By 2001, the Commonwealth Government had identified that to ensure the safe and 
quality use of medicines partnerships were required with private hospital practice and 
not just public sector hospitals. The Private Health Industry Quality and Safety 
(PHIQS) Committee was established in 2001 to lead and coordinate safety initiatives 
in this sector. A coordinated approach begun with the first ‗Safety and Quality of 
Medicines- Issues for the Private Sector Workshop‖, held 17-18 October 2002 in 
Sydney under the auspices of PHIQS.17 This workshop put private health on the 
agenda and initially focused on two key areas: firstly ‗continuum of quality use of 
medicines from hospital to home‘ and secondly ‗organisational structures, including 
medication advisory committees‘.17  At the workshop it was identified that the 
success of the government‘s initiatives required private health to become fully 
involved. To do this it was recognised that private hospital practice was diffuse and 
initiatives had to differentiated to accommodate local requirements.17 Greater 
education and understanding of initiatives had to be established to ensure appropriate 
governance occurred around medication safety.17 This workshop crystallised the 
need for published work on medication incidents in the private health arena and to 
provide information on the type, frequency and causes of medication errors in that 
setting. 
In order to progress the stated aims of the PHIQS meeting, it was essential to 
understand some of the issues more fully that influenced private hospital pharmacy 
practice and made it so complex and different to the public hospital sector. Private 
hospital pharmacies have to incorporate the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme into 
their provision of medications to hospital patients despite the Scheme being designed 
for community not hospital practice. Similarly they need to accommodate the goals 
of the different ownership models that exist for private hospitals in Australia, i.e. 
―Not For Profit‖ and ―For Profit‖ hospitals which may directly affect the motivation 
to embrace additional pharmacy services that go beyond the supply of medications 
function. In addition to different models of ownership, different location models 
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existed for pharmacy services which could influence the ability of that service to 
respond to a request for change from the Government. In addition patients are 
expected to pay for any services received from their hospital stay, treatment and 
medications and this can be further compounded by the health insurers‘ relationship 
with the hospital owners. Private hospitals are in the main serviced by Specialist 
Visiting Medical Officers (VMOs) who are not routinely on site and they have few 
or no junior medical staff. The hospitals are predominantly led by nursing staff who 
provide the bulk of the permanent staff caring for patients. 
The PHIQS meeting in 200217 had challenged the attendees to determine the extent 
of the medication safety practices in private hospitals as there was little or no 
knowledge in comparison to public sector practice.  
As part of this research project a survey to ascertain information on how medication 
safety practices were managed in Australian Private Hospitals was undertaken. 
Firstly this was to establish an understanding of the extent of medication incident 
reporting and management and secondly to establish what role if any hospital 
pharmacy service providers played in the process.  
5.1.1 FUNDING FOR PRIVATE HOSPITAL MEDICATIONS 
5.1.1.1 PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS SCHEME 
Private hospital health care practice is based on a user pays model which includes 
medications. The funding streams used for medications are more familiar to 
community pharmacy based patient care. In this regard Australia is unique in having 
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Schedule (PBS) as a means to provide to the community 
subsidized medications.75 The PBS directs the payment of specified fees to 
pharmacies for the cost of acquisition, the process of dispensing and provision of 
consumer information. These arrangements for PBS dispensing are set out in five 
year agreements negotiated between the Pharmacy Guild of Australia (representing 
pharmacy owners) and the Australian Commonwealth Government and are known as 
Community Pharmacy Agreements (CPAs).76 The Fifth CPA was signed on the 3rd 
May 2010.76 
The cost of PBS medications is shared by the patient and the Australian Government. 
Different patient co-payments exist depending on the cost of the medication and the 
Medication Incidents in a Private Hospital: Frequency, type, causes and outcomes 
 
107 
reduced contribution of those entitled to concessions.76 Reimbursement from the 
Australian Government is a very complex, time consuming, predominantly paper 
based system. On the other hand, payment to pharmacy for non-PBS listed 
medications are the full responsibility of the patient unless their private insurance 
company has a specific arrangement with that hospital. 
The incorporation of the PBS into private hospital practice adds a degree of 
complexity to hospital pharmacy practice that is not catered for in the workload and 
staffing models for Pharmacy Services published in Australia.42,77 These public 
sector based research models suggest responsibilities to be performed by the clinical 
pharmacist and staffing models based on pharmacist to bed ratios that specifically do 
not cater for any dispensing, supply, or the associated paperwork required to access 
reimbursement of PBS listed items. This complex activity though, is essential to 
recover the funds for the medications needed to treat a hospitalised patient and to 
provide compensation for the supply functions, with a fee to dispense. This fee is an 
essential element of the profit making ability of a pharmacy and covers the clinical 
pharmacy and stock management services provided.78 In a typical community 
pharmacy, 70 per cent of sales income is derived from the PBS benefit-paid 
prescriptions.76 
To be permitted to dispense PBS listed medications, a pharmacy must hold a PBS 
license which is obtained on application to the Australian Community Pharmacy 
Authority (ACPA).76 ACPA can issue two different licenses to applicants. They are, 
a full license to dispense PBS medications to any member of the public (Section 90 
approval), or a restricted license for inpatient hospital PBS use (Section 94 approval). 
The latter restricted license holders cannot service the general public and are only 
allowed to dispense PBS medications for inpatient or discharge purposes. This 
restricted license is common in private hospitals,78 and where it exists, a section 90 
license holder is allowed to operate on or near the campus to cater for the general 
public including hospital staff.  
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5.1.1.2 HEALTH FUND ARRANGEMENTS 
Additional layers of complexity are added to health care provision in private 
hospitals by the fact that patients seeking choice will take out private health 
insurance to facilitate this as well as minimise their costs. Health Insurers will dictate 
terms with individual private hospitals or groups of hospitals as to what type of 
funding will be provided. These terms will include how medications for the treatment 
of their members are managed. It is common then, that the health funds will insist 
that the patient be given access to the PBS medicines first as a medicare card holder, 
before any consideration is given to making a claim against the insurer for a 
particular non PBS medicine.79 This further highlights the importance of the PBS as 
a funding model for pharmaceuticals and the additional strata of information that 
pharmacy staff in private hospitals need to be familiar with. 
5.1.1.3 PHARMACY OWNERSHIP 
Another unique fact is that in Australia and distinct from other health professionals, 
the pharmacy profession and their services are highly regulated by Commonwealth, 
State and territory legislation.76 Regulations limit the ownership of community 
pharmacies to registered pharmacists and impose restrictions on the location of 
existing and new pharmacies.76 Most jurisdictional legislation places numerical 
limits on the number of pharmacies that can be owned by a pharmacist in a particular 
jurisdiction.  
5.1.1.4 PHARMACEUTICAL REFORM AGENDA 
The Australian Government has implemented a Pharmaceutical Reform Agenda. 
Each State and Territory has been offered the opportunity to approve the dispensing 
of medications by public hospitals under the PBS in return for implementation of the 
APAC Guidelines (PSA reform).76 The APAC Guiding principles for the continuity 
of medication management 200545 are designed to provide cohesive care to patients 
across the transition of care between the community and hospital and back into the 
community by reducing medication related harm. This development adds greater 
substance for the need by private hospital services to embrace these types of services. 
For too long private hospital pharmacy providers had been constrained by their 
medication supply functions. Today in larger public hospitals, hospital pharmacists 
have become widely recognised as a part of multidisciplinary clinical teams,  
Medication Incidents in a Private Hospital: Frequency, type, causes and outcomes 
 
109 
particularly in complex areas with complex medication use such as oncology. Their 
roles span the transition from admission medication review, inpatient monitoring and 
management to predischarge counselling and provision of medication lists and 
consumer product information. Hospital pharmacy has grown to meet the challenges 
and now provides a more patient centred healthcare model that goes beyond the 
supply paradigm and the confines of the hospital walls. 
This challenge is just as relevant to the private hospital sector if hospitals are  
 going to respond to the needs and expectations of a more educated patient as to 
the role a hospital pharmacist can provide  
 provide optimal medication management services to their patients to the 
standards dictated by peer groups e.g. SHPA Standards of Practice  
 meet the expectations of the State and Commonwealth Government for safe 
clinical practice and  
 the growing expectations of a safer medication environment for their patients by 
a more powerful and demanding health insurance sector. 
 
5.1.1.5 PROVISION AND FUNDING OF COGNITIVE PHARMACY SERVICES 
The provision of cognitive services in pharmacy practice such as clinical pharmacy, 
committee representation and drug information are still not routinely funded. Wyer 
did describe that some (Off Site, Contracted) private hospitals did charge for services 
provided, such as provision of guidelines and meeting attendances.78 In most private 
hospital settings their provision is reliant on the profitability of the pharmacy 
managing the medications and the optimal management of the PBS adds therefore to 
the profitability of a pharmacy. It should be noted though that as patents expire in 
increasing numbers on commonly prescribed PBS items and their wholesale price 
decreases, this will reduce the return to the pharmacy provider and may be seen as a 
threat to these services.76 This threat will be larger for small individual concerns and 
will require the need for affiliations within bigger entities with bigger purchasing 
power and support. This change, which will affect community pharmacy initially, 
will also impact on pharmacy providers to private hospitals, in particular in rural 
areas or where servicing specialized needs e.g. psychiatry. Group ownership will be 
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essential where high turnover hospitals and centralised purchasing contracts will be 
necessary to subsidise weaker more exposed services. 
This would be the same whether the pharmacy is located on or off site although off 
site would provide its own challenges in providing access to clinical pharmacists for 
their cognitive services and the linkage with the important supply functions. 
As ownership must be by a pharmacist, in private practice one would expect that 
contracted services would be the norm. The fact that hospital owned pharmacies do 
exist can only be a result of that institution having a pharmacist as a partner or an 
owner. In Australia, this is frequently the case with private hospitals that are run by 
religious congregations as Not for Profit institutions. The ability to reinvest the 
income generated from PBS reimbursement is a strong indicator of the potential 
investment in ancillary pharmacy cognitive and medication safety activities.  
5.1.1.6 BENEFITS OF CLINICAL PHARMACY SERVICES 
Clinical pharmacists embrace this function as medication safety experts and have a 
proven benefit in the prevention of adverse medication outcomes and by influencing 
the prescribing and administration of medications.17,43,45,52,53 Recent research has 
begun to quantify the financial benefit associated with having a clinical pharmacy 
service that is staffed and resourced appropriately.43 The authors, speaking from a 
public sector hospital point of view, specified that hospital based clinical pharmacists 
were responsible for detecting 56.3 interventions per 1000 hospital overnight 
admissions.43 This is significant when other studies9,80 have indicated that up to 
190,000 hospital admissions per year may be associated with a medication and as 
many as 50% of these may be preventable. The average time spent on the clinical 
intervention was 9.6 minutes.43 Once annualized, for each dollar spent on a clinical 
pharmacist to initiate change, their intervention saving was valued as $23 to the 
hospital.43 Even when all clinical pharmacy activities are accounted for the savings 
exceeded the cost of the employment of clinical pharmacists. A USA study showed 
that providing clinical pharmacy services can help minimize drug related problems 
and control health care costs for ambulatory care patients.81 The author estimated that 
that for every dollar (USA) invested in clinical pharmacy services, an average of 
$16.70 can be saved in overall health care costs.81 
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5.1.1.7 PHARMACEUTICAL REVIEW 
On 23 April 2004 the Australian Health Ministers issued a Joint Communiqué 
agreeing to a series of seven uniform steps in the national health reform agenda 
aimed at improving safety in public hospitals. One of the steps was ―To also help 
safer use of medicines, by the end of 2006, every hospital will have in place a 
process of pharmaceutical review of medication prescribing, dispensing, 
administration and documenting processes for the use of medicines’’.48 
A definition for Pharmaceutical Review in 2005 was a ―Minimum standard of 
systematic appraisal of all aspects of patients management within an institution 
conducted by a qualified professional (ideally a pharmacist) acting as part of a 
multidisciplinary team. It includes objective review of medication prescribing, 
dispensing, distribution, administration, monitoring of outcomes and documentation 
of medication related information in order to optimize the quality use of 
medicines‖.48,82 
An announcement was made at the 10 February 2006 Council of Australian 
Governments‘ (COAG) meeting, about measures to commence 1 July 2006 “to 
improve care for older patients in public hospitals to minimise their length of stay, to 
avoid readmission.”82 
The SHPA in their letter to the Health Ministers,82 supported this announcements and 
suggested that the ―SHPA Standards of Practice for Clinical Pharmacy (SHPA-CP),42 
albeit designed for pharmacists, represent a mature and detailed resource that was 
suitable for adaptation for the broader provision of ―Pharmaceutical Review‖ by all 
members of the health care team‖. The letter continued that SHPA supported a 
national approach on Pharmaceutical Review but also that funding be considered for 
activities such as medication reconciliation at discharge and hospital outreach 
medication reviews conducted by hospital pharmacists for patients deemed to be at 
‗high risk‘. The usefulness of the SHPA-CP was recognised during the development 
of the Australian Pharmaceutical Advisory Council (APAC) guiding principles to 
achieve continuity in medication management45 with several sections of the SHPA-
CP being offered as resource references for relevant APAC guiding principles.82 The 
SHPA-CP also mimic the key features of the Pharmaceutical Review process.  
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5.1.1.8 MEDICATION MANAGEMENT CIRCLE 
The second National Report on Patient Safety for the Australian Council on Quality 
and Safety in Health Care in July 20024 noted, ―In order to recognise what can go 
wrong with use of medicines, we need to understand the processes that are involved.‖ 
The report described a pathway for medicines in hospitals, from the decision to 
prescribe to monitoring the patient response. To achieve the goal of safe use of 
medicines, all steps of the medicines management pathway must be delivered 
without error. 
A paper83 by Stowaser in 2004, described the pathway as a closed loop or circle, 
comprised of nine steps and three background processes, with feedback on the effect 
of the medicines and how transfer of information regarding the previous steps 
influence future treatment decisions in the next cycle of care.  
Figure 5.1 The medicines management pathway 
Data collection and reporting, audit 
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“Understanding the medicines management 
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5.1.1.9 WA HEALTH DEPARTMENT PHARMACEUTICAL REVIEW POLICY 
In March 2007 the Western Australian Health Department launched its 
Pharmaceutical Review Policy to ―strengthen the quality processes around 
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medication use in Western Australia (WA) by outlining the key component of the 
process”.48 The key drivers were the Australian Health Ministers directive in 2004 
and the national health reform agenda. The policy was made applicable to all WA 
public hospitals and related to all staff involved in medication safety. The policy48 
consisted of 5 standards which were linked back to an appropriate APAC Guideline: 
 Chart review 
 Medication reconciliation on admission 
 Medication education during hospitalisation and on discharge 
 Discharge process-communication with general practitioners and other health 
professionals 
 Quality activities promoting medication safety. 
5.2 METHOD 
5.2.1 DEVELOPMENT OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
From April through to May 2005 a questionnaire and covering letter (Appendices 
7,8) were developed for circulation to Australian Private Hospitals to assess how 
they managed medication incidents in their hospitals. Opinions were sought from key 
hospital risk management and pharmacy staff in an effort to gather meaningful data 
from the questionnaire. The questionnaire entitled ―Medication Incidents 
Management, Questionnaire for Australian Private Hospitals‖ was comprised of 27 
questions and was broken into three (3) distinct sections, namely: 
 Hospital and Patient Demographics (Qs 1 to 7) 
 Risk Management Processes (Qs 1 to 13) 
 Involvement of Pharmacy Services (Qs 14 to 27) 
The questionnaire and covering letter was reviewed and approved by the Quality and 
Safety Department at SJOGHS in late May 2005 and was subsequently sent for 
approval by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the Curtin University of 
Technology. 
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5.2.2 ETHICS APPROVAL 
The Curtin University of Technology Human Research Ethics Committee (HR 
29/2004) initially approved the project in 2004 (Appendix 5) and on the 9th June 
2005 the questionnaire and covering letter were submitted and approved by the 
Committee.. 
5.2.3 DATABASE OF PRIVATE HOSPITALS IN AUSTRALIA 
A database of Australian Private Hospitals proved to be a very difficult task to obtain 
and had to be researched and constructed by the primary investigator due to the fact 
that each hospital was either an individual concern or belonged to some larger group 
and each viewed the other as a competitor. The larger groups were predominantly 
aligned along ownership by a private company or a religious congregation with ―Not 
for Profit‖ status. An example of the latter was Catholic Health Care which had as 
members, St John of God Health Care, Mercy Health and Mater Health under their 
umbrella. The larger private companies operating hospitals included Healthsense and 
Ramsay Healthcare. Many of these companies were open to corporate takeover and 
could suddenly be marketed under a different name; for example Mayne Health was 
taken over by venture capitalists including Citigroup in 2003 and was rebadged as 
Affinity Health. During the time of the survey many sources were used to assemble 
the database. One of the barriers in compiling the database was the reluctance of 
companies to give out information about their hospitals in case it could be used by a 
competitor and was seen as commercial in confidence. 
Compounding the difficulty in compiling the database were: 
 The inability of local contacts (e.g. a pharmaceutical company or wholesaler) to 
provide information on the size of the hospital or postal address.  
 The Health Department of WA data on private hospitals being limited to Western 
Australia only  
 The Private Hospital Association nationally, being unable to provide a 
comprehensive list of members as not all private hospitals belonged to their 
group. In fact in the end, for commercial reasons, they would not provide any 
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information on their members despite submitting the survey and covering letter 
for review. 
In addition, assistance was sought from the primary investigators‘ hospital, SJOGHS, 
who were also unable to help. 
Finally, a review of the yellow pages provided some leads for private hospital 
groupings in each state. Allied with this numerous searches via the internet 
established a short list of companies or corporations that were involved in private 
health care. From this a search was made of each individual corporation‘s website to 
establish the hospitals which were owned by them. Each hospitals individual website 
was then visited to establish the size of that hospital, i.e. number of beds and the 
types of services offered. 
5.2.4 EXCLUDED HOSPITAL SITES 
It was decided that hospitals with less than 80 beds would not be included unless 
they provided an extensive range of services, e.g. had an Accident and Emergency 
Department or an Intensive Care or Coronary Care unit (ICU/CCU). It was also 
decided that private hospitals that managed public hospitals beds for a particular 
Health Department would also be excluded. This practice was more apparent on the 
eastern seaboard of Australia (e.g. Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland and 
South Australia).  
All postal details of potential hospitals were entered into an Excel® database until a 
final list of 88 hospitals nationally was constructed which had representation from all 
states. Hospitals were found to be aligned with three major groups. These were 
Ramsay Healthcare with 31 hospitals, Catholic Health 30 and Healthscope 27 
hospitals. 
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5.2.5 TO WHOM SHOULD THE QUESTIONNAIRE BE SENT? 
The question to whom the questionnaire should be directed to was deliberated on for 
some time. As many of the questions were of a general nature with regards to 
medication management within a hospital and others were requesting information on 
pharmacy services, it was difficult to establish who should receive the questionnaire. 
Cognisant that everyone is busy in healthcare it was felt imperative that one person 
should attempt to complete the questionnaire if possible, rather than have to rely on a 
number of people to do so. 
Pharmacy services to private hospitals vary substantially from hospital to hospital. 
Some hospitals such as SJOGHS own their own pharmacy department and all 
pharmacy staff are employed by them. Other hospitals have a pharmacy department 
on site but it is not owned by them and services are provided on a contractual basis. 
Others are serviced by a pharmacy off site which is often a community pharmacy and 
which operates under a contractual arrangement as well. It was felt that sending the 
questionnaire to the pharmacy service providers was not ideal as they may not have a 
consistent knowledge of the hospitals services pertaining to medication management. 
Instead, the questionnaires were addressed to the ―Quality Coordinators‖ in each 
hospital.  Even though this may not be their exact title, it was thought there would be 
someone who would have a responsibility for the quality potfolio in the hospital and 
so that person would be in the best position to answer the questions posed. 
5.3 RESULTS 
5.3.1 RESPONSE RATE TO QUESTIONNAIRE 
The initial batch of surveys and covering letters were sent out in October 2005 with 
responses to be returned in an enclosed pre-paid envelope by the 18th November 
2005. The response rate was 35/88 (39.8%). A reminder was posted to 21 hospitals 
whom it was thought would be likely to respond by December 2005. From these 
reminders a further three responses were received providing a total response rate of 
38/88 hospitals or a rate of 43.2% (Table 5.1) 
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Table 5.1 Questionnaires and reminders sent to Australian Private Hospitals 




Reminders Final response rate 
n/N (%) 
Ramsay Health 31 17 1 17/31 (54.8) 
Catholic Health 30 11 17 14/30 (46.7) 
Healthscope 27 7 3 7/27 (25.9) 
Total 88 35 21 38/88 (43.2) 
 
5.3.2 DATA ANALYSIS AND PRIVACY CONCERNS 
It was agreed and stated in the covering letter that for the purposes of data-analysis 
and publication all data would be grouped and no reference would be made to 
individual institutions. Results of the survey would be made available for 
downloading from the Curtin University School of Pharmacy website once finalised 
or would be provided on request. A table of participating hospitals by state is 
included in Appendix 13. 
5.3.3 RESULTS FROM QUESTIONNAIRE 
The overall response rate for the survey was 38/88 or 43.2%. The greatest number of 
respondents came from New South Wales (NSW) followed by Victoria (Vic), 
Queensland (Qld), Western Australia (WA), South Australia (SA) and Tasmania 
[Table 5.2]. There were no responses received from either the Northern Territory 
(NT) or the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). The WA response was disappointing 
given that this was a local research project with only 50% of expected hospitals 
replying. 
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Table 5.2 Response rate by State (n = 38) 
State Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
New South Wales 13 34.2 
Victoria 9 23.7 
Queensland 7 18.4 
Western Australia 5 13.2 
South Australia 3 7.9 
Tasmania 1 2.6 
Total 38 100 
 
5.3.3.1 HOSPITAL AND PATIENT DEMOGRAPHICS OF RESPONDING HOSPITALS 
The first series of seven questions in the survey sought to illicit hospital demographic 
data to assist in the evaluation of similarities that exist between hospitals and their 
core business activities. It must be noted that some responders did not respond to 
certain questions whilst other questions were always answered. This may imply that 
certain questions were considered commercial in confidence and were not for general 
use or the nature of the information was not known or easily identified. If questions 
were not responded to as a result of commercial reasons, this was done despite an 
assurance that all data would be deidentified. 
Table 5.3 (Q1) Number of beds in each hospital 
Bed Numbers Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
< 100 13 34.2 
100-150 9 23.7 
150-200 5 13.2 
200-250 5 13.2 
> 250 6 15.8 
Total 38 100 
 
The majority (65%) of responding hospitals had 100 beds or more, with almost 16% 
having more than 250 beds which would equate to a similar size as SJOGHS (Table 
5.3). 
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Table 5.4 (Q2) Average level of occupancy 
Occupancy Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
<70% 10 28.6 
71-80% 12 34.3 
81-90% 9 25.7 
>90% 4 11.4 
Total 35 100 
 
Over 70% of respondents reported occupancy rates greater than 70%, with 37.1% 
reporting rates greater than 81%. These high average figures probably reflect the 
greater surgical focus of the private hospitals, which results in reduced seasonal 
variations which may be seen with public hospitals.. 
Table 5.5 (Q3) Specialties catered for in each hospital 
Medical or surgical specialty Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals  
(%) 
Orthopaedics 37 97.4 
General surgery 37 97.4 
Plastics 33 86.8 
Gastroenterology 31 81.6 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology 31 81.6 
Urology 33 86.8 
Oncology 23 60.5 
Cardiology 21 55.3 
Paediatrics 17 44.7 
Neurology 12 31.6 
Other 13 34.2 
Total 38 100 
 
Of the hospitals that responded 97.4% stated they catered for Orthopaedics and 
General Surgery, whilst 86.7% catered for Plastics and Urology specialties (Table 
5.5). These were followed closely by Gastroenterology and Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology which were provided by 81.6% of hospitals. 
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Table 5.6 (Q4) High acuity areas in hospitals? 
High acuity area Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
 (%) 
Emergency Department 12 44.4 
Adult Intensive Care Unit 21 77.8 
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit 5 18.5 
Coronary Care Unit 23 85.2 
Total 27 100 
 
Only 12/27 (44%) respondents stated their hospital had an Emergency Department 
(Table 5.6). On the other hand, almost 78% of respondents stated their hospital had 
an adult ICU, which possibly reflects the high surgical/procedural orientation of 
private hospital practice and 85% of hospitals had a CCU possibly reflecting a high 
proportion of cardiology patients being managed in the private sector, although this 
result was higher than expected given that only 55% of hospitals reported providing 
Cardiology services (Table 5.5). 
Table 5.7 (Q5) Medical versus surgical patients 
Distribution of patients Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals  
(%) 
Medical > Surgical 1 2.6 
Surgical > Medical 26 68.4 
Surgical = Medical 11 28.9 
Total 38 100 
 
Table 5.8 (Q6.1) Average length of stay for surgical patients 





Proportion of Hospitals  
(%) 
< 1 day 1 2.9 
1-3 days 20 58.8 
4-5 days 13 38.2 
Total 34 100 
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Table 5.9 (Q6.2) Average length of stay for medical patients 
Average Length of Hospital Stay 
(Days) 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
 (%) 
<1 day 0 0 
1-3 days 2 6.5 
4-5 days 8 25.8 
6 or more 21 67.7 
Total 31 100 
 
Table 5.7 indicates that in the majority of private hospitals, surgical patients 
outnumber medical patients (68.4%). The average length of stay of surgical patients 
was 5 days or less in 100% of respondents and 3 days or less in 55% of hospitals 
(Table 5.8). In contrast the average length of stay for medical patients was longer, 
with 6 or more days in 67.7% of respondents and 4-5 days in 25.8% of hospitals 
(Table 5.9). In those cases where these questions were not answered it was thought 
that the most likely explanation was the potential commercial sensitivity of the data. 
Table 5.10 (Q7) Collocation with public hospital 
Collocation with public 
hospital 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals  
(%) 
Yes 6 15.8 
No 32 84.2 
 
Six hospitals nationally reported being collocated with a public hospital. This low 
number also reflects the Western Australian experience where only one such hospital 
collocation of public and private exists at Joondalup Health Campus. 
5.3.3.2 RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESSES (RMP) 
This portion of the questionnaire sought information on the risk management 
processes (RMP) in use and whether medication incidents were collected, the 
frequency, how they were managed/processed, who reviewed them and what types of 
reports were generated and for whom. 
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Table 5.11 (Q1 RMP) Medication Safety policy exists? 
Medication Safety policy Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Yes 31 86.1 
No 5 13.9 
Total 36 100 
 
Table 5.12 (Q1.2 RMP) Could a copy be made available? 
Availability of Medication Safety 
policy 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Yes 21 84 
No 4 16 
Total 25 100 
Of the respondents 86% stated their hospital had a Medication Safety policy (Table 
5.11) and 84% stated they would make a copy available (Table 5.12). 
 
Table 5.13 (Q2.1 RMP) Are medication incidents reported? 
Medication incidents reported Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Yes 38 100 
 
Table 5.14 (Q2.2 RMP) Part of hospital incident reporting? 
Medication incidents are part of the 
hospital incident reporting 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Yes 37 100 
Total 37 100 
 
All hospitals stated that medication incidents were reported (Table 5.13) and in every 
hospital, bar one, medication incidents formed part of that hospital‘s Incident 
Reporting system (Table 5.14). 
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Table 5.15 (Q3 RMP) How are medication incidents reported? 
Mode of incident reporting Number of Hospitals 
n 
#Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Hard copy 33 86.0 
Electronic 15 39.5 
#Note: some hospitals offered both manual and electronic reporting 
Table 5.16 (Q3.2 RMP) Could a hard copy form be provided? 
Availability of hard copy report form Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Yes 23 79.3 
No 6 20.7 
Total 29 100 
 
Table 5.17 (Q3.3 RMP) Could a copy of  the electronic form be provided? 
Availability of electronic 
report form 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Yes 8 66.7 
No 4 33.3 
Total 12 100 
 
At the time of the survey, the majority of medication incident reports were provided 
on hard copy with a smaller number using an electronic format (Table 5.15). While 
the majority of respondents were prepared to provide copies of their hard-copy 
incident reporting forms (Table 5.16), a smaller proportion were prepared to provide 
access to their electronic system (Table 5.17). 
Table 5.18 (Q4.1 RMP) Medication incident reports are initially reviewed by? 
Reviewer Number of Hospitals 
n/N 
Proportion of Hospitals 
 [N = 38] 
(%) 
Senior Nurse 10/38 26.3 
Nurse/Unit Manager 30/38 78.9 
Director 4/38 10.5 
Pharmacist 6/38 15.8 
Other 1/38 2.6 
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In the majority of hospitals the initial review of medication incidents was conducted 
by a Nurse Unit Manager (78.9%) or a Senior Nurse (26.3%) or possibly both (Table 
5.18). 
Table 5.19 (Q4.2 RMP) To whom are medication incidents sent to? 
 Number of Hospitals 
n/N 
Proportion of Hospitals 
 [N = 38] 
(%) 
(Nursing ) Director 19/38 50.0 
Medication Safety Officer 2/38 5.3 
Project Officer 3/38 7.9 
Safety & Quality Coordinator 18/38 47.4 
Other 11/38 28.9 
Following initial review, the medication incident reports were usually sent to a 
Director i.e. Director of Nursing or Nursing Co-Director or Safety and Quality 
Officer/Coordinator. Very few hospitals had a designated Medication Safety Officer 
(Table 5.19). 
Table 5.20 (Q 5 RMP) Do you have a Safety and Quality Coordinator? 
Safety and Quality  
Coordinator 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals  
(%) 
Yes 37 97.4 
No 1 2.6 
Total 38 100 
Almost all hospitals (97%) stated they had a Safety and Quality Coordinator (Table 
5.20), whilst only 47% of them reported that medication incident forms were sent to 
them (see Table 5.19). 
Table 5.21 (Q 6 RMP) Are medication incidents placed on database? 
Medication incidents database 
exists 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals  
(%) 
Yes 35 92.1 
No 3 7.9 
Total 38 100 
 
The majority of hospitals (92.1%) used a database to collate their medication incident 
data (Table 5.21). 
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Table 5.22 (Q7 RMP) What database is used? 
Database used Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals  
(%) 
Excel 10 28.6 
AIMS 0 0 
Access 2 5.7 
CHRIS 1 2.9 
Risk Manager Pro 3 8.6 
Risk Monitor Pro 2 5.7 
Riskman 16 45.7 
S.H.E. 1 2.9 
Total 35 100 
 
There was wide variation in the types of databases used to store medication incident 
data in private hospitals. This is interesting given that the AIMS system, which is 
predominantly in use nationally throughout the public hospital system, was not used 
by one responding private hospital. Many hospitals used a Microsoft Excel 
Spreadsheet and 46% of hospitals used a ―Riskman‖ database (Table 5.21). 
In answer to the question (Q8) ‗Who manages the database input of incidents‘ there 
were no answers from any hospital. It was therefore assumed that this was 
undertaken by clerical staff. The provision of a specific resource at SJOGHS to enter 
the data took some time to realize as prior to this time the data input relied on the 
good will of secretarial staff who volunteered time to do the task. 
Table 5.23 (Q9.1 and 9.2 RMP) Are reports produced and frequency? 
Reports provided Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals  
(%) 
Yes 38 100 
Frequency of reports   
Monthly 30 78.9 
Quarterly 13 34.2 
Six monthly 5 13.2 
Annually 4 10.5 
Ad Hoc 5 13.2 
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All hospitals reported that reports were produced from the medication incident data 
collected, regardless of whether the data was placed into a database or not (Table 
5.23). Eighty per cent of hospitals produced monthly reports, whilst 34% produced 
quarterly reports. Six and twelve monthly reports were produced less frequently. 
Table 5.24 (Q10 RMP) Type of report produced? 
Report type Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals  
(%) 
Error types 34 94.4 
Error frequency 28 77.8 
Contributing factors 14 38.9 
Error severity 26 72.2 
Other 17 47.2 
Responses 36 100 
 
There were a variety of different reports provided by hospitals (Table 5.24). The 
majority of respondents provided reports on the different error types reported, 
followed by the frequency of each error type and a severity measure for each error. 
Table 5.25 (Q11 RMP) Are reports reviewed by hospital committee? 
 Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals  
(%) 
Yes 37 97.4 
No 1 2.6 
 
According to the respondents, 97% of hospitals had the reports reviewed by a 
hospital committee to provide some peer review (Table 5.25). It was interesting to 
note that no name was provided for these hospital review committees. At the primary 
investigator‘s hospital, the Drug and Therapeutics Committee provided this peer 
review for many years. Subsequently a subcommittee was formed called the 
Medication Policy and Procedure Subcommittee which among other things became 
the peer review committee until such time as a Quality and Safety Department was 
established. 
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Table 5.26 (Q11.2 RMP) Actions of review committee 
Committee Actions Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Table report only 11 29.7 
Practice changes 34 91.9 
Authorise education 29 78.4 
Other 9 24.3 
Responses 37 100 
 
All hospitals who used a committee to review the reported medication incidents 
stated that they were involved in remedial actions to try and reduce or remove that 
error in the future. These actions varied from suggesting practice changes in that 
hospital (92%) and authorizing staff education (78%) where appropriate (Table 
5.26). While 30% of hospitals suggested that they tabled the report only, many of 
these hospitals still took action to change practice. 
Table 5.27 (Q12 RMP) Number of medication incidents reported in past 12 months 
Number of Incidents Reported Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals  
(%) 
0-50 12 37.5 
51-100 7 21.9 
101-150 5 15.6 
151-200 2 6.3 
201-250 4 12.5 
251-300 0 0 
301-350 0 0 
351-400 2 6.3 
Responses 32 100 
Mean 111.63  
Standard Deviation 100.14  
Of our respondents, 75% stated that the number of reported medication incidents was 
less than 150 per annum and 37.5% had less than 50 incidents reported annually 
(Table 5.27). The average number of medication incidents report amongst the 32 
responding hospitals was 112±100 per annum. 
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Table 5.28 (Q13 RMP) Number of medication incidents reported in comparison to 
previous year 
Number of incidents compared to 
previous year 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
More 8 25 
Less 11 34.4 
Same 8 25 
Don’t know 5 15.6 
Responses 32 100 
 
Almost one third of respondents (Table 5.28) reported that the number of medication 
incidents reported was less than the number reported in the previous year whilst 25% 
stated it was the same and another 25% said it was greater than the previous year. 
5.3.3.3 INVOLVEMENT OF PHARMACY SERVICES (PS) IN MEDICATION INCIDENT 
MANAGEMENT 
This portion of the questionnaire dealt with the role pharmacy services (PS) in each 
hospital plays in medication incident management. There are many different 
pharmacy service models in place in private hospital practice in Australia. Each 
model may have a different focus on medication error prevention depending on the 
extent of the agreed services they provide. 
Table 5.29 (Q14 PS) Hospital have pharmacy service? 
Hospitals that have a pharmacy 
service 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Yes 36 94.7 
No 2 5.3 
Total 38 100 
 
The great majority of hospitals stated that their hospital had a pharmacy service 
(Table 5.29). 
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Table 5.30 (Q15 PS) Pharmacy service on site/off site? 
Location of pharmacy service Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
On Site 19 52.8 
Off Site 17 47.2 
Total 36 100 
 
Of the respondents that had a pharmacy service, slightly over half (53%) replied that 
they had a pharmacy service located on site (Table 5.30). 
Table 5.31 (Q16 PS) Ownership of pharmacy department 
Ownership of pharmacy Service Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
By Hospital 8 22.2 
Contracted Out 28 77.8 
Total 36 !00 
 
Contracted pharmacy services accounted for 78% of hospitals while the balance were 
owned by the hospital (Table 5.31). 
Table 5.32 (Q 17 PS) Are clinical pharmacists employed? 
Clinical pharmacists employed? Number of Hospitals Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Yes 30 85.7 
No 5 14.3 
Total 35 100 
 
Thirty of the respondents (86%) stated they employed clinical pharmacists to 
undertake clinical pharmacy services on the wards (Table 5.32). 
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Table 5.33 (Q18 PS) Number of clinical pharmacists employed? 
Number of clinical pharmacists 
employed? 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
0.5-1 14 51.9 
>1-2 5 18.5 
>2-3 2 7.4 
>3-4 1 3.7 
>4-5 2 7.4 
>5-6 1 3.7 
>6 2 7.4 
Total 27 100 
Mean 2.33  
Standard Deviation 2.00  
The respondents indicated that 70% of hospitals employed up to two clinical 
pharmacists (Table 5.33). The mean number of clinical pharmacists employed by 
each pharmacy service was 2.33 +/- 2.00 clinical pharmacists. This low figure may 
be related to the fact that 70% of hospitals had less than 200 beds (Table 5.3). 
Table 5.34 (Q19 PS) Percentage of wards serviced by clinical pharmacists 
Percentage of wards serviced by 
clinical pharmacists 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
< 25% 3 10.3 
25-50% 4 13.8 
51-75% 5 17.2 
Over 75% 17 58.6 
Total 29 100 
 
Table 5.35 (Q20.1 PS) Are clinical pharmacists on wards full time? 
Clinical pharmacists on wards full 
time? 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Yes 4 13.3 
No 25 83.3 
Some 1 3.3 
Total 30 100 
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Table 5.36 (Q20.2 PS) If part- time, do clinical pharmacists have other duties? 
If part time do clinical pharmacists 
have other duties? 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Yes 19 76 
No 5 20 
Unknown 1 4 
Total 25 100 
 
Although 30 hospitals reported employing clinical pharmacists, 70% of them 
employed only two clinical pharmacists (Tables 5.32 and 5.33). 59% of respondents 
stated that their clinical pharmacists covered over 75% of wards in those hospitals 
(Table 5.34). Only four hospitals employed clinical pharmacists on a full time basis 
on the wards, so the balance must have provided services on a part time basis (Table 
5.35). The majority (76%), of the part time ward clinical pharmacists employed, had 
other duties to perform within the pharmacy department (Table 5.36). The remainder 
(5/25, 20%) were employed as part timers whose primary function, it would appear 
were ward clinical pharmacy duties.  
Table 5.37 (Q21 PS) Clinical pharmacist activities to reduce medication error? 
Clinical pharmacist activities? Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Preadmission clinic 2 6.7 
Admission history interview 8 26.7 
Medication  chart review 25 83.3 
Discharge counselling 25 83.3 
Provide medication lists 23 76.7 
Trial management 6 20 
Design of charts 14 46.7 
Medication guidelines 23 76.7 
Nursing policy advice 23 76.7 
Nurse education 28 93.3 
Total 30 100 
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Looking at specific activities that assist in accurate transfer of information from 
home to hospital we see a minor involvement by clinical pharmacists in 
preadmission clinics (6.7%) and a slightly higher involvement (27%) in the taking of 
admission history interviews (Table 5.37). More routine daily duties reported for 
clinical pharmacists such as daily MCR were conducted in 83% of hospitals. 
Activities that assist in this process were also provided by the majority of hospitals. 
These included assisting in the design of medication charts (47%), provision of 
medication guidelines (77%), and advice on nursing polices (77%). In service 
education to nursing staff (93%) was a common activity. Activities related to the 
transfer of patients from hospital to the home were frequently undertaken with the 
provision of medication lists on discharge (77%) and discharge medication 
counselling (83%). 
Table 5.38 (Q 22.1 PS) Pharmacy involved with review of medication incidents? 
Pharmacy involved in review of 
medication incidents? 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Yes 23 63.9 
No 13 36.1 
Total 36 100 
 
Only 64% of responding hospitals involved their pharmacy provider in the review of 
medication incidents (Table 5.38). The balance would have involved nursing staff 
only, as staff medical practitioners are very rare in private hospital practice. It is 
likely that where pharmacy was not involved, nursing staff managed the entire 
review process. 
Table 5.39 (Q 22.2 PS) Who in pharmacy is responsible for review? 
Position/Title Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Chief/Director/Manager 8 42.1 
Deputy Chief Pharmacist 3 15.8 
Coordinator Clinical Pharmacy 2 10.5 
Clinical Pharmacist 7 36.8 
Other 4 21.1 
Total responses 19 100 
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The responsibility for the review of medication incidents in the Pharmacy 
Department varied substantially amongst respondents and it would seem that the 
review in some departments was carried out by more than one staff member. The 
Chief Pharmacist/Director of Pharmacy or Pharmacy Manager provided the review 
in 42% of cases with the clinical pharmacists (37%) being the next major group 
(Table 5.39). 
Table 5.40 (Q 23 PS) Role of clinical pharmacists in medication incident review 
Role of clinical pharmacist in 
incident review 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
N/A (no role) 6 20 
Trend recognition 13 43 
Remedial action 18 60 
Education/change 22 73 
Other 2 6.7 
Responses 30 100 
 
Table 5.41 (Q 24 PS) What FTE (Full time equivalent) of clinical pharmacist 
associated with review process? 
FTE clinical pharmacist associated 
with incident review 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
1 fte 4 13.8 
0.75 fte 1 3.4 
0.5 fte 3 10.3 
0.25 fte 4 13.8 
< 0.25 fte 5 17.2 
Unknown 12 41.4 
Total 29 100 
The respondents indicated that 73% of the clinical pharmacists involved in 
medication incident review in private hospitals were involved in education or the 
changing of processes to reduce or avoid future medication errors (Table 5.40). 
Providing advice on remedial action required in preventing the error recurring was 
given 60% of the time. Only 43% were involved in the recognition of trends in the 
types of errors reported. 
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Respondents did not know what component of a ―full time equivalent‖ from 
pharmacy was involved in medication incident review in 41% of cases (Table 41). In 
four hospitals (14%) this was a full time role whilst in 31% of responding hospitals it 
was less than or equal to a quarter of a ‗full time equivalent‘. 
Table 5.42 (Q 25 PS) Do clinical pharmacist collect pharmacist intervention data? 
Do clinical pharmacists collect 
intervention data? 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Yes 24 80 
No 1 3.3 
Unknown 5 16.7 
Total 30 100 
 
Table 5.43 (Q25.2 PS) Do interventions form part of incident reporting? 
Do pharmacist interventions form 
part of incident data? 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Yes 14 58.30 
No 10 41.70 
Total 24 100 
 
It was reported that in 80% of responding hospitals, clinical pharmacists collected 
their own pharmacist intervention data (Table 5.42) but only 58% of these 
respondents (Table 5.43) added their interventions to the hospitals medication 
incident reporting system. 
Table 5.44 (Q 26 PS) Do pharmacy dispensing errors that arrive on wards form part 
of incident reporting? 
Pharmacy dispensing errors noted 
on wards recorded as incidents? 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Yes 31 88.6 
No 4 11.4 
Total 35 100 
 
Eighty nine per cent of hospitals reported in their hospital medication incident 
system any pharmacy dispensing errors that arrived from pharmacy onto the ward or 
hospital department (Table 5.44) 
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Table 5.45 (Q 27.1 PS) Do pharmacy record pharmacy dispensing “Near Misses”? 
Do pharmacy record dispensing 
”near misses”? 
Number of Hospitals 
n 
Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Yes 17 48.6 
No 12 31.6 
Don’t Know 6 15.8 
Total 35 100 
 
Almost half of all responding hospitals reported that their pharmacy departments 
recorded any dispensing errors detected prior to them leaving the department (Table 
5.45). These errors are often referred to as ―near misses‖ or potential errors. 
Table 5.46 (Q 27.2 PS) Are dispensing ‘Near Misses’ added to incident reporting? 
Are dispensing ‘near misses’ added 
to incident reports 
Number of Hospitals Proportion of Hospitals 
(%) 
Yes 8 47 
No 9 53 
Total 17 100 
 
Of those pharmacy departments that recorded ‖near misses‖ nearly half of them 
(Table 5.46) added those errors to the hospitals medication incident management 
system. 




Despite the initial difficulties in contacting private hospitals in Australia, the 
questionnaire elicited a response rate that was an acceptable and representative 
sample at 43.2% of those surveyed. The majority of respondents came from New 
South Wales and Victoria which are the more populous states. It was noted that 65% 
of responding hospitals had 100 beds or more and over 70% of respondents reported 
occupancy of greater than 70%. 
The survey results indicated that the majority of private hospitals cater for surgical 
patients in preference to medical patients, with a key focus on procedures with a 
variable length of stay. This is commensurate with the fact that there are very few 
staff medical practitioners and most admitting doctors are considered to be VMOs 
who generally are Consultant Specialists. With the growing number of privately 
insured patients since the introduction of the 30% rebate in 1999 and the growing 
desire of Australians to have a choice in who should undertake their care, the need 
for access to the private sector is growing, accounting now for almost 40% of all 
admitted patients.84 Between 2004-2005 and 2008-2009, the number of number of 
hospital separations increased 14.4% in public acute hospitals and 18.8% in private 
hospitals whilst the number of patient days in public acute hospitals increased by 
7.4% and 10.1% in private hospitals.85 There was also a relatively large increase in 
beds in private hospitals, and relatively small increases in public acute hospitals and 
private day-only hospitals.85 
The survey indicated that a mix of surgical specialties such as Plastics, Urology, 
Gastroenterology and Orthopaedics were commonplace. There was limited 
availability of Accident and Emergency Departments amongst the hospitals surveyed 
which was in contrast to the presence of adult Intensive Care Units and Coronary 
Care Units. These latter critical care areas would complement a large and busy 
surgical case load.  
As would be the norm in public hospitals in Australia, most private hospitals also had 
a medication safety policy and reported medication incidents as part of the hospitals 
Incident Reporting System. At the time of the survey the majority of incident reports 
were provided on hard copy with a smaller number using an electronic format such 
Medication Incidents in a Private Hospital: Frequency, type, causes and outcomes 
 
137 
as Riskman®, which is similar to the Australian Incident Monitoring System (AIMS) 
widely in use in public hospitals nationally. 
Medication incidents were reviewed in almost all cases by the line manager who was 
usually a nurse, given that most incidents are reported by nursing staff. Review by 
higher officers in the hospital occurred less frequently but this may be because the 
reported incident did not warrant higher scrutiny. Appropriately, almost all hospitals 
produced monthly medication incident reports detailing the error types and frequency 
and these were reviewed by a committee who would provide guidance on practice 
changes to reduce or prevent recurrence of that error. 
The great majority of private hospital respondents had a pharmacy service and these 
were split evenly between being On Site and Off Site. As Australian states govern 
through the relevant Pharmacy Acts the ownership rules for pharmacies and 
predominantly most require a pharmacist to be the owner of a pharmacy, it is not 
surprising that the minority of hospitals owned their own pharmacy service. Some of 
these hospitals, e.g. SJOGHS have been grandfathered under the Act, owing to the 
fact that members of the religious congregation owned and operated the pharmacy 
prior to the introduction of the Pharmacy Act of 1969. 
As expected, since the publication of the Second National Report on Patient Safety4  
in 2002 and the publication of the Society of Hospital Pharmacists of Australia 
(SHPA) sponsored article on the value of clinical pharmacists in the medication 
management circle,43 most private hospitals have employed clinical pharmacists at 
least on a part time basis to improve medication safety. The fact that only the 
minority of hospitals employed clinical pharmacists on the wards full time reflects 
that in many institutions the role of the clinical pharmacist has not progressed much 
further than the basic supply function. This low percentage of full time ward based 
clinical pharmacists will need to change in the future if hospitals are going to be able 
to embrace the Australian Pharmaceutical Advisory Council (APAC) Guidelines 
200518 and the SHPA-CP Standards.42 The transition of care has been identified as an 
important area to focus our attention on minimising medication errors. Medication 
management across the continuum from home to hospital and from hospital to home 
has increasingly been considered as important as the routine daily management of the 
patient whilst in hospital.46-48,83  
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Clinical pharmacists in private hospitals played a minor role in activities that 
emphasized the transition from the community to hospital such as preadmission 
clinic roles and the taking of admission medication histories. On the other hand 
activities related to the transition from the hospital to the community were more 
frequently undertaken, such as the provision of medication lists and discharge 
medication counselling. This is interesting given the importance given to accurate 
medication history taking in many local jurisdictions in Australia, including 
Queensland and Western Australia (WAMSG Working Party on Medication 
History), the launch of the WA Health Department Pharmaceutical Review Policy48 
which includes medication reconciliation, to a national approach to medication 
reconciliation by ACSGHC86 and the WHO High 5s project.87. 
 Recognised activities such as daily MCR, provision of medication guidelines, and 
education for nursing staff were conducted more frequently by clinical pharmacists 
working in the private sector.  
 Private hospital pharmacy departments were involved in the routine review of 
medication incidents in most hospitals with the Director of Pharmacy or Chief 
Pharmacist usually responsible for the review. Activities predominantly centred 
around remedial action and education for change in practice. Although Clinical 
Pharmacist involvement in this process was less, a minority of respondents stated 
they employed at least a portion of a full time equivalent of a clinical pharmacist to 
undertake a review of medication incidents. This is a good development as clinical 
pharmacists should be more aware of the types of issues that get reported as 
medication incidents on their wards and should be more easily able to recognise and 
empathise with how the system failed and have an understanding of how best to 
avoid it in the future. It is worth remembering that medication incidents reports are 
predominantly reported by nursing staff and in the main reflect administration errors. 
Many clinical pharmacists were also reported to collect pharmacy intervention data, 
of which just over half reported their interventions as part of the hospitals medication 
incident reporting system. This is a great development as clinical pharmacist 
interventions usually reflect prescribing errors and this is an area that is infrequently 
reported by nursing staff through the medication incident reporting system. 
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Pharmacy dispensing errors that are picked up on the wards or departments are 
routinely reported on the hospital system, predominantly by nursing staff, but could 
also be reported by clinical pharmacists. Allied to this some hospital pharmacy 
departments recorded dispensing ‖near misses‖ that do not leave the department and 
are picked up by a checking or supervising pharmacist. These checking roles are 
standard where dispensing technicians and pharmacy interns are used to commence 
the dispensing process. It is encouraging that nearly half of the responding hospitals 
reported these ―near miss‖ events as part of the hospitals incident reporting system. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
With a response rate of 43% this survey of Australian private hospitals provides a 
glimpse into the practices that exist to promote medication safety within them. Allied 
to the variety of sizes of hospitals and the specialties catered for, medication risk 
management processes vary. In addition pharmacy services are provided in a variety 
of different models from those located Off Site to On Site, and services owned by the 
hospital or contracted out. These factors were thought to influence the involvement 
of pharmacy providers in medication incident reporting and actions that ensued from 
their investigation. The employment of clinical pharmacists varied from hospital to 
hospital, with the minority of respondents employing full time clinical pharmacists. 
These clinical pharmacists are far more likely to be involved in activities that focus 
on the daily medication management activities as well as preparation for discharge.  
Involvements in activities at the transition into hospital from home were noted to be 
underdeveloped at the time of the survey. Pharmacy providers had variable 
involvement with the collection of pharmacy intervention data, pharmacy dispensing 
errors and ―near misses‖. The addition of this data to a centralised medication 
incident process was still requiring further development and promotion in most 
hospitals.  
In conclusion medication safety practices do vary across the cohort of Australian 
private hospitals surveyed and working towards a more standardized approach to 
reporting was warranted and should be independent of the current factors that seem 
to influence the involvement of particular hospitals. A more detailed appraisal of 
factors such as pharmacy ownership, pharmacy location and the employment of 
clinical pharmacists may provide a greater insight to explain these noted variations. 
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CHAPTER 6 FACTORS INFLUENCING MEDICATION 
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT IN AUSTRALIAN 
PRIVATE HOSPITALS 
6.1 BACKGROUND 
Further analysis of the results of the Medication Incidents Management 
Questionnaire for Australian Private Hospitals was undertaken to determine the 
influence of particular parameters on the results. Each parameter analysis has been 
separated and forms a separate results section. 
The parameters chosen were: 
 Location of pharmacy services either On Site or Off Site 
 Ownership model for pharmacy services  
 Whether clinical pharmacists were employed  
6.2 METHOD 
Cross tabulations were prepared for each question in the questionnaire to evaluate the 
influence each parameter had on the responses. In this chapter, the influence of the 
three parameters chosen were presented and reviewed. The results from each 
question have either been tabulated or a separate scripted commentary has been 
made.  
6.3 RESULTS 
6.3.1 THE INFLUENCE OF LOCATION OF PHARMACY SERVICE ON SITE OR OFF SITE 
Between states, there was no statistically significant difference between the 
proportion of pharmacy services provided On Site or Off Site (Table 6.1). Hospitals 
with a higher level of occupancy tended to have On Site pharmacies, although the 
difference did not reach statistical significance. 
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Table 6.1 Breakdown by State and level of occupancy 
Breakdown within each 
state 
Pharmacy On Site 
 n (%) 












Queensland 4 (80) 1 (20) 5 (100) 
South Australia 2 (66.7) 1 (33.3) 3 (100) 
Tasmania 0 (0) 1 (100) 1 (100) 
Victoria 6 (66.7) 3 (33.3) 9 (100) 
Western Australia 3 (60) 2 (40) 5 (100) 
Total 19 (52.8) 17 (47.2) 36 (100) 
Q2: Average level of 
occupancy:  
Pharmacy On Site  
n (%)  
Pharmacy Off Site 
n (%)  
Total 
 n (%)  
p value 




71-80% 6 (31.6) 6 (42.9) 12 (36.4)  
81-90% 6 (31.6) 2 (14.3) 8 (24.2)  
>90% 3 (15.8) 0 (0)  3 (9.1) 
Total 19 (100) 14 (100) 33 (100)  
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Table 6.2 Specialties and critical care areas provided 
Q 3 Specialties in each 
hospital 
Pharmacy On Site 
 n (%) 
Pharmacy Off Site 
 n (%) 
Total 
n (%) 
Orthopaedics 19 (100) 17 (100) 36 (100) 
Cardiology 14 (73.7) 6 (35.3) 20 (55.6) 
Urology 19 (100) 13 (76.5) 32 (88.9) 
Oncology 17 (89.5) 5 (29.4) 22 (61.1) 
Obsterics &Gynaecology 19 (100) 11 (64.7) 30 (83.3) 
Paediatrics 8 (42.1) 9 (52.9) 17 (47.2) 
General surgery 19 (100) 17 (100) 36 (100) 
Gastroenterology 19 (100) 11 (64.7) 30 (83.3) 
Neurology 8 (42.1) 4 (23.5) 12 (33.3) 
Plastics 17 (89.5) 15 (88.2) 32 (88.9) 
Other 7 (36.8) 5 (29.4) 12 (33.3) 
Total 19 (100) 17 (100) 36 (100) 
Q 4 Special/Critical care 
areas in the hospital 
Pharmacy On Site 
n (%) 
Pharmacy Off Site 
n (%) 
Total  
 n (%) 
Emergency Department 8 (44.4) 3 (37.5) 11 (42.3) 
Adult ICU 16 (88.9) 4 (50) 20 (76.9) 
Neonatal ICU 3 (16.7) 2 (25) 5 (19.2) 
CCU 16 (88.9) 6 (75) 22 (84.6) 
Total 18 (100) 8 (100) 26 (100) 
 
Those hospitals that had pharmacy services provided On Site were more likely to 
cater for more complex specialties such as Oncology, Gastroenterology and 
Neurology. They were also more likely to have an adult ICU, CCU and an 
Emergency Department (Table 6.2). 
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Table 6.3 Breakdown by surgical and medical patients 
Q 5 Hospital caters 
predominantly for 
Pharmacy On Site 
n (%) 




Surgical > Medical 14 (73.7) 11 (64.7) 0.559 
  
  
Surgical = Medical 5 (26.3) 6 (35.3) 
Total 19 (100) 17 (100) 
Q 6.1 Average length of stay of 
surgical patients: 
Pharmacy On Site  
n (%)  
Pharmacy Off Site 
 n (%)  
p 
value 




1-3 days 11 (61.1) 9 (60.0) 
4-5 days 7 (38.9) 5 (33.3) 
Total 18 (100) 15 (100) 
Q 6.2 Average length of stay of 
medical patients: 
Pharmacy On Site 
 n (%)  
Pharmacy Off Site 
 n (%)  
p 
value 





1-3 days 2 (11.8) 0 (0) 
4-5 days 3 (17.6) 5 (38.5) 
6 days 12 (70.6) 8 (61.5) 
Total 17 (100) 13 (100) 
 
As can be seen in Table 6.3 in those hospitals with an On Site pharmacy there was a 
slightly greater emphasis on surgery, however the difference was not statistically 
significant.  
The location of pharmacy services did not affect the length of stay. 
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Table 6.4 Collocation, Medication Safety policy and medication incident reporting 
    Pharmacy services are provided 
 Response On site 
 n N (%)  
Off site 
n N (%) 
p value 
Q7: Collocated with a public 
hospital 
Yes 5/19 (26.3) 1/17 
(5.9) 
0.101 




Yes 18/18 (100) 12/16 
(75) 
0.024 
Q1.2 RMP: Copy of policy 
made available? 
Yes 14/15 (93.3) 6/9 
(66.7) 
0.09 
Q2.1 RMP: Medication 
incidents reported? 
Yes 19/19 (100) 17/17 
(100) 
ns  
Q 2.2 RMP: Part of hospital 
incident reporting? 




Of the respondents six hospitals were collocated with a public hospital (Table 6.4), 
and of these 5 (83.3%) were On Site. As such, if a private hospital is collocated with 
a public hospital it is more likely to be On Site whilst if it is not, it is likely to be Off 
Site (5/19 vs 16/17; p = 0.101). There is a significant difference on existence of a 
medication safety policy based on whether the pharmacy was located on site or not 
(p = 0.024). Almost all On Site pharmacies provided copies of the hospital‘s 
medication safety policy, as compared to two-thirds of Off Site pharmacies (p = 
0.09). 
All hospitals reported medication incidents independent of location of the pharmacy. 
Further, medication incidents were part of hospitals‘ incident reporting independent 
of location of the pharmacy department. 




 RMP = Risk Management Processes of the Questionnaire.  
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Table 6.5 Format for collection of medication incidents 
Q 3.1 RMP: Medication 
incidents are collected 
Pharmacy On Site 
 n (%) 
Pharmacy Off Site 
 n (%) 
Total  
 n (%) 
Hard Copy 15 (78.9) 16 (94.1) 31 (86.1) 
Electronically 10 (52.6) 5 (29.4) 15 (41.7) 
Total 19 (100) 17 (100) 36 (100) 
 
Hospitals with On Site pharmacy services were more likely to collect medication 
incidents electronically (Table 6.5). 
When hospitals were asked to provide a hard or electronic copy of how they collect 
their medication incident data, of those that responded it was more likely that an On 
Site pharmacy would provide a hard copy than an Off Site pharmacy, i.e. 12/13 
(92.3%) from On Site compared to 9/14 (64.3%) for Off-Site pharmacies (p = 0.080). 
When an electronic copy was requested we had six positive responses (75%) from 
On Site pharmacies compared to two (50%) for Off Site pharmacies (p = 0.386). 
Table 6.6 Review of medication incidents 
Q 4.1 Initial review of incident 
undertaken by 
Pharmacy On Site 
 n (%) 




Senior Nurse 1 (5.3) 8 (47.1) 9 (25) 
Nurse/Unit Manager 16 (84.2) 12 (70.6) 28 (77.8) 
Director 1 (5.3) 2 (11.8) 3 (8.3) 
Pharmacist 5 (26.3) 1 (5.9) 6 (16.7) 
Other 0 (0) 1 (5.9) 1 (2.8) 
Total 19 (100) 17 (100) 36 (100) 
Q 4.2 Incident reports are sent 
to 
Pharmacy On Site  
n (%) 




Director 10 (52.6) 8 (47.1) 18 (50) 
Medication Safety Officer 2 (10.5) 0 (0) 2 (5.6) 
Project Officer 3 (15.8) 0 (0) 3 (8.3) 
Safety and Quality 9 (47.4) 8 (47.1) 17 (47.2) 
Other 6 (31.6) 5 (29.4) 11 (30.6) 
Total 19 (100) 17 (100) 36 (100) 
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It was more likely that if the pharmacy service was provided On Site that a 
pharmacist was involved in medication incident reviews (Table 6.6).Further, if 
pharmacy services were provided On Site it was far more likely that reports were 
sent to a Medication Safety or Projects officer. 
Table 6.7 Use of a database and reports for medication incidents 
  Pharmacy services are provided 
Question? Response On Site  
n (%)  
Off Site  
n (%) 
P value 
Q 5 RMP: Have a Safety and Quality 
Coordinator? 
Yes 19 (100) 16 (94.1) 0.284 
Q 6 RMP: Medication incidents on a 
database? 
Yes 18 (94.7) 16 (94.1) 0.935 
Q 7 RMP: Database used is Excel Yes 4 (21.1) 5 (33.3) 0.42 
Q 9.1 RMP: Medication incident 
reports produced? 
Yes 19 (100) 17 (100) ns  
 
As can be seen from the data presented in Table 6.7 a Safety and Quality Officer 
existed in all hospitals with an On Site pharmacy. Medication Incidents are entered 
onto a data base independent of the location of the pharmacy department, and 
databases other than ExcelTM were in use in most hospitals. All hospitals produce 
medication incident reports, independent of the location of the pharmacy department. 
No information was provided by respondents on who would enter the data onto the 
database. 
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Table 6.8 Frequency and content of medication incident reports 
Q 9.2 RMP: How frequently are 
reports produced? 
Pharmacy On Site  
n (%) 
Pharmacy Off Site 
 n (%) 
Total 
n (%) 
Monthly 15 (78.9) 14 (82.4) 29 (80.6) 
Quarterly 9 (47.4) 3 (17.6) 12 (33.3) 
Six Monthly 4 (21.1) 1 (5.9) 5 (13.9) 
Annually 4 (21.1) 0 (0) 4 (11.1) 
Ad Hoc 5 (26.3) 0 (0) 5 (13.9) 
Total 19 (100) 17 (100) 36 (100) 
Q 10 RMP: Type or content of 
reports produced? 
Pharmacy On Site  
n (%) 
Pharmacy Off Site 
 n (%) 
Total 
n (%) 
Type of error 19 (100) 13 (86.7) 32 (94.1) 
Frequency of error 16 (84.2) 10 (66.7) 26 (76.5) 
Contributing factors 6 (31.6) 6 (40) 12 (35.3) 
Severity 16 (84.2) 8 (53.3) 24 (70.6) 
Other 11 (57.9) 5 (33.3) 16 947.1) 
Total 19 (100) 15 (100) 34 (100) 
 
Whilst production of medication incident reports was commonly undertaken on a 
monthly basis (Table 6.8), hospitals with On Site pharmacies were more likely to 
have them across a range of times. In terms of the type and content of medication 
incidence reports it would appear that those produced in hospitals with On Site 
pharmacies were more comprehensive. 
The location of the pharmacy did not influence the review process of medication 
incidents, with the majority of hospitals having a specific committee undertake this 
task. (Onsite 94.7% vs Off-site 100%; p = 0.337). 
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Table 6.9 Actions by Review Committee 
Q 11.2 RMP Actions taken by 
reviewing committee 
Pharmacy On Site 
 n (%) 
Pharmacy Off Site 
 n (%) 
Total 
n (%) 
Table report only 6 (33.3) 5 (29.4) 11 (31.4) 
Suggest practice change 17 (94.4) 15 (88.2) 32 (91.4) 
Authorise education 14 (77.8) 13 (76.5) 27 (77.1) 
Other 5 (27.8) 4 (23.5) 9 (25.7) 
Total 18 (100) 17 (100) 35 (100) 
As can be seen from the data presented in Table 6.9 the location of pharmacy 
services did not seem to influence what actions were taken by the reviewing 
committee. 
Graph 6.1 Mean number (± SD) of Medication Incidents reported in previous 12 
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df 1, F = 13.394, p = 0.001
 
 
Table 6.10 Comparison of medication incident reports to previous year 
Q 13 RMP: Comparison of 
medication incident numbers to 
previous year 
Pharmacy On Site 
 n (%)  
Pharmacy Off Site  
n (%)  
p value 





Less 5 (29.4) 5 (38.5) 
Same 4 (23.5) 4 (30.8) 
Don’t Know 2 (11.8) 2 (15.4) 
Total 17 (100) 13 (100) 
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From Graph 6.1 it is evident that the number of medication incidents reported is 
higher amongst hospitals with an On Site pharmacy. However, whether the rate of 
reporting had changed over the previous 12 months was unclear from the data 
presented in Table 6.10. 
The remaining questions reflect the involvement of Pharmacy Services (PS) in the 
medication safety process. All respondents reported ‗Yes‘ that they had a pharmacy 
service associated with their hospital and this was independent of whether the 
pharmacy service was Off Site or On Site. 
Table 6.11 Pharmacy ownership 
Q 15 PS: Are pharmacy services 
owned or contracted? 
2
 
Pharmacy On Site 
 n (%)  
Pharmacy Off Site  
n (%)  
p value 
Hospital owned 7 (36.8) 1 (5.9) 0.026 
  
  
Contracted 12 (63.2) 16 (94.1) 
Total 19 (100) 17 (100) 
 
There was a significant difference in location of pharmacy services when compared 
to ownership model, as shown in Table 6.11, with hospital owned services tending to 
be on site and contracted services off site. (p = 0.026). 
Clinical pharmacists were employed by On Site pharmacies more frequently than Off 
Site pharmacies but the difference was not statistically significant (On Site 89.5% Vs 
Off Site 81.3%;, p = 0.489). However, as can be seen from Graph 6.2, On Site 
pharmacies employed significantly more clinical pharmacists.  




  PS means Pharmacy Services section of the Questionnaire. 
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df 1, F = 9.163, p = 0.006
 
 
Table 6.12 Percentage of wards serviced by clinical pharmacists 
Q 19 PS: percentage of wards 
serviced by clinical pharmacists 
Pharmacy On Site 
 n (%)  
Pharmacy Off Site  
n (%)  
p value 




25-50% 0 (0) 4 (30.8) 
51-75% 3 (18.8) 2 (15.4) 
> 75% 12 (75) 5 (38.5) 
Total 16 (100) 13 (100)   
 
As can be seen from Table 6.12 hospitals with pharmacy services On Site were more 
likely to service more wards than those services provided Off Site, however the 
difference did not reach statistical significance ( p value = 0.066). 
Table 6.13 Time spent on wards by clinical pharmacists 
  Pharmacy services are provided 
Question? Response On Site 
 n (%)  
Off Site 
 n (%) 
P value 
Q 20.1 PS: Clinical pharmacists 
on wards fulltime? 
Yes 5 (29.4) 0 (0) 0.101 
Q 20.2 PS: Clinical pharmacist if 
part-time have other duties 
Yes 13 (100) 6 (50) 0.014 
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Table 6.13 shows the allocation of clinical pharmacists duties in hospitals with On 
Site versus Off Site pharmacies. What is evident from the data is that On Site 
pharmacies had more pharmacists engaged in clinical services either on a full-time or 
part-time basis. 
Table 6.14 Activities of  clinical pharmacist 
Q 21 PS: Clinical pharmacist 
activities 
Pharmacy On Site 
 n (%) 




Preadmission clinics 2 (11.8) 0 (0) 2 (6.7) 
Admission histories 7 (41.2) 1 (7.7) 8 (26.7) 
Daily medication chart review 13 (76.5) 12 (92.3) 25 (83.3) 
Discharge counselling 16 (94.1) 9 (69.2) 25 (83.3) 
Provide medilists 15 (88.2) 8 (61.5) 23 (76.7) 
Management of trials 6 (35.3) 0 (0) 6 (20) 
Design of charts/forms 11 (64.7) 3 (23.1) 14 (46.7) 
Medication guidelines 13 (76.5) 10 (76.9) 23 (76.7) 
Develop nursing policy 13 (76.5) 10 (76.9) 23 (76.7) 
Nurse education 15 (88.2) 13 (100) 28 (93.3) 
Total 17 (100) 13 (100) 30 (100) 
 
Pharmacy services delivered on site were more likely to be involved in such 
activities as clinical trials management, admission medication history taking, 
discharge counselling, provision of medication lists, as well as design of charts and 
forms in use (Table 6.14). Core activities such as daily medication chart review and 
provision of medication guidelines were fairly standard across all sites. 
One significant difference was that pharmacy services provided On Site were more 
likely to be involved in the review of medication incidents than those not. (On Site 
78.9% vs Off Site 47.1%; p = 0.047.) 
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Table 6.15 Pharmacy roles in reviewing medication incidents 
Q 22.2 PS: Who in pharmacy is 
responsible for medication 
incident reviews 
Pharmacy 
 On Site  
n (%) 
Pharmacy 
 Off Site 
 n (%) 
Total 
n (%) 
Chief/Director/Manager 7 (53.8) 1 (16.7) 8 (42.1) 
Deputy Chief 2 (15.4) 1 (16.7) 3 (15.8) 
Coordinator of Clinical Pharmacy 2 (15.4) 0 (0) 2 (10.5) 
Clinical Pharmacist 4 (30.8) 3 (50) 7 (36.8) 
Other 2 (15.4) 2 (33.3) 4 (21.1) 
Total 13 (100) 6 (100) 19 (100) 
Q 23 PS: What role do clinical 
pharmacists play in the review? 
Pharmacy  
On Site 
 n (%) 
Pharmacy 
 Off Site 
 n (%) 
Total  
n (%) 
Recognise trends 8 (47.1) 5 (35.7) 13 (41.9) 
Advise on remedies 10 (58.8) 8 (57.1) 18 (58.1) 
Assist in education 12 (70.6) 10 (71.4) 22 (71) 
Not applicable 3 (17.6) 3 (21.4) 6 (19.4) 
Other 2 (11.8) 0 (0) 2 (6.5) 
Total 17 (100) 14 (100) 31 (100) 
 
As can be seen from the information provided in Table 6.15 pharmacy services 
provided Off Site were less likely to involve the Director of Pharmacy or have a 
Clinical Pharmacy Coordinator involved in medication incident review. However, 
where the pharmacy services were provided from did not seem to influence the roles 
clinical pharmacists played in the review of medication incidents. Further, it did not 
influence the allocation of clinical pharmacists to medication incident review as 
shown in Table 6.16. 
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Table 6.16 Allocation of clinical pharmacists to medication incident review 
Q 24 PS: What FTE clinical 
pharmacist associated with 




Pharmacy Off Site  
n (%) 
p value 






0.75 FTE 0 (0) 1 (8.3) 
0.5 FTE 2 (11.8) 1 (8.3) 
0.25FTE 2 (11.8) 2 (16.7) 
< 0.25 FTE 2 (11.8) 3 (25) 
Unknown 8 (47.1) 4 (33.3) 
Total 17 (100) 12 (100)   
 
Table 6.17 Reporting of pharmacist interventions and dispensing errors 
  Pharmacy services are provided 





Q 25 PS: Clinical pharmacists collect 
own interventions? 
Yes 15 (83.3) 9 (60.0) 0.253 
Q 25.1 PS: Are pharmacist interventions 
added to incident data? 
Yes 8 (53.3) 6 (66.7) 0.521 
Q 26 PS: Are dispensing errors that 
arrive on wards collected? 
Yes 18 (94.7) 13 (81.3) 0.212 
Q 27.1 PS: Does pharmacy self-record 
near misses? 
Yes 13 (68.4) 4 (25.0) 0.023 
Q 27.2 PS: Are pharmacy near misses 
added to incident data? 
Yes 7 (53.8) 1 (20.0) 0.196 
On Site pharmacy services are more likely to have clinical pharmacists collecting 
their own intervention data, but those with Off Site pharmacies more likely to 
include this data in their incident reports (Table 6.17), although the differences were 
not statistically significant.  
Dispensing errors that arrive on the wards are collected as pharmacy dispensing 
errors regardless of the location of pharmacy service. However, near misses 
occurring in the pharmacy were far more likely to be reported in On Site pharmacies 
compared to their Off Site counterparts (68.4% vs 25.0%; p = 0.023) 
On site pharmacy models are more likely to record pharmacy near misses as part of 
the general medication incident reporting system.  
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6.3.2 THE INFLUENCE OF THE OWNERSHIP MODEL FOR PHARMACY SERVICES 
 




 n (%) 





New South Wales 1 (7.7) 12 (92.3) 13 (100) 0.309 
Queensland 1 (20) 4 (80) 5 (100)   
South Australia 1 (33.3) 2 (66.7) 3 (100)   
Tasmania 1 (100) 0 (0) 1 (!00)   
Victoria 3 (33.3) 6 (66.7) 9 (100)   
Western Australia 1 (20) 4 (80) 5 (100)   
Total 8 (22.2) 28 (77.8) 36 (100)   
Q2: Average level of 
occupancy:  
Hospital Owned  
n (%) 
Contracted Out  
n (%) 
Total 
n (%)  
p value 
<70% 1 (12.5) 9 (36) 10 (30.3) 0.619 
71-80% 4 (50) 8 (32)  12 (36.4)   
81-90% 2 (25) 6 (24)  8 (24.2)   
>90% 1 (12.5) 2 (8)  3 (9.1)   
Total 8 (100) 25 (100)  33 (100)   
 
Between states, there was no statistically significant difference in ownership model 
between the pharmacy services Contracted Out or Hospital Owned (Table 6.18). 
Hospitals with a higher level of occupancy tended to have Hospital Owned 
pharmacies, although the difference did not meet statistical significance. 
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Table 6.19 Specialties and critical care areas provided 
Q 3 Specialties in each hospital: Hospital Owned 
 n (%) 




Orthopaedics 8 (100) 28 (100) 36 (100) 
Cardiology 7 (87.5) 13 (46.4) 20 (55.6) 
Urology 8 (100) 24 (85.7) 32 (88.9) 
Oncology 7 (87.5) 15 (53.6) 22 (61.1) 
Obstetrics & Gynaecology 8 (100) 22 (78.6) 30 (83.3) 
Paediatrics 3 (37.5) 14 (50) 17 (47.2) 
General surgery 8 (100) 28 (100) 36 (100) 
Gastroenterology 8 (100) 22 (78.6) 30 (83.3) 
Neurology 4 (50) 8 (28.6) 12 (33.3) 
Plastics 7 (87.5) 25 (89.3) 32 (88.9) 
Other 3 (37.5) 9 (32.1) 12 (33.3) 
Total 8 (100) 28 (100) 36 (100) 
Q 4 Special/Critical care areas in 
the hospital: 
Hospital Owned 
 n (%) 




Emergency Department 5 (62.5) 6 (33.3) 11 (42.3) 
Adult ICU 7 (87.5) 13 (72.2) 20 (76.9) 
Neonatal ICU 1 (12.5) 4 (22.2) 5 (19.2) 
CCU 7 (87.5) 15 (83.3) 22 (84.6) 
Total 8 (100) 18 100)  26 (100) 
 
Those hospitals with a Hospital Owned pharmacy service were more likely to cater 
for more complex specialties such as Cardiology, Oncology, Gastroenterology and 
Neurology. They were also twice as likely to have an Emergency Department and 
more likely to have an Adult ICU (Table 6.19). 
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Table 6.20 Breakdown by surgical and medical patients 
Q 5 Hospital caters predominantly 
for 
Hospital Owned  
n (%) 
Contracted Out  
n (%) 
p value 
Surgical > Medical 4(50) 21 (75) 0.178 
Surgical = Medical 4 (50) 7 (25)   
Total 8 (100) 28 (100)   
Q 6.1 Average length of stay of 
surgical patients 
Hospital Owned  
n (%) 
Contracted Out  
n (%) 
p value 
Up to 1 day 0 (0) 1 (3.8) 0.409 
1-3 days 3 (42.9) 17 (65.4)   
4-5 days 4 (57.1) 8 (30.8)   
Total 7 (100) 26 (100)   
Q 6.2 Average length of stay of 
Medical patients 
Hospital Owned 
 n (%) 
Contracted Out  
n (%) 
p value 
Up to 1 day 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.102 
1-3 days 0 (0) 2 (8.7%)   
4-5 days 0 (0) 8 (34.8)   
6 days 7 (100) 13 (56.5)   
Total 7 (100) 23 (100)   
 
As can be seen in Table 6.20 in those hospitals with Contracted Out pharmacy 
services there was an increased likelihood they would have a higher focus on surgery 
although the difference was not statistically significant. Contracted Out pharmacy 
service hospitals were more likely to have a shorter length of stay. 
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Table 6.21 Collocation, Medication Safety policy and medication incident reporting 
    Pharmacy services are 
 Response Hospital Owned 
 n N (%) 
Contracted 
Out  
n N (%) 
P value 
Q7: Collocated with a public 
hospital 
Yes 4/8 (50) 2/28 (7.1) 0.014 




Yes 8/8 (100) 22/26 (84.6) 0.238 
Q1.2 RMP: Copy of policy 
made available 
Yes 6/7 (85.7) 14/17 (82.4) 0.841 
Q2.1 RMP: Medication 
incidents reported? 
Yes 8/8 (100) 28/28 (100) ns 
Q2.2RMP: Part of hospital 
incident reporting 
Yes 8/8 (100) 27/27 (100) ns  
 
Of the respondents six hospitals were co-located with a public hospital (Table 6.21) 
and of these 4 (66.6%) had a Hospital Owned pharmacy service. As such if a private 
hospital is collocated with a public hospital it is more likely that the pharmacy 
services would be Hospital Owned whilst if it is not collocated it is likely to be 
Contracted Out ( 4/8 vs 26/28; p = 0.014) and this difference was significant. All 
Hospital Owned pharmacy services stated the existence of a hospital medication 
safety policy and almost all provided copies of that policy as compared to 80% of 
Contracted Out pharmacies (p = 0.841). 
All hospitals reported medication incidents and these incidents were part of the 
hospitals‘ incident reporting system independent of the ownership model.  
Table 6.22 Format for collection of medication incidents 








Hard Copy 6 (75) 25 (89) 31 (86.1) 
Electronically 6 (75) 9 (32.1) 15 (41.7) 
Total 8 (100) 28 (100) 36 (100) 




 RMP means Risk Management Processes’ section of the Questionnaire. 




Hospitals that owned their pharmacies were more likely to collect data on medication 
incidents electronically (Table 6.22). 
When hospitals were asked to provide a hard or electronic copy of how they collect 
their medication incident data, of those that responded it was more likely that a 
Hospital Owned pharmacy would provide a hard copy than a Contracted Out 
pharmacy, i.e. 5/5 (100%) Hospital Owned compared to 16/22 (72.7%) for 
Contracted pharmacies (p = 0.185). When an electronic copy was requested we had 
four positive responses (80%) from Hospital Owned pharmacies compared to four 
(57%) from Contacted Out pharmacies (p = 0.408). 
Table 6.23 Review of medication incidents 
Q 4.1 Initial review of 
incident undertaken by 
Hospital Owned  
n (%) 




Senior Nurse 0 (0) 9 (32.1) 9 (25) 
Nurse/Unit Manager 6 (75) 22 (78.6) 28 (77.8) 
Director 0 (0) 3 (10.7) 3 (8.3) 
Pharmacist 5 (62.5) 1 (3.6) 6 (16.7) 
Other 0 (0) 1 (3.6) 1 (2.8) 
Total 8 (100) 28 (100) 36 (100) 
Q 4.2 Incident reports are 
sent to 
Hospital Owned  
n (%) 




Director 4 (50) 14 (50) 18 (50) 
Medication Safety Officer 2 (25) 0 (0) 2 (5.6) 
Project Officer 0 (0) 3 (10.7) 3 (8.3) 
Safety and Quality 5 (62.5) 12 (42.9) 17 (47.2) 
Other 3 (37.5) 8 (28.6) 11 (30.6) 
Total 8 (100) 28 (100) 36 (100) 
 
Hospital Owned pharmacies were more likely to have a pharmacist involved in 
medication incident reviews (Table 6.23). Further, it was more likely that reports 
were sent to a Medication Safety Officer or Safety and Quality person in a Hospital 
Owned pharmacy service. 
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Table 6.24 Use of a database and reports for medication incidents 
    Pharmacy services are 
Question? Response Hospital Owned 
n (%) 




Q 5 RMP: Have a Safety and 
Quality Coordinator? 
Yes 8 (100) 27 (96.4) 0.588 
Q 6 RMP: Medication incidents 
on a database 
Yes 8 (100) 26 (92.9) 0.437 
Q 7 RMP: Database used is 
Excel 
Yes 2 (25) 7 (26.9) 0.914 
Q 9.1 RMP: Medication 
incident reports produced 
Yes 8 (100) 28 (100)   
 
As can be seen from the data presented in Table 6.24, a Safety and Quality Officer 
existed in almost all hospitals surveyed. Medication Incidents are entered onto a data 
base at more hospitals who own their pharmacy service and databases other than 
Excel™ were in use in most hospitals. 
All hospitals produce medication incident reports, independent of the ownership of 
the pharmacy department. 
Table 6.25 Frequency and content of medication incident reports 
Q 9.2 RMP: How frequently are 
reports produced? 
Hospital Owned 
 n (%) 




Monthly 6 (75) 23 (82.1) 29 (80.6) 
Quarterly 5 (62.5) 7 (25) 12 (33.3) 
Six Monthly 3 (37.5) 2 (7.1) 5 (13.9) 
Annually 3 (37.5) 1 (3.6) 4 (11.1) 
Ad Hoc 4 (50) 1 (3.6) 5 (13.9) 
Total 8 (100) 28 (100) 36 (100) 
Q 10 RMP: Type or content of 
reports produced? 
Hospital Owned 
 n (%) 




Type of error 8 (100) 24 (92.3) 32 (94.1) 
Frequency of error 8 (100) 18 (69.2) 26 (76.5) 
Contributing factors 4 (50) 8 (30.8) 12 (35.3) 
Severity 7 (87.5) 17 (65.4) 24 (70.6) 
Other 5 (62.5) 11 (42.3) 16 (47.1) 
Total 8 (100) 26 (100) 34 (100) 
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Whilst production of medication incident reports was commonly undertaken on a 
monthly basis independent of the ownership model, hospitals that owned their 
pharmacies were more likely to have them across a range of times. In terms of type 
and content of medication incident reports it would seem that those produced in 
hospitals that owned their pharmacies were more comprehensive. 
The ownership of the pharmacy service did not influence the review process of 
Medication incidents with the majority of hospitals having a specific committee 
undertaking this task. (Hospital Owned 100% vs Contracted Out 96.4%; p = 0.588). 
Table 6.26 Actions by review committee 
Q 11.2 RMP Actions taken 
by reviewing committee: 
Hospital Owned  
n (%) 




Table report only 2 (25) 9 (33.3) 11 (31.4) 
Suggest practice change 8 (100) 24 (88.9) 32 (91.4) 
Authorise education 5 (62.5) 22 (81.5) 27 (77.1) 
Other 1 (12.5) 8 (29.6) 9 (25.7) 
Total 8 (100) 27 (100) 35 (100) 
 
As can be seen in the data presented in Table 6.26 the ownership of pharmacy 
services did not influence what actions were taken by the reviewing committee 
although those with a Contracted Out model had a slightly more varied role. 
Medication Incidents in a Private Hospital: Frequency, type, causes and outcomes 
 
161 









Hospital                                                 Contracted out













































Table 6.27 Comparison of medication incident reports to previous year 
Q 13 RMP: Comparison of 
medication incident numbers to 
previous year 
Hospital Owned  
n (%) 
Contracted Out  
n (%) 
p value 
More 3 (42.9) 5 (21.7) 0.591 
Less 1 (14.3) 9 (39.1)   
Same 2 (26.6) 6 (26.1)   
Don’t Know 1 (14.3) 3 (13.0)   
Total 7 (100) 23 (!00)   
 
From Graph 6.3 it is evident that the number of medication incidents reported is 
higher amongst hospitals that own their own pharmacy service. The rate of reporting 
change over the previous 12 months was hard to assess from Table 6.27 with 
Hospital Owned pharmacy services reporting more reports and Contracted Out 
pharmacy services reporting less reports. 
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Table 6.28 Pharmacy location 
Q 15 PS: Are pharmacy services 
provided from a Department?
4
 
Hospital Owned  
n (%) 
Contracted Out  
n (%) 
p value 
On Site 7 (87.5) 12 (42.9) 0.026 
Off Site 1 (12.5) 16 (57.1)   
Total 8 (100) 28 (!00)   
 
There is a significant difference in ownership models when compared with location 
of pharmacy services as shown in Table 6.28, with On Site services tending to be 
Hospital Owned and Off Site services Contracted Out (p =0.026).  
Clinical pharmacists were employed by Hospital Owned pharmacies more frequently 
than Contacted Out Pharmacy services but the difference was not significant. 
(Hospital Owned 100% vs Contracted Out 81.5%; p = 0.189). However, as can be 
seen from graph 6.4. Hospital Owned pharmacies employed significantly more 
clinical pharmacists. 
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  PS means Pharmacy Services portion of the Questionnaire 




Table 6.29 Percentage of wards serviced by clinical pharmacists 
Q 19 PS: Percentage of wards 
serviced by clinical pharmacists 
Hospital Owned 
 n (%) 
Contracted Out  
n (%) 
p value 
< 25% 1 (14.3) 2 (9.1) 0.633 
25-50% 0 (0) 4 (18.2)   
51-75% 1 (14.3) 4 (18.2)   
> 75% 5 (71.4) 12 (54.5)   
Total 7 (100) 22 (100)   
 
As can be seen from Table 6.29, hospitals that owned their pharmacy service are 
likely to service more wards that those services that are Contracted Out (p = 0.633). 
Table 6.30 Time spent on wards by clinical pharmacists 
    Pharmacy services are 
Question? Response Hospital Owned 
 n (%) 




Q 20.1 PS: Clinical 
pharmacists on wards 
fulltime? 
Yes 2 (25) 3 (13.6) 0.457 
Q 20.2 PS: Clinical 
pharmacist if part time 
have other duties 
Yes 5 (83.3)  15 (78.9)  0.812 
 
Table 6.30 shows the allocation of clinical pharmacists‘ duties in hospitals that have 
Hospital Owned vs Contracted Out pharmacies. It is evident that most clinical 
pharmacists work on the wards on a part time basis and carry out other duties as well 
and this is independent of the ownership model involved. 
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Table 6.31 Activities of Clinical Pharmacist 
Q 21 PS: Clinical pharmacist 
activities 
Hospital Owned  
n (%) 




Preadmission clinics 1 (12.5) 1 (4.5) 2 (6.7) 
Admission histories 4 (50) 4 (18.2) 8 (26.7) 
Daily medication chart review 7 (87.5) 18 (81.8) 25 (83.3) 
Discharge counselling 8 (100) 17 (77.3) 25 (83.3) 
Provide medication lists 7 (87.5) 16 (72.7) 23 (76.7) 
Management of trials 4 (50) 2 (9.1) 6 (20) 
Design of charts/forms 5 (62.5) 9 (40.9) 14 (46.7) 
Medication guidelines 7 (87.5) 16 (72.7) 23 (76.7) 
Develop nursing policy 6 (75) 17 (77.3) 23 (76.7) 
Nurse education 7 (87.5) 21 (95.5) 28 (93.3) 
Total 8 (100) 22 (100) 30 (100) 
 
Pharmacy services delivered from Hospital Owned pharmacies were more likely to 
be involved in such activities as admission medication history taking, discharge 
counselling, management of trials, design of forms and guidelines (Table 6.31). A 
core activity such as daily medication chart review was uniform across both models.  
Pharmacies owned by the hospital were slightly more likely to be involved in 
medication incident review than those that were not. (Hospital Owned 75% vs 
Contracted Out 60.7%; p = 0.458). 
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Table 6.32 Pharmacy roles in reviewing medication incidents 
Q 22.2 PS: Who in pharmacy is 
responsible for medication incident 
reviews 
Hospital Owned  
n (%) 




Chief/Director/Manager 3 (50) 5 (38.5) 8 (42.1) 
Deputy Chief 2 (33.3) 1 (7.7) 3 (15.8) 
Coordinator Clinical Pharmacy Services 1 (16.7) 1 (7.7) 2 (10.5) 
Clinical Pharmacist 2 (33.3) 5 (38.5) 7 (36.8) 
Other 1 (16.7) 3 (23.1) 4 (21.1) 
Total 6 (100) 13 (100) 19 (100) 
Q 23 PS: What role do clinical 
pharmacists play in the review? 
Hospital Owned 
n (%) 




Recognise trends 5 (62.5) 8 (34.8) 13 (41.9) 
Advise on remedies 3 (37.5) 15 (65.2) 18 (58.1) 
Assist in education 5 (62.5) 17 (73.9) 22 (71) 
Not applicable 2 (25) 4 (17.4) 6 (19.4) 
Other 2 (25) 0 (0) 2 (6.5) 
Total 8 (100) 23 (100) 31 (100) 
 
As can be seen from the information provided in Table 6.32 pharmacy services 
owned by the hospital were more likely to involve the Director or Deputy Director of 
Pharmacy in medication incident review. However, who owned the pharmacy service 
did affect who would recognise trends with Hospital Owned more involved while 
advice on remedies or assistance with education was more likely provided by 
Contracted Out services.  
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Table 6.33 Allocation of clinical pharmacists to medication incident review 
Q 24 PS: What FTE clinical 
pharmacist associated with 
medication incident review? 
Hospital Owned 
n (%) 
Contracted Out  
n (%) 
p value 
1 FTE 1 (16.7) 3 (13) 0.716 
0.75 FTE 0 (0) 1 (4.3)   
0.5 FTE 1 (16.7) 2 (8.7)   
0.25FTE 1 (16.7) 3 (13)   
< 0.25 FTE 2 (33.3) 3 (13)   
Unknown 1 (16.7) 11 (37.8)   
Total 6 (100) 23 (100)   
 
The majority of Hospital Owned pharmacies provided 0.5 or less FTE to do this 
function compared to Contracted Services. It was interesting to note the number of 
responders who did not know how much time was spent on this function if the 
pharmacy provider was a contracted service. 
Table 6.34 Reporting of pharmacist interventions and dispensing errors 
    Pharmacy services are 
Question? Response Hospital Owned 





Q 25 PS: Clinical 
pharmacists collect own 
interventions 
Yes 7 (87.5) 17 (68) 0.539 
Q 25.1 PS: Are 
pharmacist 
interventions added to 
incident data 
Yes 3 (42.9) 11 (64.7) 0.324 
Q 26 PS: Are dispensing 
errors that arrive on 
wards collected? 
Yes 8 (100) 23 (85.2) 0.247 
Q 27.1 PS: Does 
pharmacy self-record 
near misses? 
Yes 6 (75) 11 (40.7) 0.171 
Q 27.2 PS: Are pharmacy 
near misses added to 
medication incidents? 
Yes 3 (50) 5 (41.7) 0.737 
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Hospital owned services were more likely to have clinical pharmacists collecting 
their own pharmacy intervention data, but Contracted Out services were more likely 
to include this data in their medication incident reports. 
Dispensing errors that arrived on the wards were collected as pharmacy dispensing 
errors regardless of the ownership model in place. However, ―near misses‖ occurring 
in the pharmacy were far more likely to be reported by Hospital Owned pharmacies 
compared to their Contracted Out counterparts. (75% vs 40.7%, p = 0.171).  
Pharmacy ownership models did not significantly affect whether pharmacy ―near 
misses‖ were added to the hospital's medication incident reporting system. 
6.3.3 THE INFLUENCE OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF CLINICAL PHARMACISTS 














NSW 10 (83.3) 2 (16.7) 12 (100) 0.292 
QLD 5 (100) 0 (0) 5 (100)  
SA 2 (66.7) 1 (33.3) 3 (100)  
Tasmania 1 (100) 0 (0) 1 (!00)  
Victoria 9 (100) 0 (0) 9 (100)  
WA 3 (60) 2 (40) 5 (100)  
Total 30 (85.7) 5 (14.3) 35 (100)  













<70% 6 (22.2) 3 (60) 9 (28.1) 0.356 
71-80% 11 (40.7) 1 (20) 12 (37.5)   
81-90% 7 (25.9) 1 (20) 8 (25)   
>90% 3 (11.1) 0 (0) 3 (9.4)   
Total 27 (100) 5 (100) 32 (100)   
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Between states there was no statistically significant difference between the 
proportion of pharmacy services that employed clinical pharmacists or not (Table 
6.35), although more state respondents stated they employed clinical pharmacists 
than not. 
Table 6.36 Specialties and critical care areas provided 




 n (%) 
Clinical pharmacists 
not employed 
 n (%) 
Total 
n (%) 
Orthopaedics 30 (100) 5 (100) 35 (100) 
Cardiology 19 (63.3) 1 (20) 20 (57.1) 
Urology 28 (98.3) 3 (60) 31 (88.6) 
Oncology 20 (66.7) 2 (40) 22 (62.9) 
Obstetrics & Gynaecology 26 (86.7) 4 (80) 30 (85.7) 
Paediatrics 13 (43.3) 3 (60) 16 (45.7) 
General surgery 30 (100) 5 (100) 35 (100) 
Gastroenterology 26 (86.7) 3 (60) 29 (82.9) 
Neurology 11 (36.7) 1 (20) 12 (34.3) 
Plastics 27 (90) 4 (80) 31 (88.6) 
Other 11 (36.7) 1 (20) 12 934.3) 
Total 30 (100) 5 (100) 35 (100) 
Q 4 Special/Critical care 









Emergency Dept 10 (43.5) 1 (33.3) 11 (42.3)  
Adult ICU 19 (82.6) 1 (33.3) 20 (76.9)  
Neonatal ICU 3 (13) 2 (66.7) 5 (19.2)  
CCU 21 (91.3) 1 (33.3) 22 (84.6)  
Total 23 (100) 3 (100) 26 (100) 
 
Those hospitals who had specialties in Cardiology, Urology, Oncology, 
Gastroenterology were more likely to employ clinical pharmacists. They were also 
more likely to have an Adult ICU and CCU (Table 6.36). 
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Table 6.37 Breakdown by Surgical and Medical patients 




 n (%) 
Clinical pharmacists 
not employed 
 n (%) 
p 
value 
Surgical > Medical 21 (70) 4 (80) 0.647 
Surgical = Medical 9 (30) 1 (20)   
Total 30 (100) 5 (100)   
Q 6.1 Average length of 
stay of surgical patients 
Clinical pharmacists 
employed  
 n (%) 
Clinical pharmacists 
not employed  
 n (%) 
p 
value 
Up to 1 day 1 (3.7) 0 (0) 0.169 
1-3 days 15 (55.6) 5 (100)   
4-5 days 11 (40.7) 0 (0)   
Total 27 (100) 5 (100)   
Q 6.2 Average length of 
stay of Medical patients 
Clinical pharmacists 
employed 
 n (%) 
Clinical pharmacists 
not employed  
 n (%) 
p 
value 
Up to 1 day 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.513 
1-3 days 2 (8) 0 (0)   
4-5 days 6 (24) 2 (50)   
6 days 17 (68) 2 (50)   
Total 25 (100) 4 (100)   
 
As can be seen in Table 6.37 those hospitals that employed clinical pharmacists had a 
greater focus on medical patients, however this was not statistically significant. The 
longer the length of stay for surgical or medical patients did appear to predict the 
likely employment of clinical pharmacists. 
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Table 6.38 Collocation, Medication Safety policy and medication incident reporting 










 n (%) 
P 
value 
Q7: Collocated with a 
public hospital 
Yes 6/6 (100) 0/6 (0) 0.0272 
No 24/29 (82.8) 5/29 (17.2) 




Yes 26/29 (89.7) 3/4 (75) 0.400 
Q1.2 RMP: Copy of policy 
made available 
Yes 18/21 (85.7) 1/2 (50) 0.203 
Q2.1 RMP: Medication 
incidents reported? 
Yes 30/30 (100) 5/5(100) ns  
Q 2.2RMP: Part of hospital 
incident reporting 
Yes 29/29 (100) 5/5 (100) ns  
 
Of the respondents six hospitals were co-located with a public hospital (Table 6.38), 
and if a private hospital is co-located with a public hospital it is more likely to 
employ clinical pharmacists than not (6/30 vs 0/5; p = 0.272).Slightly more hospitals 
who employed clinical pharmacists had a policy on medication safety (p = 0.400) 
and were willing to make a copy available (p = 0.203). 
All hospitals reported medication incidents and ensured they formed part of the 
hospitals‘ incident reporting system, independent of whether clinical pharmacists 
were employed or not. 
Table 6.39 Format for collection of medication incidents 
Q 3.1: Medication Incidents 
are collected RMP  
Clinical pharmacists 
employed 
 n (%) 
Clinical pharmacists 
not employed 
 n (%) 
Total 
n (%) 
Hard Copy 26 (86.7) 4 (80) 30 (85.7) 
Electronically 13 (43.3) 2 (40) 15 (42.9) 
Total 30 (100) 5 (100) 35 (100) 




 RMP means Risk management processes’ portion of the Questionnaire.  
Medication Incidents in a Private Hospital: Frequency, type, causes and outcomes 
 
171 
Clinical pharmacists employed or not did not make any major difference as to how 
medication incidents were collected. 
When hospitals were asked to provide a hard or electronic copy of how they collect 
their medication incident data, of those that responded it was more likely that a 
Hospital that employed clinical pharmacists would provide a hard copy than those 
that did not, i.e. 19/23 (82.6%) employed clinical pharmacist to 2/4 (50%) for those 
that did not (p = 0.148). When an electronic copy was requested we had 6/10 positive 
responses (60%) from Hospital‘s that employed clinical pharmacists compared to 2/2 
(100%) for those that did not (p = 0.273). 
Table 6.40 Review of medication incidents 
Q 4.1 Initial review of 




 n (%) 
Clinical pharmacists 
not employed  
 n (%) 
Total 
n (%) 
Senior Nurse 8 (26.7) 1 (20) 9 (25.7) 
Nurse/Unit Manager 23 (76.7) 4 (80) 27 (77.1) 
Director 3 (10) 0 (0)  3 (8.6) 
Pharmacist 6 (20) 0 (0)  6 (17.1) 
Other 1 (3.3) 0 (0)  1 (2.9) 
Total 30 (100) 5 (100) 35 (100) 
Q 4.2 Incident reports are 
sent to RMP: 
Clinical pharmacists 
employed  
 n (%) 
Clinical pharmacists 
not employed  
 n (%) 
Total 
n (%) 
Director 14 (46.7) 4 (80) 18 (51.4) 
Medication Safety Officer 2 (6.7) 0 (0) 2 (5.7) 
Project Officer 3 (10) 0 (0) 3 (8.6) 
Safety and Quality 16 (53.3) 1 (20) 17 (48.6) 
Other 10 (33.3) 0 (0) 10 (28,6) 
Total 30 (100) 5 (100) 35 (100 
 
The initial review of medication incidents was performed by the Nurse Manager 
regardless of whether clinical pharmacists were employed or not (Table 6.40) but 
was performed by a pharmacist when clinical pharmacists were employed. 
It is more likely that reports are sent to a Medication Safety, Project or Safety and 
Quality Officer if clinical pharmacists are employed.  
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 n (%) 
P 
value 
Q 5 RMP: Have a Safety and 
Quality Coordinator? 
Yes 29 (96.7) 5 (100) 0.679 
Q 6 RMP: Medication 
incidents on a database 
Yes 29 (96.7) 4 (80) 0.137 
Q 7 RMP: Database used is 
Excel 
Yes 9 (31.0) 0 (0) 0.191 
Q 9.1 RMP: Medication 
incident reports produced 
Yes 30 (100) 5 (100) ns  
 
As can be seen from the data presented in table 6.41, a Safety and Quality Officer 
existed in almost all hospitals surveyed. Medication incidents are entered onto a data 
base at more hospitals that employ clinical pharmacists and databases other than 
Excel™ were in use in most hospitals. 
All hospitals produce medication incident reports, independent of whether clinical 
pharmacists are employed. 
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Table 6.42 Frequency and content of medication incident reports 
Q 9.2 RMP: How frequently 
are reports produced? 
Clinical pharmacists 
employed 
 n (%) 
Clinical pharmacists 
not employed 
 n (%) 
Total 
n (%) 
Monthly 24 (80) 4 (80) 28 (80) 
Quarterly 11 (36.7) 1 (20) 12 (34.3) 
Six Monthly 5 (16.7) 0 (0)  5 (14.3) 
Annually 4 (13.3) 0 (0)  4 (11.4) 
Ad Hoc 5 (16.7) 0 (0)  5 (14.3) 
Total 30 (100) 5 (100) 35 (100) 










Type of error 27 (96.4) 4 (80) 31 (93.9) 
Frequency of error 22 (78.6) 4 (80) 26 (78.8) 
Contributing factors 11 (39.3) 0 (0) 11 (33) 
Severity 21 (75) 2 (40) 23 (69.7) 
Other 14 (50) 2 (40) 16 (48.5) 
Total 28 (100) 5 (100) 33 (100) 
 
Whilst production of medication incident reports was commonly undertaken on a 
monthly basis independent of the employment of clinical pharmacists, hospitals that 
did employ them were more likely to have them across a range of times (Table 6.42). 
In terms of type and content of medication incident reports it would seem that those 
produced in hospitals where clinical pharmacists were employed were more 
comprehensive and reported on contributing factors and severity of the incident. 
The employment of clinical pharmacists did not influence the review process of 
medication incidents with the majority of hospitals having a specific committee 
undertaking this task. (Clinical Pharmacists employed 96.7% vs those that did not 
100%; p = 0.679). 
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Table 6.43 Actions by review committee 










Table report only 9 (31) 1 (20) 10 (29.4) 
Suggest practice change 28 (96.6) 3 (60) 31 (91.2) 
Authorise education 24 (82.8) 2 (40) 26 (76.5) 
Other 7 (24.1) 1 (20) 8 (23.5) 
Total 29 (100) 5 (10) 34 (100) 
 
As can be seen in the data presented in Table 6.43 hospitals that employed clinical 
pharmacists had reviewing committees that were more likely to suggest practice 
changes and authorise corrective education. 
 
Graph 6.5 (Q12 RMP) Mean number of Medication Incidents reported in previous 12 
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Table 6.44 Comparison of medication incident reports to previous year 
Q 13 RMP: Comparison of 
medication incident 








More 6 (25) 2 (40) 0.821 
Less 9 (37.5) 1 (20)   
Same 6 (25) 1 (20)   
Don’t Know 3 (12.5) 1 (20)   
Total 24 (100) 5 (100)   
 
From Graph 6.5 it is evident that the number of medication incidents reported is 
higher amongst hospitals that employ clinical pharmacists. The rate of reporting 
change over the previous 12 months was hard to assess from Table 6.44 with those 
that did not employ clinical pharmacists reporting more reports. 
Table 6.45 Pharmacy location and ownership 
Q 15 PS: Are pharmacy 






 n (%) 
Clinical pharmacists 
not employed 
 n (%) 
p 
value 
On site 17 (56.7) 2 (40) 0.489 
Off site 13 (43.3) 3 (60)   
Total 30 (100) 5 (100)   
Q 16 PS: Are pharmacy 




 n (%) 
Clinical pharmacists 
not employed 
 n (%) 
p 
value 
Hospital owned 8 (26.7) 0 (0) 0.189 
Contracted 22 (73.3) 5 (100)   
Total 30 (100) 5 (100)   
 




  PS means Pharmacy Services portion of the Questionnaire. 
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A pharmacy service was available to all hospitals regardless of whether clinical 
pharmacists were employed (30/30,100%) or not (5/5,100%). 
Location of the pharmacy service as shown in Table 6.45, either On Site or Off Site, 
was not influenced by whether clinical pharmacists were employed or not (p = 
0.489). 
Clinical pharmacists were employed by Hospital Owned pharmacies more frequently 
than Contacted Out Pharmacy services but the difference was not significant. 
(Hospital Owned 100% vs Contracted Out 81.5%; p = 0.189).  
However, as can be seen from graph 6.4. Hospital Owned pharmacies employed  
more clinical pharmacists. 
Table 6.46 Percentage of wards serviced by clinical pharmacists 
Q 19 PS: Percentage of wards 
serviced by clinical pharmacists 
Clinical pharmacists employed 
n (%) 
< 25% 3 (10.3) 
25-50% 4 (13.8) 
51-75% 5 (17.2) 
> 75% 17 (58.6) 
Total 29 (100) 
 
Table 6.47 Time spent on wards by Clinical Pharmacists 
Question? Response Clinical pharmacists employed  
n (%) 
Q 20.1 PS: Clinical pharmacists on 
wards fulltime? 
Yes 4 (13.3) 
Q 20.2 PS: Clinical pharmacist if part 
time have other duties 
Yes 19 (76) 
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Table 6.48 Activities of clinical pharmacist 
Q 21 PS: Clinical pharmacist 
activities 
Clinical pharmacists employed 
 n (%) 
Preadmission clinics 2 (6.7) 
Admission histories 8 (26.7) 
Daily medication chart review 25 (83.3) 
Discharge counselling 25 (83.3) 
Provide medication lists 23 (76.7) 
Management of trials 6 (20) 
Design of charts/forms 14 (46.7) 
Medication guidelines 23 (76.7) 
Develop nursing policy 23 (76.7) 
Nurse education 28 (93.3) 
Total 30 (100) 
 
The questions represented by Tables 6.46 6.47 and 6.48 could only be answered by 
hospitals that employed clinical pharmacists. 
Pharmacy providers who employ clinical pharmacists are statistically more likely to 
be involved in the review of medication incidents (Clinical pharmacists employed 
73.3% vs Clinical pharmacist not employed 20%; p = 0.20). 
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Table 6.49 Pharmacy roles in reviewing medication incidents 
Q 22.2 PS: Who in pharmacy is 




 n (%) 
Clinical pharmacists 
not employed 
 n (%) 
Total 
n (%) 
Chief/Director/Manager 7 (38.9) 1 (100) 8 (42.1) 
Deputy Chief 3 (16.7)   3 (15.8) 
Coordinator Clinical Pharmacy 2 (11.1)   2 (10.5) 
Clinical Pharmacist 7 (38.9)   7 (36.8) 
Other 4 (22.2)   4 (21.1) 
Total 18 (100) 1 (100) 19 (100) 
Q 23 PS: What role do clinical 




 n (%) 
Clinical pharmacists 
not employed 
 n (%) 
Total 
n (%) 
Recognise trends 12 (42.9) 1 (33.3) 13 (41.9) 
Advise on remedies 17 (60.7) 1 (33.3) 18 (58.1) 
Assist in education 21 (75.5) 1 (33.3) 22 (71) 
Not applicable 4 (14.3) 2 (66.7) 6 (19.4) 
Other 2 (7.1) 0 (0) 2 (6.5) 
Total 28 (100) 3 (100) 31 (100) 
 
As can be seen from the information provided in Table 6.49, pharmacy services that 
employ clinical pharmacists were more likely to involve a range of pharmacy 
positions along with the Director of Pharmacy in medication incident review. 
However, employing clinical pharmacists did influence activities such as advice on 
remedies and assistance with corrective education. The data for when clinical 
pharmacists were not employed it was assumed referred to the roles provided by the 
Director of Pharmacy. 
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Table 6.50 Allocation of clinical pharmacists to medication incident review 
Q 24 PS: What FTE clinical 





 n (%) 
Clinical pharmacists 
not employed 
 n (%) 
Total 
n (%) 
1 FTE 3 (11.5) 1 (33.3) 4 (13.8) 
0.75 FTE 1 (3.8) 0 (0) 1 (3.4) 
0.5 FTE 3 (11.5) 0 (0) 3 (10.3) 
0.25FTE 4 (15.4) 0 (0) 4 (13.8) 
< 0.25 FTE 5 (19.2) 0 (0) 5 (17.2) 
Unknown 10 (38.5) 2 (66.7) 12 
(41.4) 
Total 26 (100) 3 (100) 29 (100) 
 
The majority of hospitals that employed clinical pharmacists provide 0.5 or less FTE 
to do this function compared to the single response for the Director of Pharmacy 
when clinical pharmacists are not employed (Table 6.50). It was interesting to note 
the number of responders who did not know how much time was spent on this 
function and the number of respondents i.e. 3 that provided a full time clinical 
pharmacist to this role. 










 n (%) 
P 
value 
Q 25 PS: Clinical 
pharmacists collect own 
interventions 
Yes 23 (79.3) 1 (33.3) 0.08 
Q 25.1 PS: Are pharmacist 
interventions added to 
incident data 
Yes 14 (60.9) 0 (0) 0.227 
Q 26 PS: Are dispensing 
errors that arrive on 
wards collected? 
Yes 28 (93.3) 3 (75) 0.225 
Q 27.1 PS: Does pharmacy 
self-record near misses? 
Yes 17 (56.7) 0 (0) 0.041 
Q 27.2 PS: Are pharmacy 
near misses added to 
medication incidents? 
Yes 8 (44.4) 0 (0)   
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As can be seen in Table 6.51, hospital pharmacy services who employed clinical 
pharmacists were significantly more likely to have clinical pharmacists collecting 
their own pharmacy intervention data (p = 0.08), but not all departments entered the 
interventions with the hospital incident data. These providers were more likely to 
collect data on dispensing errors that reached the wards as well (93.3% vs 75%; p = 
0.225). 
However, ―near misses‖ occurring in the pharmacy were far more likely to be 
reported by pharmacy services that employed clinical pharmacists compared to those 
who did not. (56.7% vs 0%, p = 0.041).  
Having clinical pharmacists did not significantly affect whether pharmacy near 
misses were added to the hospital's medication incident reporting system. 
6.4 DISCUSSION  
The influences of the location of the pharmacy service (Table 6.1 to Table 6.17), the 
ownership of pharmacy services (Tables 6.18 to Table 6.34) and the employment of 
clinical pharmacists (Table 6.35 to Table 6.51) on responses to the Questionnaire 
have been reviewed and the results detailed in section 6.3. In this section the key 
findings for each of these studied influences will be discussed and where possible the 
results assessed against the published literature.  
6.4.1 KEY FINDINGS FROM THE INFLUENCE OF LOCATION OF PHARMACY  
Of those hospitals that completed the survey, nineteen hospitals responded they had a 
pharmacy On Site whilst seventeen responded they had an Off Site pharmacy. The 
balance (2/38) did not state they had a pharmacy service.  
It was worth noting that all hospitals reported medication incidents and these were 
part of the hospital‘s incident reporting system independent of the location of the 
pharmacy, demonstrating a strong willingness to collect data. But it was significant 
that On Site pharmacy respondents had a policy on medication safety as compared to 
the Off Site pharmacies (p = 0.024), as well as having a higher mean number of 
medication incidents reported (p = 0.001). On Site pharmacy services were 
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significantly more likely to be involved in the review of medication incidents than 
Off Site (p = 0.047). 
There was a significant difference in the location of pharmacy services when 
compared to ownership model, with hospital owned services tending to be On Site 
and contracted services more likely to be Off Site (p = 0.026). This is key to 
understanding the reasons why On Site services are provided at a higher level than 
Off site. The incorporation of a pharmacist into a multidisciplinary clinical team is 
easier to achieve if all hospital caregivers share the same employer and share the 
same mission for the organisation to reduce harm from medications. While clinical 
pharmacists were employed by the majority of pharmacies independent of their 
location, On Site pharmacies were more likely to employ almost three times more 
clinical pharmacists than Off Site pharmacies (p = 0.006). Similarly On Site 
pharmacies had more pharmacists engaged in clinical services activities either on a 
full time or part-time basis. If part-time, clinical pharmacists were more likely to 
have other duties to perform if employed by an On Site pharmacy (p = 0.014). Even 
in the pharmacy while completing the dispensing process, ―near miss‖ dispensing 
errors that occurred in the pharmacy were far more likely to be reported in On Site 
pharmacies compared to their Off Site counterparts (p = 0.023). 
The more positive outcomes from On Site pharmacy services are obvious from the 
highlighted key results above. But this does not mean that there is not an important 
role for Off Site contracted services and that innovative solutions cannot be provided 
to ensure services are provided at an acceptable level. In the USA where the majority 
of hospitals are private, many different location and ownership models exist. Both 
On Site and Off Site pharmacy services are common but some key technological and 
system solutions have been developed to enhance Off Site services development. The 
use of telepharmacy is widely reported as a solution to service hospitals in rural and 
remote areas, even across state boundaries,88 with long distance supervision of 
pharmacy technicians by pharmacists being developed. Various telepharmacy models 
are being implemented depending on state regulations, hospital ownership, hospital 
size and medication order volume. Some claim that error rates have improved since 
telepharmacy was introduced. In 2008 in USA, Off Site medication order review was 
used in 20.7% of hospitals in a national survey.89 Telepharmacy has also spread to 
critical care beds with reports of small hospitals gaining benefit from connection to a 
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remote office based ICU monitoring facility powered by telemedicine technology 
called eICU.90 The remote pharmacists provided ratification to electronic physician 
order entries as well as recommendations for problems with antimicrobial coverage 
and formulary choices. On Site pharmacies in the USA have also been expanding 
their services to an ―around the clock‖ clinical pharmacy service.91 Use of an 
external source to problem solve and review clinical issues could help to offset this 
development. Similarly remote dispensing via remote access to a hospital‘s computer 
network and the use of electronic medication management systems with robotic 
dispensing processes are also gaining in popularity.89 This has effectively been used 
to manage rural hospitals from a central larger ―hub‖ hospital in Minnesota during 
perceived high risk times such as weekends and public holidays.92 Hence, a 24 hour 
clinical pharmacy review or information service could be provided to assist hospitals 
without an On Site pharmacy, using remote access to their computer systems. With 
private hospital bed numbers and throughput increasing annually, pharmacies must 
continually review and look for solutions that have been proven to be of benefit to 
ensure safe medication practices exist and harm to patients from medications is 
reduced. 
6.4.2 KEY FINDINGS FROM THE INFLUENCE OF OWNERSHIP 
Pharmacy Services in private hospitals in Australia were either Hospital Owned or 
Contracted Out to a third party. The majority of those surveyed were Contracted Out 
and this was consistent across all Australian states. Similar ownership models exist in 
USA with religious congregation owned hospitals owning their own pharmacies93 
and private companies such as Kaizer Permanente, a closed health maintenance 
organisation, owning or contracting services out.94    
Peterson et al in 1988 surveyed Australian private hospitals and identified that the 
vast majority of the hospitals were serviced by the community pharmacies and that 
services provided varied across the sector.125 Moles et al in 2004 in a survey of NSW 
private hospitals concluded that 92% were serviced by community pharmacies with 
90% of these pharmacies located outside the hospital grounds i.e. Off Site. 126 They 
too noted that the type and frequency of pharmacy services provided varied greatly in 
these hospitals with some providing clinical pharmacy duties weekly whilst others 
provided services daily. 126 
Medication Incidents in a Private Hospital: Frequency, type, causes and outcomes 
 
183 
Another ownership model exists in Australia called collocation. This is where a 
private hospital is constructed in the grounds of or near to a traditional public 
hospital or a privately operated public hospital. This is a growing trend in Australia, 
with 40 collocated hospitals reported to exist in 2000, with a range of collocation 
models in place in response to local needs.78 
In this study, Wyer stated that only one pharmacy service was located Off Site and 
the rest were all On Site. The ownership of the pharmacy providing services was 
either owned by the private hospital (e.g. Catholic Health) or by the public hospital 
or in a partnership with either an On Site or Off Site pharmacy and a sessional 
clinical pharmacist.78 This correlated closely with this projects findings where private 
hospitals collocated with a public hospital, were more likely to have a Hospital 
Owned pharmacy service whilst if not collocated it was more likely to be Contracted 
Out (p = 0.014). It is worth noting that the private denominational hospitals have 
operated as collocated hospitals much longer than the other private hospital models.78 
All hospitals reported medication incidents that formed part of the hospitals‘ incident 
reporting system and produced regular reports which were all independent of the 
ownership model. Allied to this, dispensing errors that arrive on wards were 
collected as pharmacy dispensing errors regardless of ownership model. But it was 
noted that hospitals that owned their own pharmacies were more likely (75% vs 
32%) to collect data on medication incidents electronically. This is most likely due to 
the fact that a hospital such as this would be more likely to have the funds to invest 
in this technology.  
Daily medication chart review was uniformly reported across both ownership models 
and this correlates with Wyer‘s findings of common services in private hospitals 
including inpatient dispensing, medication chart review, drug information, discharge 
medication counselling and written information to selected patients.78 In contrast, 
Moles et al more recently reported that although the range of pharmacy services 
provided to NSW private hospitals varied greatly they in particular noted that clinical 
pharmacy services were underdeveloped.127 They reported that approximately a third 
of pharmacy providers provided medication chart review or patient counselling 
services at their private hospitals127 but they did not examine the role of a pharmacist 
in medication incident reporting or management. Similarly, Petersons study from 
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1988, revealed that medication chart reviews were provided in approximately 49% of 
their sample of private hospitals.125  
The number of medication incidents reported is statistically significantly higher 
amongst hospitals that own their own pharmacy service compared to Contracted Out 
services (p = 0.011). This is an important to note as hospitals that own their own 
pharmacy are more likely to reinvest the income generated into improving their 
medication management process. This would be due to the pharmacy staff being 
involved in hospital committees, aware of hospital priorities, having access to 
hospital initiatives e.g. electronic recording of incidents, and particularly being more 
aware of the value of clinical pharmacists working in a multidisciplinary team. This 
is easier to understand when you note that there is a significant difference in 
pharmacy ownership models when compared with the location of pharmacy services, 
with On Site services tending to be Hospital Owned and Off Site services Contracted 
Out (p = 0.026). A similar experience is reported in the USA when the Sisters of 
Mercy Health Systems recently transformed their medication management process 
by procuring new technology and by actively training and placing clinical 
pharmacists from their hospital owned pharmacies onto their wards.93 The primary 
reason for this change by Mercy Health was the realisation that they needed to invest 
in patient safety and improve their clinical practices.93 
6.4.3 KEY FINDINGS FROM THE INFLUENCE OF CLINICAL PHARMACISTS 
The need for hospitals to employ clinical pharmacists to reduce medication related 
harm has been stated widely in the literature as medication safety grows in 
importance.4,43 This has grown from the Second National Report in 2002,4 to the 
Health Ministers assertion in 2004, that all inpatients in public hospitals should 
undergo a process of pharmaceutical review. This has led to the development of the 
WA Health Department Pharmaceutical Review Policy,48 which was the first state to 
action this undertaking. Allied to this the assigning of a financial value on the impact 
of clinical pharmacist interventions on wards has led to increased publicity for the 
value of clinical pharmacists.43,95 
This study demonstrates the uptake of these developments in the Australian private 
hospital sector and reflects the USA experiences highlighted by Mercy Health 
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Systems when they pursued active employment of greater numbers of clinical 
pharmacists on their wards i.e. a an increase of 0.5 FTE clinical pharmacist per 100 
beds to 2.3 FTE per 100 beds to good effect.93 
We know that all hospitals reported medication incidents, that were included in the 
hospitals incident reporting system and produced reports, independent of whether 
clinical pharmacists were employed or not. The initial review of medication incidents 
was performed by the nurse manager regardless of whether clinical pharmacists were 
employed or not, but where this task was performed by a pharmacist, clinical 
pharmacists were employed by that hospital, demonstrating their involvement in the 
process. It is worth noting, but not statistically significant that when hospitals 
employed clinical pharmacists they produced more frequent and comprehensive 
medication incident reports including type, contributing factors and severity of the 
incident. 
Pharmacy providers who employed clinical pharmacists were statistically more likely 
to be involved in the review of medication incidents (p = 0.02) and they influenced 
the process by providing advice on remedial actions. Three of those providers had an 
FTE assigned to the role of medication incident review; however, the majority 
assigned 0.5 FTE or less. 
Hospitals who employed clinical pharmacists were more likely to have clinical 
pharmacists collecting their own pharmacy intervention data (79% vs 33%; p = 
0.08). This was not statistically significant, but an important fact none the less. 
Both models collected data on dispensing errors that reached the wards but this was 
more common when clinical pharmacists were employed. Similarly ―near misses‖ 
occurring in the pharmacy were far more likely to be reported by pharmacy providers 
that employed clinical pharmacists compared to those who did not (p = 0.041) 
The American Society of Hospital Pharmacists endorsed in June 2003, that 
―deficiencies in the sharing of patient information are core contributing factors to the 
discontinuity of care, which is a logical precursor to medical errors‖.94 They stated 
that continuity of care was a vital requirement in the appropriate use of medications 
and that pharmacists should take responsibility for this and work to identify any gaps 
that would prevent the continuous management of medications. 
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These findings indicate clearly that clinical pharmacists, or a pharmacist in general, 
are a vital cog in the medication management cycle and their value has now been 
assigned a financial benefit. Clinical pharmacists‘ have a demonstrated and valued 
role in reducing medication misadventure. The quantum of medication incidents 
occurring or the level of medication misadventure has been shown to be inversely 
related to the number of clinical pharmacists employed to undertake pharmaceutical 
care on the wards. This fact strengthens the case further for their routine employment 
and their continued and ongoing involvement in medication safety. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
Many different models exist for pharmacy services attached to Australian private 
hospitals. The extent of those services was affected by the location of the service, the 
ownership of the service and the employment or not of clinical pharmacists. Services 
provided On Site were more likely to be Hospital Owned and in general provided 
wider support to the hospital to avoid medication misadventure. Off Site pharmacies 
which were generally Contacted Out services were faced with the challenge of 
addressing some of the gaps and shortfalls in their service. These gaps are possible to 
overcome given the developments in technology and telepharmacy in particular in 
the United States of America and their success in meeting patients‘ needs for 
pharmaceutical care. The drivers for clinical pharmacist employment to avoid 
medication error and harm are becoming so obvious now that services that employ 
few or no clinical pharmacists will be forced by administrators, clinical staff and 
patients alike to improve the range and quality of their clinical pharmacy services to 
ensure optimal patient safety and care. 
Other models such as public and private collocated services do exist and are growing 
in number in Australia. This model has demonstrated advantages based on the 
circumstances around their development but were not studied in any great detail in 
this study.  
Finally, pharmacists are medication experts and their use in whatever model of 
private hospital pharmacy service that is in existence, will reduce the harm associated 
with medications in those hospitals. 
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CHAPTER 7 DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICATION SAFETY 
AND IMPACT ON ST JOHN OF GOD HEALTH 
CARE  
7.1 BACKGROUND 
The origins of the concept of medication safety lie in the concept of patient safety. 
Patient safety was first brought to the public‘s attention in the Harvard Medical 
Study and later reproduced in the Quality in Australian Healthcare Study (QAHCS).9 
The QAHCS showed that preventable problems due to health care management were 
a major cost to the Australian healthcare system with medication errors accounting 
for up to 10.8% of adverse events in hospitalised patients. This equated to 1.8% of 
hospital admissions associated with an adverse drug event (adverse drug reaction and 
medication error) severe enough to cause disability, of which 43% were considered 
preventable. Extrapolating these results to all public and private hospital admissions 
in Australian in 1994/95 provided an estimation that 87,000 adverse drug events in 
that year were severe enough to cause disability with an estimated cost of $350 
million annually, 
While the information from this study (QAHCS) identified preventable problems 
existed, it did not provide information useful to practicing clinicians on the nature of 
the problems or on prevention methods. These studies led to a national interest in 
addressing these issues and finding solutions and resulted in the formation of the 
Australian Patient Safety Foundation and the Australian Medication Safety Working 
Group. An initial Workshop entitled ―Reducing Adverse Events in the Australian 
Health Care System‖ 13-14 March 1998 Adelaide96, brought together many of the 
future major contributors to the area of medication safety. The contributors spoke of 
the nature and extent of medication related adverse events and hospitalisations, along 
with the need for a classification system, a national policy, a focus on system 
problems and identified high risk medications. 
Subsequently some important reports were generated for the Australian Health 
Ministers, in particular the Second National Report on Patient Safety ‗Improving 
Medication Safety‘4 which focused on the work in medication safety primarily in the 
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public hospital sector and an increasing focus on identifying types of medication 
incidents and the risks associated with them. 
7.1.1 PRIVATE AND PUBLIC HOSPITALS IN AUSTRALIA: 
The development of a medication safety focus in private hospital practice took longer 
owing to the diverse nature of private hospital practice. Private hospitals catered for 
many different ownership models including, ‗For Profit‘ and ‗Not for Profit‘, with 
commercial interests and sensitivities in a competitive marketplace providing little 
common ground. This allied to varying sizes and specialties covered made consensus 
and common focus difficult. In addition, private hospitals had to contend with a lack 
of medical practitioner buy in as the majority are non-staff members and are in fact 
Visiting Medical Officers (VMOs) who desire autonomy. Private hospitals had a 
different focus and different set of challenges to overcome to accommodate changes 
in practice, even if there was good evidence. This was highlighted at the Private 
Health Industry Quality and Safety Committee (PHIQS) meeting in Sydney 17-18 
October 200217 along with the need to focus attention on this large component of the 
total health industry in Australia.85 In 1994-95 Libby Roughhead reported96 there 
were 3.4 million separations from public acute hospitals and a further 1.5 million 
private hospital separations. By 2004-5 and 2008-9, if we extrapolate the data 
available from the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 85 the number of 
separations increased significantly over these years and the contribution of the 
private sector continued to grow. In 2004/5 public hospital separations were 
approximately 4.06 million compared with 3.04 million private hospital separations. 
By 2008/9 this had grown by a further 16% with public hospital separations now 5.0 
million compared to 3.9 million private hospital separations.85 
7.1.2 ST JOHN OF GOD HOSPITAL SUBIACO DRUG AND THERAPEUTIC COMMITTEE 
The major medication safety supporting committee at SJOGHS, the largest hospital 
in the St John of God Health Care group, with approximately 300 beds in the early 
2000s, was the hospital‘s DTC. This committee with multidisciplinary representation 
including medical practitioners, nursing and pharmacy representatives was modelled 
on similar committees operating in the public hospital sector in Western Australia. 
The committees function was not purely medication safety but in 2000 it was the 
only formal committee that would address any medication safety issues including 
Medication Incidents in a Private Hospital: Frequency, type, causes and outcomes 
 
189 
review of medication policies, guidelines, charts and forms. The committee evaluated 
new medication treatment modalities and was a forum to present data gathered from 
drug utilisation surveys and medication incident reports. 
7.2 METHOD 
A review of the Annual Reports of SJOGHC and key medication safety supporting 
committees at the Subiaco campus was undertaken to gain an insight into the 
development of medication safety within the organisation over the period 2000-2010. 
Allied to this a summary of parallel medication safety developments occurring within  
Australia was conducted. 
7.3 RESULTS 
7.3.1 FINANCIAL YEAR 2000-2001 
7.3.1.1 SUBIACO DEVELOPMENTS:  
In 2000 a Medication Policy and Procedure Subcommittee of the DTC was already in 
operation, with the DCP as chairperson, to assist in the more timely development and 
review of medication policy and procedures, and reduce time of the parent DTC.  
Deidentified quarterly summary reports of accident and incident forms presented to 
pharmacy, continued to be provided to the DTC by the Chief Pharmacist. Concern 
was raised that no outcomes were measured or measurable. From early 1999 each 
medication incident was sent to the DCP for review. 
A new self-directed learning package on medication administration was under 
development by the DCP and the hospital‘s Learning and Development Department, 
with the aim of reducing the frequency of medication incidents. 
An Adverse Drug Reaction Monitoring System and policy was developed by the 
DCP and was ratified by the hospital‘s Medical Advisory Committee on the 20th 
March 2001. Then a Complementary Medicines policy was introduced for 
consideration (March 2001).  
Medication incident reports were considered low in number and concerns were 
expressed with regard to the low levels of reporting. Concerns were expressed 
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regarding the effect that a high usage level of agency nursing staff by the hospital 
may have, as they were often not aware of the hospitals policies and procedures.  
In February 2001, concerns arose with regard to any potential liability committee 
members reviewing medication incidents may have had under the Health Services 
(Quality Improvement) Act 1994.19 This was in particular a concern when incidents 
continued to recur and hence posed the question whether the Act indemnified them 
or not. A letter was sent to the Health Department of Western Australia to clarify 
whether the DTC was an approved Quality Improvement Committee. The DTC felt 
that reviewing incidents was important but it needed wider trend data other than 
quarterly reports of incidents received and also needed a measure of outcomes 
achieved. The DTC requested formalising the incident reporting process into a flow 
chart showing the reporting structure for medication incidents through the various 
committees; e.g. Pharmacy, Medication Policy and Procedure Sub Committee, 
Nursing Practice Council, Patient Care Committee and finally to the DTC. 
The DTC requested a review of the accident and incident form classifications with a 
view to standardisation to allow some analysis of trends as well as the creation of a 
computerised database to assist in strengthening the reporting loop between 
Committees and specific parties. It was noted it was difficult to get access to 
appropriate databases and reports. It was also noted that infrequent reviews were 
occurring as key committees met so infrequently. 
The ―Medication Quiz‖, developed by the DCP and Learning and Development was 
made compulsory for all nursing staff to undertake. 
The hospital proposed the formation of an Office of Safety and Quality of Care at 
Subiaco to promote better clinical care throughout the hospital but initially in 
Orthopaedic Surgery only. This proposal did not mention anything about a role in 
medication error prevention and management. 
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7.3.1.2 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
The Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care was established in 
January 2000. 
7.3.2 FINANCIAL YEAR 2001-2002 
7.3.2.1 SUBIACO DEVELOPMENTS  
From July 1 2001, the DCP developed and commenced reporting a summary of each 
incident with suggested recommendations to avoid the incident in the future. This 
―Summary Medication Incident‖ form (Appendix 2) was then attached to the 
Accident and Incident Report form (Appendix 1). This summary was then sent to the 
relevant Directors for comment and entered onto a new database managed by the 
Nursing Director. A monthly report was provided for review by the Medication 
Policy and Procedure Subcommittee and a report tabled from them at the Nursing 
Practice and Research Council for action by Nurse Mangers if required (Appendix  
3). The DTC then received a quarterly compilation report.  
An Admission Medication Policy, with added role for a clinical pharmacist in the 
process was ratified by the DTC. 
In April 2002, the Hospital Executive decided that the separate summary form of the 
incidents by pharmacy and other hospital staff was no longer required and that the 
Accident and Incident forms were to be signed as read only with comments if 
deemed relevant. 
The DCP requested the need to increase the number of medication incidents 
reviewed as it was felt a high degree of underreporting was occurring. Nurse 
Managers were urged to provide a summary on the Accident and Incident forms and 
pharmacy would add information only if necessary. It was proposed that the 
Accident and Incident form be redesigned and reduced to a 2 page format. 
Information from the accident and incident data began to be recorded in a new 
specific hospital Access™ database. 
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7.3.2.2 SJOG GROUP DEVELOPMENTS 
In early 2002, the National body, SJOGHC, the group responsible for all divisions or 
hospitals throughout Australia, commenced a review aimed at resolving the issue of r 
indemnity for committee members.97 
7.3.3 FINANCIAL YEAR 2002-2003 
7.3.3.1 SJOG GROUP DEVELOPMENTS 
In October 2002, SJOGHC set up a National Clinical Risk Management and Quality 
Committee with a view to developing an integrated system for patient safety and 
quality care.98 A National Clinical Risk Coordinator was appointed for each division 
with the Subiaco campus in the western division. The aims of the committee and the 
appointment included the following: 
 To develop a set of National Risk Classification Tools 
 Identify priority risk areas 
 Implement national standards to ensure consistency 
 Clarify accountability and responsibility 
 Implement a culture of audit and continuous improvement 
The aims of the National Risk Classification Tool were to establish a severity of risk 
involved and determine a course of action. If the risk was deemed critical or major, 
then a root cause analysis (RCA) would be required. To this end training in RCA was 
provided to all senior clinical staff at Subiaco including the DCP. 
Allied to this a decision was made to review the benefits of introducing an integrated 
electronic accident-incident management system to capture all patients‘ incidents.98 
7.3.3.2 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS: 
The PHIQS Committee was established in January 2001 to coordinate and lead 
quality and safety enhancement initiatives in the private health sector. PHIQS in 
collaboration with the Pharmaceutical Health and Rational Use of Medicines 
(PHARM) Committee convened a workshop in Sydney on 17-18 October 200217 to 
consider two key areas:  
 Continuum of quality use of medicines from hospital to home and 
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 Organisation structures, including medication advisory committee 
PHARM, a multidisciplinary committee, provides expert advice to the Minister for 
Health and Ageing on the National Strategy for Quality Use of Medicines (QUM). 
The aim of the workshop, which was attended by the DCP, was to highlight the 
issues, challenges and priorities to improve safety and quality of the use of medicines 
in the private health sector.17 
In July 2002, the ACSQH published the Second National Report on Patient Safety, 
entitled ―Improving Medication Safety‖4. This landmark report provided key 
information on why a focus on medication safety was essential, acknowledging the 
problems that occur with medicines and their causes. As well, this report commenced 
looking at what could be done or had already commenced to improve medication 
safety. The material quoted in this report dealt primarily with public hospital patients 
and its discussion at the PHIQS workshop was an attempt to broaden the scope to 
include private hospital patients as well. In this regard it was a defining moment and 
‗call to arms‘ for caregivers to improve medication safety for private hospital 
patients. 
7.3.4 FINANCIAL YEAR 2003-2004 
7.3.4.1 SJOG GROUP DEVELOPMENTS 
An organisational wide system for adverse incident reporting, meeting Australian 
Standards, was developed to provide a centralised clinical risk management function 
to collect common data, use common benchmarks and ensure a standardised accident 
and incident management approach.99 This system would collect all incidents from 
all areas including Infection Control, Facility/Security, Patient and Caregiver 
incidents. 
The National Medication Safety Breakthrough Collaborative (NMSBC) Wave 1 was 
commenced. The aim of the NMSBC was to improve patient safety and quality of 
care through medication safety projects funded by the Australian Council of Safety 
and Quality. St John of God Hospital Murdoch completed Wave 1 and Subiaco 
successfully applied for inclusion in the following round of Wave 2 projects.99 
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7.3.5 FINANCIAL YEAR 2004-2005 
7.3.5.1 SUBIACO DEVELOPMENTS 
In 2004-2005 the Preadmission Clinic (PAC) at SJOGHS was expanded to assist in 
catering with the increased throughput of patients. PAC services were conducted by 
registered nurses mainly via telephone interviews prior to patient‘s admission to 
hospital. Recognising this expanding role, the Pharmacy Department put forward a 
successful business case to provide a clinical pharmacy service to PAC high risk 
patients who would be identified using a referral criteria system. This new role 
involved an admission medication history interview and confirmation with each 
identified patient, within 24 hours of admission to hospital, to avoid omissions and to 
clarify any potential errors. The position and role were integrated into the Subiaco 
NMSBC Wave 2 project to provide it with an opportunity to promote the value of 
this medication safety initiative. 
Following a review of the available electronic systems, the public sector system, 
AIMS (Australian Incident Management System), was rejected in favour of 
Riskpro® and roll out and training began to allow recording of all incidents 
including medication incidents. 
The classification of error types was standardised by the St John of God National 
Quality and Risk Management Committee and introduced to all hospitals including 
Subiaco. This system classified error on the basis of the action i.e. prescribing, 
dispensing and administration errors with easily identifiable subcategories (Appendix 
8). 
With this ongoing review of the hospital‘s practices and commitment to medication 
safety, the hospital‘s risk prevention strategies evolved. This investment in time and 
resources sat well with the organisation given that one of the Core Values of 
SJOGHC was ―Excellence in Care‖. 
Opportunities to benchmark reportable key performance indicators (KPIs) with other 
peer group hospitals were then investigated. These included adverse drug reaction 
reporting numbers along with reported medication incidents. (Appendix 15). 
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7.3.5.2 SJOG GROUP DEVELOPMENTS 
A standardised organisational or group wide manual system for managing incidents 
(reportable sentinel events and complaints) was developed and implemented. An 
electronic system was also under development to record this information and 
improve the ability to provide data analysis and reporting.100 This new approach was 
expected to assist in identifying strategies to minimise risks and improve outcomes. 
SJOGHC continued to have a number of hospitals participating in the NMSBC. The 
Collaborative aimed to reduce the number of adverse medication events and the 
related number of medication related hospital admissions9 by improving systems and 
processes and targeting the management of high risk medications. 
7.3.5.3 NATIONAL MEDICATION SAFETY BREAKTHROUGH COLLABORATIVE (NMSBC) 
PROJECT WAVE 2 
SJOGHS was involved in the NMSBC Wave 2 medication safety projects that 
focused on the Continuum of Care aspects of patient care and reflected the Australian 
Pharmaceutical Advisory Committee (APAC) Guidelines 1998 and 2005. The aims 
of the Subiaco project were to reduce harm in the surgical patient population on 
admission and discharge as it was felt at that time they were not as well serviced as 
medical patients. All surgical patients on four or more medications on the 
participating surgical wards, (Orthopaedics, General Surgery, Neurosurgery) were 
recruited. A reconciliation was carried out prior to discharge to identify all current 
and obsolete medications; a medication green bag was developed to carry and secure 
all current medications; a Medprofs® medication list was provided to each patient 
along with counselling on their medications amd copies were faxed to their General 
Practitioner. Patients were encouraged to attend their doctor for a follow-up visit 
within two (2) weeks of discharge. The new role of a preadmission pharmacist was 
incorporated into the project to facilitate a true continuum of care focus at both  
admission and discharge from hospital as they were considered as high risk times by 
pharmacy. 
A multidisciplinary committee was formed to guide the project with representatives 
from consumers, general practitioner liaison medical officer, nursing, pharmacy, and 
safety and quality staff. Surveys were conducted to gain feedback from each group 
involved. 
Medication Incidents in a Private Hospital: Frequency, type, causes and outcomes 
 
196 
Many tools were provided by the NMSBC organising committee at their quarterly 
meetings. One such tool was the introduction of the ―NMSBC Harmometer‖ 
(Appendix 11) which was adapted by the NMSBC from the NCC-MERP National 
Coordinating Council Medication Error Reporting Prevention. (Appendix 12). This 
was considered an extremely valuable tool as it divided harm into a sliding scale of 
―Potential‖ and ―Actual‖ harm in a reproducible manner. Four categories were 
assigned to potential harm (A to D) while five categories were assigned to actual 
harm. It was suggested by the Subiaco committee that this harm measure should be 
included in all medication incident reports in the future. 
Subiaco demonstrated over the duration of the collaborative that it had a 70% 
reduction in patients experiencing medication related harm both potential and actual 
during the discharge process and increased from 5% to 77% the number of patients 
visiting their GP within 7-10 days of discharge. 
7.3.5.4 SUBIACO MEDICATION SAFETY WORKSHOP 2005 
Following the success of the NMSBC project in 2004/2005 and to ensure the 
sustainability of the achievements gained, the hospital undertook to support 
medication safety further. With collaboration between the Pharmacy Department, 
Office of Safety and Quality and the Division of Nursing, a workshop of interested 
parties was held in early 2005. From this three distinct Medication Safety Teams 
were formed to look at the following projects: 
 Ensure the sustainability of the NMSBC achievements including a minimum 
figure for the provision of medication reconciliation of at least 15% of all 
discharged patients. 
 Improve the legibility and timeliness of when medications charts were  written up 
or rewritten on expiry. 
 Develop a set of criteria and format to ensure appropriate timely pharmaceutical 
review of newly admitted patients to the wards. 
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7.3.6 FINANCIAL YEAR 2005-2006 
7.3.6.1 SUBIACO DEVELOPMENTS 
All medication incidents received in hard copy commenced were entered onto the 
hospitals new database, by staff of the new Office of Safety and Quality and then 
were sent to the DCP for review. The DCP still held the responsibility to ensure the 
incident data was complete and to suggest any actions required to avoid the incident 
in the future as well to recognise and notify if any trends were occurring. 
The medication safety teams successfully achieved their individual aims and many 
new initiatives were introduced to the hospital. The success of the projects 
culminated in the presentation of a paper in October 2006 to the national participants 
of the NMSBC in Sydney on our collaborative achievements to date. 
WA Health Department requested Hospital Chief Executive Officer, Dr Shane Kelly, 
to commence implementing at least some of the components of the National 
Inpatient Medication Chart (NIMC) (per the 2004 Australian Health Ministers 
endorsement of the ACSQHC Recommendation that a single standardised 
medication chart be used in all public hospitals by June 2006) 
7.3.62 GROUP DEVELOPMENTS 
St John of God Health Care moved in this year from implementing a clinical risk 
management strategy to consolidating its practice through a nationally consistent 
approach.101 This included the introduction and roll out of a web based electronic 
incident management system throughout the group, improving incident reporting, 
management, investigation and standardising of reports. This had the added value of 
improving efficiency by the removal of duplication of effort, as managers had the 
ability to view investigations and comments on line and allowed the more timely 
investigation of incidents. 101 
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7.3.7 FINANCIAL YEAR 2006-2007 
7.3.7.1 SUBIACO DEVELOPMENTS 
The Pharmacy Department commenced developing a new medication chart that 
would encompass the key changes included in the recently launched new NIMC102 as 
well as attempt to facilitate the requirement of private hospital practice and the use of 
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. This project would be the first time a private 
hospital in Western Australia attempted to incorporate this change in practice into 
their medication chart. 
In October 2006, it was decided at a meeting between pharmacy and the nursing 
division that due to the marked increase in the number of reported medication 
incidents and time involved, a review of each incident by the DCP was no longer 
feasible. It was decided that only those incidents with a ‗high or above‘ risk rating or 
a harm rating of ‗D or above‘ would routinely be sent to the DCP for investigation 
and review. This review would look at what caused the error, what if any 
contributing factors were involved and what remedial action should be taken. 
In November 2006 an audit was conducted of the medication chart in use at that time 
to establish some of the current limitations of that chart. In April 2007 another 
pharmacy audit demonstrated that the times of administration used in the hospital for 
the administration of medicine varied from ward to ward and from shift to shift. With 
the approval of the Director of Nursing, pharmacy standardised the times of 
administration to reflect those used in the NIMC.. 
7.3.7.2 GROUP DEVELOPMENTS 
During this year the Group focus was on moving towards measuring outcomes while 
consolidating practice in clinical risk management.103 Since the introduction of the 
electronic incident management system in the previous year, reports had been 
produced on incident types and incident severity to guide changes in practice. 
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7.3.8 FINANCIAL YEAR 2007-2008 
7.3.8.1 SUBIACO DEVELOPMENTS 
In February 2008, the DCP and the Pharmacy Department launched the new 
approved inpatient medication chart throughout the hospital, with educational tools 
to assist staff understand the rationale for change and assist in the changeover. The 
chart encompassed many of the elements of the new NIMC in use in the public sector 
nationally and was the subject of a poster presentation at the SHPA Federal  
Conference in 2008.104. 
7.3.8.2 GROUP DEVELOPMENTS 
In March 2008, the first meeting of the SJOGHC national ‗Medication Reference 
Group‘ (MRG) was held with representatives from all hospitals in Australia within 
the SJOGHC group.105 The Subiaco hospital was represented by the DCP. The aims 
of this MRG were to promote a Group wide focus to: 
 Manage medications in accordance with evidenced based best practice 
 Facilitate audit and review of medication errors and significant adverse events 
and to identify risk reduction strategies  
 Explore new technologies such as e-prescribing 
 Facilitate standardisation of clinical policies, procedures and forms to improve 
medication safety. 
7.3.9 FINANCIAL YEAR 2008-2009 
7.3.9.1 SUBIACO DEVELOPMENTS 
In September 2008, the DCP developed an electronic survey tool to survey all 
hospital caregivers including medical practitioners, nurses and pharmacists, to assess 
their attitude to the new recently introduced medication chart. This survey allowed 
scope for free text comments as well as a graded assessment of each section of the 
chart. This survey tool was considered very useful in seeking solutions for the 
Pharmacy Department when designing a better chart that was receptive to the needs 
of the end users. In June 2009, Pharmacy launched it‘s newer improved version of 
the inpatient medication chart following the identification of the deficiencies and 
shortcomings of the 2008 chart version. 
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In conjunction with this launch, Pharmacy also introduced a separate and new 
Medication Reconciliation form to assist the process of reconciliation at admission 
and at discharge.106 This initiative placed the hospital in the forefront of private 
hospitals as medication reconciliation was on the national and international 
medication safety agenda. A ward based Signature Identification Register was 
developed and circulated at the same time, to ensure the easy identification of 
signatures of all staff involved in medication management on a ward. This was a 
direct request of the WA Health Department Licensing Unit following an audit 
conducted in September 2008. 
7.3.9.2 GROUP DEVELOPMENTS 
The SJOGHC Group commissioned each hospital to undertake an omissions 
medication audit on up to 30% of all inpatients who had been on medication for the 
24 hours previous.107 The aim was to get some values around the actual extent of the 
problem, given the most common medication incident type reported each year are 
administration errors of omissions, at between 25-30% of all reports. 
The SJOGHC Group, including Subiaco, engaged in the National Institute for 
Clinical Studies and Private Hospital VTE Prevention Programme project, to develop 
a Venous Thromboembolism Risk Assessment Tool and screening process based on 
the current ANZ Guidelines. 
 
7.3.10 FINANCIAL YEAR 2009- 2010 
7.3.10.1 SUBIACO DEVELOPMENTS 
In August 2009, a multidisciplinary committee chaired by the DCP introduced the 
first private hospital version of the WAMSG new Anticoagulation Chart. This public 
sector state wide initiative was already in existence in the major tertiary public 
hospitals in the Perth metropolitan area. This chart combined the prescription and 
administration of a high risk class of medication,  on the same chart with evidence 
based guidelines to assist in a standardised management of anticoagulants. 
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The hospital was granted a full four year accreditation by the Australian Council 
Healthcare Standards (ACHS). The hospital has been accredited since the inception 
of ACHS in the mid-eighties. 
The Subiaco Medication Safety Committee, monthly multidisciplinary meetings 
began in September 2009, chaired by the Director of Safety and Quality and with two 
pharmacy representatives including the DCP as members. The aim of the committee 
was to review programs, strategies and incidents to reduce medication errors and 
raise awareness of medication safety in the hospital by concentrating on system 
changes and promoting cultural changes regarding behaviours that inhibit improving 
medication safety. The Committee reported to the Quality and Patient Care and Risk 
Management Committee and provided minutes to the DTC. 
7.3.10.2 GROUP DEVELOPMENTS 
A review of the medication error reports and classification types was conducted by 
the SJOGHC. This review was conducted between the hospital‘s Safety and Quality 
Department and the National Risk Manager. Pharmacy was not asked to comment on 
this review despite the ongoing review of all highlighted incidents!! So gaps still 
exist! 
7.4  DISCUSSION 
The following discussion focuses on the medication safety landscape and how that 
has changed over the same period as well as how that has influenced what has 
happened at SJOGHC and SJOGHS 
7.4.1 CURRENT STATUS OF MEDICATION SAFETY IN AUSTRALIA 
In 2005, a study demonstrated that despite 10 years having passed since the Quality 
in Australian Health Care Study,9 the risk from medication misadventure was still the 
same. This was despite the formation of the Australian Council for Safety and 
Quality in Health Care in 2000. A top down approach alone was not then enough to 
prevent harm from medicines and that a bottom up approach involving the health 
care worker was now deemed essential.109  
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7.4.1.1 AUSTRALIAN COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE 
In 2006 the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care 
(ACSQHC) was formed to replace the previous Council (ACSQH).102 The new 
Commission reported to the Health Ministers and had a remit across public and 
private health care sectors as well as acute and primary care. Amongst its committee 
structure a Private Hospital Sector Committee was established. The role of 
ACSQHC102 was to: 
 Coordinate and lead improvements in safety and quality in health care 
 Collect, analyse and disseminate information 
 Recommend national standards for quality improvement 
 Report on the status of safety and quality 
 Provide strategic advice to Health Ministers 
The ACSQHC has nine priority programmes of which Medication Safety is one. 
In April 2009 the National Medication Safety and Quality Scoping Study Report was 
endorsed, which included the establishment of a Medication Reference Group and 
the need to provide a national focus for medication safety and quality.110 The major 
identified areas were: 
 Medication accuracy at transitions in care/medication reconciliation. 
 Development of standardised initiatives e.g. NIMC. 
 Standards for user applied labels for medicines in hospitals.  
 Guidance on safe e-medication management systems. 
 To share information nationally via alerts and bulletins. 
Currently the ACSQHC is working on all of these areas and has been very 
productive. Two examples of the Commission‘s collaborative approach to solutions 
are medication reconciliation and standardised user applied labels on injectable 
medicines, fluids and lines. 
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7.4.1.1.1 MEDICATION RECONCILIATION 
As the lead technical agency for Australia, the ACSQHC announced in April 2010 
their collaboration with the WHO High 5s Medication Reconciliation Project.111 The 
ACSQHC has recruited and is managing hospital sites in Australia for this 
international study, including private hospitals such as the Epworth Hospital, a 
private hospital in Victoria.111 Tools such as a National Medication Management 
Plan and a ‗Match Up‘ medicines resource have been produced by the Commission 
to assist the communication deficits during the transition of care which lead to 
unintended changes to medication order.86,112 
7.4.1.1.2  USER –APPLIED LABELLING OF INJECTABLE MEDICINES FLUIDS AND LINES 
In August 2010, the ACSQHC produced a set of recommendations called ―User –
applied Labelling of Injectable Medicines, Fluids and Lines‖.86 This national 
initiative to promote safer use of injectable medicines, comprises a standard colour 
system to identify the target route of administration of the medication to be 
administered. This work, added to an initiative completed in Perth at the Royal Perth 
Hospital and SJOGHS, led to the establishment of an Australian Standard for 
labelling in 2002.113 
7.4.1.2 MEDICATION ERROR AND PREVENTION DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIA 
The Windows into Safety and Quality in Health Care 2008 Study stated that 
―medications are the most prevalent health therapy in Australia. In any two week 
period, around seven in ten Australians will have taken at least one medicine. For 
older Australians that increases to nine in ten‖.114 
A review of Australian studies in medication safety for this Study to update the 
available data from the Second National Patient Safety Report (2002)4, concluded 
that medication related admissions were approximately 2-3% accounting for 190,000 
admissions per year at a cost of $660 million with approximately 50% still 
preventable.80 The review further highlighted that up to 30% of admissions of 
patients greater than 75 years were medication related.80 This increased to 74% for 
oncology admissions and it was noted there was a five-fold increase in adverse drug 
reaction associated admissions over 1981 to 2002.80 This review shows no great 
improvement since the original work undertaken on medication related admissions in 
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the 1990s.9 A paper by Aronson115 in 2009 classified medication error into four 
different categories. They included 
 Knowledge based (Lack of knowledge) 
 Rules based (Bad or misapplied rules) 
 Action based (Slips such as wrong drug chosen) 
 Memory based (Lapses- forget to ask) 
A further study74 reviewed twenty nine errors and classified 21/29 as slips and lapses 
across prescribing, dispensing and administration errors, whilst eight were 
considered knowledge based prescribing errors. The major contributing factors 
determined were inadequate knowledge, communication problems and lack of 
familiarity with the patient. A review of administration errors commented that poor 
communication and environmental factors such as stress and high workload 
contributed to administration errors.116  
7.4.1.3 ELECTRONIC MEDICATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
Many hospitals in Australia have a computerised provider order entry system which 
accommodates ordering tests and reviewing results on line.117 The use of electronic 
medication management systems (eMMS) in hospitals has been advocated as an 
additional component to this.117 eMMS has been studied and has been advocated as a 
strategy to reduce medication errors, in particular prescribing errors and improve 
patient safety.117 Systems like this should replace paper medication charts; allow 
electronic prescribing, administration and clinical pharmacist review. The experience 
of an eMMS introduction to a mental health unit at St Vincent‘s Hospital, Sydney, 
using the Hatrix MedChart™ with  limited decision support, did reduce some 
prescribing errors related to incorrect documentation and did eliminate incomplete 
and unclear orders.118 Anecdotal evidence following a visit to the Royal Darwin 
Hospital in June 2010, another Hatrix site, suggested omission errors of 
administration were almost entirely eliminated due to the alarm warning system in 
use with this system. 
The advent of eMMS does impact on work flow and communication patterns for 
doctors‘ nurses and clinical pharmacists and considerable time and resources must be 
committed to ensure successful outcomes.117  
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7.4.2 CURRENT STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL MEDICATION SAFETY ACTIVITY 
Medication error prevention is not just an Australian priority. It has been a focus in 
many developed countries for some years. 
7.4.2.1 SALAMANCA DECLARATION 
The first meeting of the International Network of Safe Medication Practice Centres 
was held in Salamanca, Spain on November 17-19, 2006.119 This group evolved into 
the International Medication Safety Network (IMSN). The participants recognised 
that: 
 Medication errors were an important system based public health issue and part of 
the patient safety agenda 
 Harm from medications arose from adverse drug reactions and medication errors 
 Confidential, non-punitive independent medication error reporting and learning 
systems needed to be introduced 
 Healthcare workers and patients in all countries were facing similar adverse 
events arising from common underlying causes of error. 
 Collaboration between countries was essential to share learning 
 Patient‘s interest was the highest priority. 
Their objectives were centred on prevention of medication error by promoting the 
empowerment of the patient, open disclosure of adverse events by manufacturers, 
dissemination of information, development of medication safety policies and 
guidelines and appropriate education of caregivers. 
In 2005, Yu et al concluded that there was an urgent need for agreement on standard 
nomenclature to describe medication related incidents due to the multiplicity of 
definitions, terms and meanings in existence.120 This was seen as essential to enable 
meaningful analysis of medication incident data and for the development of 
prevention strategies.120 
7.4.2.2 WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION (WHO) 
In January 2004, the WHO passed a resolution to bring experts together to improve 
patient safety in all areas including use of medicines. In October 2004, WHO 
launched the World Alliance for Patient Safety with the slogan ―First do no harm‖.121 
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This was the first time that all agencies came together to advance the patient safety 
goal. In developed countries it was noted than 1 in 10 patients hospitalised were 
harmed, but in developing countries this was much higher.121 
7.4.2.2.1 WHO HIGH 5S PROJECT 
This worldwide collaboration commenced in 2006 and includes Australia, UK, 
Canada, USA and others to reduce the frequency of 5 problems in 5 countries in 5 
years.87 Two of the priority topics involve medications:  
1. Assuring medication accuracy at the transition of care (led by Canada)87 and 
2. Concentrated injectable medicines e.g. potassium, opioids etc. (led by UK)  
The ACSQHC has as mentioned earlier, recruited hospitals across both public and 
private to participate in the medication reconciliation project.86 
7.4.2.3 IMSN POSITION PAPER ON PHARMACOVIGILANCE AND MEDICATION ERROR 
In October 2009, the IMSN published a position paper that redefined medication 
safety as being a two sided coin with adverse drug reactions on one side and 
medication errors on the other.122 The paper stated that both should be reported in a 
non-punitive voluntary manner and that results be analysed and evaluated 
collaboratively to ensure that measures are in place to prevent their recurrence. An 
example of this in action is the sharing of information freely between the Institute for 
Safe Medication Practice (ISMP) (medication errors) and US Food and Drug 
Administration (adverse drug reactions). IMSN is a link with other major 
international medication safety jurisdictions and showcases their work including 
USA, Canada, UK, Australia, Spain, WHO.etc. Other areas of interest to IMSN are a 
Global Label Project to eliminate look alike, unclear and cluttered labelling led by 
the United Kingdom.122 
7.4.2.4 NATIONAL PATIENT SAFETY AGENCY (UK) 
The United Kingdom based National Patient Safety Agency provides Rapid 
Response Reports which are brief timely guidelines that alert the National Health 
System there to a problem or issue from the incidents reported to the National 
Reporting and Learning Service. In February 2010, a Rapid Response Report was 
published on ―reducing harm from omitted and delayed medications in hospital‖.24  
The core of this project is the need to achieve a reduction in interruptions to and a 
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streamlining of the medication administration process. It incorporates the 
identification of critical medications and development of guidelines with regard to 
actions to be taken if a medicine is delayed or omitted.24 
7.4.2.5 THE INSTITUTE OF SAFE MEDICATION PRACTICE (ISMP) 
The ISMP in Philadelphia, USA, is a non-profit organisation dedicated to medication 
error prevention and safe medication use.123 It has a worldwide reputation for 
providing timely and impartial medication safety information. ISMP collaborates 
with many agencies including the Food and Drug Administration and the American 
Hospital Association within the USA and others overseas. The ISMP places a major 
focus on communication and education on medication errors. To this end it produces 
‗medication safety alerts‘ which are reputed to be the best in the world.123 
The ISMP Canada branch exists to facilitate the collecting and analysing of 
medication incidents and developing recommendations to enhance patient safety.124 
(web address) The Institute sees itself as the leader in researching the causes of 
medication errors. Current areas of interest include the use of dangerous 
abbreviations in prescribing, medication reconciliation and a Bar-Coding project.124 
They have developed a Medication Safety Self-Assessment Tool which is used by an 
organisation to assess their own medication safety climate against set criteria and any 
risk they may be exposed to. This powerful tool has been adapted for use in Australia 
by the ACSQHC. 




The development of medication safety as a concept has made significant progress 
over the past decade both at a national and international level. The speed of access 
and the collaboration and sharing of ideas worldwide ensures that every effort is 
being taken to address medication related harm at all levels. The ACSQHC continues 
to lead and facilitate projects and provide a conduit to state based medication safety 
groups who directly influence health care workers in those states. 
SJOGHC has embraced the need for collaboration and sharing of ideas and as a 
major private health care provider in Catholic Health in Australia, is happy to lead in 
ensuring their private hospitals are aware of the methods to reduce harm to their 
patients. SJOGHS as the major flag ship for the Group, takes pride in taking the lead 
to trial and implement current medication safety projects to gain experience in 
providing a safer health care environment for patients by reducing the risk of harm 
from medications. 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION: LEARNING FROM THE 
PROJECT THEN AND NOW 
The undertaking and completion of this project mimics the evolution and growth of 
medication safety in a private health care setting. At the outset, following the 
publication in 2002 of the Second National Report on Patient Safety ―Improving 
Medication Safety‖4 it was apparent that there was a growing awareness of 
medication safety in public sector Australian hospitals. Given that private hospitals 
accounted for a third of all admitted patient episodes in Australia, this sizeable group 
could not be ignored. Later that year a first step was taken when the PHIQS 
workshop was convened17 with representatives from most private hospitals attending. 
Following this meeting it became obvious that medication safety practices at St John 
of God Hospital Subiaco and other private hospitals were not aligned very well with 
public sector hospitals and that a number of deficiencies existed requiring urgent 
attention.  
Medication incidents or adverse events in a hospital setting encompass adverse drug 
reactions and medication errors. Adverse drug reactions are either predictable side 
effects or idiosyncratic events that are unpredictable. On the other hand medication 
errors are generally a result of a system breakdown in the medication management 
cycle whether that be at the point of prescribing, dispensing or administration by 
different health professions. Collection of information on medication errors is 
common in most hospitals but their review and use is the key to learning from 
previous incidents. This study hoped to address some of those shortcomings. 
Medication incidents were reported and collated at SJOGHS in 2002 but did not 
make a discernable difference to practice and health care workers were not aware  of 
common issues or trends. A silo effect was apparent as data was collected and not 
shared in a common hospital system. The collection of this data by date of incident 
rather than date of review by the pharmacist, allowed the assessment of whether the 
day, time and location of the error had any relevance as to its cause. Standardisation 
of classifications used allowed comparative data to be prepared over time or bench 
marking to occur with other similar sized institutions. The use of a classification 
system based on the origin of the error in the medication management cycle i.e. 
prescribing by a medical practitioner, dispensing by a pharmacist, administration by 
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a nurse accommodated the different professional roles. Administration errors 
predominated which is not surprising given that the majority of medication incident 
reports were completed by nursing staff and this encapsulates their primary 
medication function. The most frequent administration error reported was an error of 
omission of a medication. Dispensing errors collected by nursing staff underreported 
the actual number of dispensing errors occurring in the hospital as the Pharmacy 
Department collected its own data on ―near misses‘, i.e. incidents that did not leave 
the department in addition to those that did. It was noted though that the dispensing 
incident classifications provided did not capture all types of dispensing errors so new 
dispensing classifications were created to better reflect the process of dispensing. 
Similarly clinical pharmacists collected pharmacist intervention data on changes to 
drug therapy they made and these were not reported centrally. These interventions 
reflected a better indication of the frequency of prescribing errors occurring in the 
hospital compared to the number of incidents reported by nursing staff. The 
provision of an integrated live electronic system for reporting all types of errors in a 
hospital is essential to achieve a true reflection of the risk faced and this system must 
be easily accessible and intuitive for all staff to use. 
Given that medication incidents were considered a breakdown in a system, the need 
to understand the reason why that occurred was seen as an integral part in developing 
a system change to prevent those incidents recurring. Systems can be affected by 
multiple factors which include organisational, work environment, team, individual, 
and task factors as well as patient characteristics. Assessing these contributing 
factors, allows one to build an image of what happened at the time of the incident. 
The collation of a set of contributing factors by group discussion with the relevant 
sections of the pharmacy department created a series of contributing factors for both 
medication incidents and dispensing errors. It was noted that some of the 
contributing factors were common to both types of errors as they dealt with human 
factors such as tiredness, inattentiveness, distractions etc. These factors could be 
attributed to any of the most frequent dispensing errors noted e.g. selection of 
medication error or a labelling error as well as nursing administration errors where 
doses are missed. Much can be learnt from the study of contributing factors to 
develop a safer medication climate regardless of what point in the medication 
management system is under review. 
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The clinical significance of a particular incident both to the patient and to an 
organisation can be more adequately assessed if a risk stratification and harm model 
is in place. Risk was assessed as a function of the consequences of a particular 
incident with the frequency or likelihood of the incident occurring or recurring. This 
provided a graded risk rating from Low to Extreme A and allowed a hierarchical 
notifications system to be implemented based on the incident‘s seriousness. Risk was 
primarily the organisation‘s risk and the effect it would have on the organisation. On 
the other hand a harm measure was predominantly a measure of harm to the patient. 
This classification system was divided into potential and actual harm. This is 
apparent when dispensing errors were assessed as clinically significant to the 
pharmacy department but from a hospital perspective were rated only to have a 
potential for harm. In contrast while the majority of administration errors by nursing 
staff had the potential for harm, some did cause actual harm. 
With the increasing research focus on medication errors and as our knowledge about 
them increases and evolves, so do the strategies available to reduce or minimise their 
incidence. At a local level, as  SJOGHS realised the need to improve their 
medication safety practices, the Pharmacy Department and the Hospital committed to 
embracing more fully practices more commonplace in public hospitals. These 
included having an active Drug and Therapeutics Committee, commencing a 
designated Medication Safety Committee in the hospital and the provision of 
evidence based and clear medication polices and guidelines. Other initiatives have 
been embraced such as the use of standardised medication charts incorporating the 
use of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and the National Inpatient Medication 
chart. In addition a strong focus has been placed on medication reconciliation at the 
transitions of care as a key component to reducing the potential for error. This has 
meant a realisation that an accurate confirmed medication history on admission and 
subsequent reconciliation with what the doctor has ordered on the medication chart is 
now an essential part of safe medication practice. Allied to this the education of the 
patient about their medications by providing oral and written information and the 
provision of details of medications changes are necessary to alert those heath care 
workers who care for the patient upon discharge. To facilitate this, the hospital has 
employed more clinical pharmacists to support patient service areas that are deemed 
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as high risk for medications. These include a Preadmission Clinic role and high risk 
areas such as Intensive Care, Oncology ward and day procedure areas. 
Finally, attempts to introduce an electronic medication management system with 
decision support (Hatrix MedChart™) on a trial basis have failed to date, owing to 
the high costs involved. Successful implementation of an iPharmacy™ computer 
system similar to that in use in the public hospitals has provided a uniform material 
management system and the ability to provide  uniform labels for all aseptically 
prepared products.  
The national survey of private hospital practices in medication safety highlighted 
some substantial variances in service levels provided. Three influences were studied 
in particular to assess their affect on medication management. These included the 
location of the pharmacy service, the ownership of the pharmacy service and whether 
clinical pharmacists were employed or not. It became apparent that it was significant 
that On Site pharmacies had a policy on medication safety, reported a higher mean 
number of medication incidents and were more involved in the review of medication 
incidents than Off Site pharmacy services. Hospital Owned pharmacies were 
significantly more likely to be On Site and that Off Site pharmacies were more likely 
to be Contracted Out services. Hospital Owned pharmacies were likely to employ 
almost three times more clinical pharmacists than Contracted Out pharmacy 
providers. Whilst it is easy to understand why Hospital Owned On Site pharmacies 
would have far greater involvement and motivation to engage in hospital approved 
medication safety initiatives, Contracted Out Off Site pharmacies could still provide 
innovative solutions to ensure service levels are delivered by greater use of 
technology e.g. telepharmacy. Pharmacy providers who employed clinical 
pharmacists were significantly more likely to be involved in the review of 
medication incidents and have been proven to aid in reducing medication errors. 
Medication safety has grown to become an international phenomenon. Two of the 
World Health Organisations top five priority areas to improve patient safety 
worldwide involve medication usage. They include assuring medication safety at the 
transition of care (between community and the hospital and back again) and a review 
of the use of concentrated injectable medicines such as potassium. The formation of 
the International Network of Safe Medication Practice Centres in 2006 centralised 
Medication Incidents in a Private Hospital: Frequency, type, causes and outcomes 
 
213 
efforts and objectives on an international level These included recognition that 
medication errors were an important system based public health issue, harm from 
medications arose from adverse drug reactions and medication errors, that patients in 
all countries were facing similar adverse events arising from common underlying 
factors and that collaboration was essential.  
In Australia the formation of an active Australian Commission on Safety and Quality 
in Health Care has provided leadership to all hospitals both private and public. This 
has included taking a lead in some international strategies e.g. medication 
reconciliation as part of the WHO High 5‘s project. At state level the formation of 
Medication Safety Groups has led to many medication safety initiatives being driven 
at a more local state level. In Western Australia, the WAMSG has developed and 
implemented a state wide Anticoagulation Chart with evidence based guidelines 
attached for use in tertiary public hospitals as well as SJOGHS. The willingness of 
some private hospitals groups to embrace fully the concept of medication safety 
becomes evident when SJOGHC established a national Medication Reference Group 
to lead all their hospitals along a common path and this has been complemented 
recently by the formation of a Medication Safety Committee at the Subiaco campus. 
Medication safety is now in a state of evolution which is responsive to sentinel 
events and national initiatives. It is now an accepted part of practice not only in this 
hospital where this study was based, but throughout the St John of God Health Care 
group who now see medication safety as a key focus, as organisations move towards 
risk minimisation to reduce harm to their patients, reduce any financial liability and 
provide safer environments for patients and staff. 
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CHAPTER 9 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The major recommendations from this study are summarised as follows: 
 Retain a ―No Blame‖ culture in the organisation 
 Promote the reporting of all medication incident types as a means for shared 
learning 
 Refine the Riskpro™ classification of dispensing errors to more suitably reflect 
the type of dispensing errors seen in practice. 
 Have a uniform way medication errors are documented regardless of the system 
used to collate them by using standardised nomenclature and descriptors. This 
would provide the opportunity for reports to be generated to allow comparison 
and benchmarking with other hospitals of a similar size to occur. This lead 
should be taken nationally by the ACSQHC.  
 It is vital to avoid the ―silo‖ effect of hospitals working in isolation of each other 
or private in isolation of public hospital practice 
 Adopt a standardised approach to recording medication errors to allow 
comparison between public and private hospital practice particularly between 
hospitals of a similar size. This development could potentially open the door to 
solutions to the problem, given a bigger pool of data and resources involved in 
their management and review. 
 Essential to have a risk stratification structure to assess the risk associated with 
an incident or incidence of the incident recurring and to have a priority system to 
alert hospital management quickly of the higher categories of risk. 
 Similarly the harm suffered by a patient as a result of an incident whether it be 
potential or actual harm should be investigated for each incident and a priority 
alert system be in place to alert hospital managers. 
 Appropriate clinical governance is assigned to the process of medication error 
review. This should include appropriate resources to collect and analyse the data, 
prepare reports on a regular basis and provide information to all relevant 
committees. 
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 Ensure clinical pharmacist involvement in the collection of medication errors 
along with medical and nursing staff. 
 Ensure that a review by a senior clinical pharmacist is carried out for all 
designated medication errors, e.g. those that cause ‗actual harm‘ or have a risk 
rating of ‗high or above‘. This could be extended to include all dispensing type 
errors and prescribing errors. 
 Have an energetic multidisciplinary Medication Safety Committee that will work 
to try and minimise the risk from medications across a hospital or organization. 
 Expect that the Pharmacy service provider regardless of the ownership or 
location model in place, is actively involved in assisting the organisation to 
reduce the risk from medication error. This would entail the employment of 
adequate numbers of clinical pharmacists per ward as per the accepted industry 
standards. 
 Need for professional bodies such as SHPA to research and develop staffing 
models per bed number per patient acuity specifically for private hospital 
pharmacy service practice. 
 Contracted pharmacy service contracts are written to better reflect medication 
safety initiatives and a commitment to resource it to agreed standards. 
 The Private Hospitals Association take more of a lead role to encourage new and 
novel ideas in private practice and provide forums for their presentation, 
dissemination and discussion. 
 Visiting Medical Officers when accredited to attend a particular private hospital, 
accept that they will embrace and become partners in all of the medication and 
patient safety initiatives undertaken by that hospital. 
 The Australian College of Health Care Standards use the medication safety 
criteria in their EQUIP surveys to ensure private hospitals meet a minimum 
safety net for medication safety. 
 That Health Insurance companies that promote and value medication safety are 
more readily aligned with a private hospital or group of hospitals. 
 That individual hospitals advertise and assure their patients that their hospital is 
striving to reduce the risk from medications and seeks their assistance and 
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partnership in attempting to reduce adverse outcomes and the subsequent 
financial cost to the community. 
 Electronic medication management systems with complete decision support need 
to be investigated. Despite the major investment in physical and human resources 
to educate, train and install a massive system change, the results of the outcomes 
achieved to date in the USA and now in Australia and New Zealand merit serious 
consideration. At the Royal Darwin Hospital, results have shown that almost all 
‗omission‘ errors and ‗given not signed‘ administration errors have been removed 
after the introduction of the Hatrix MedChart system following a site visit in 
2010. 
 Essential that the concept of pharmacovigilance is promoted in all hospitals as an 
active role made up of medication errors on one hand and adverse drug reactions 
on the other. 
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